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I. INTRODUCTION
! )NTRODUCTION TO THE )SSUE AND THE ,AW
Charitable gifts made to government entities and charitable organizations can
be either restricted or unrestricted. An unrestricted charitable gift is a contribution
of money or property that the donor makes without attaching any conditions
on its use by the recipient entity or organization. An entity or organization in
receipt of an unrestricted charitable gift is free to use that gift as it sees ﬁt in
accomplishing its general public or charitable mission.1 A restricted charitable
1

The typical unrestricted charitable gift is the $50 check written to a favorite charity at the
end of the calendar year or the $20 bill dropped in the church collection plate on Sunday, both of
which the donor intends will be used by the recipient organization as it sees ﬁt in accomplishing its
general charitable mission.
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gift, in contrast, is a contribution of money or property that the donor makes to
a government entity or charitable organization to be used for a speciﬁc charitable
purpose and often according to carefully negotiated terms. As explained in more
detail below, under state law a restricted charitable gift creates a charitable trust
or its functional equivalent, and the recipient entity is obligated to administer the
gift in accordance with the terms and purpose speciﬁed by the donor (such terms
and purpose are typically set forth in the donative instrument).2
Many conservation easements are conveyed to government entities or
charitable conservation organizations (referred to as “land trusts”) in whole or in
part as charitable gifts, and the primary issue addressed in this article is whether
such easements constitute restricted or unrestricted charitable gifts for state law
purposes. In (ICKS V $OWD3 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY (hereinafter, 4HE %ND OF

2
See, e.g., Robert A. Katz, ,ET #HARITABLE $IRECTORS $IRECT 7HY 4RUST ,AW 3HOULD .OT #URB
"OARD $ISCRETION OVER A #HARITABLE #ORPORATIONS -ISSION AND 5NRESTRICTED !SSETS, 80 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 689, 701–02 (2005) (“[T]he law imposes more restrictions on a charitable corporation’s use
of restricted gifts (i.e., gifts that expressly limit their use to speciﬁc purposes) than unrestricted gifts
(i.e., outright gifts with no express restrictions on their use). A restricted gift creates a charitable
trust or its functional equivalent, and the donee is obliged to honor these restrictions. . . . By
contrast, an unrestricted gift does not create a formal ‘trust’ within the meaning of trust law, and
the donee can use it for any charitable purpose set forth in its articles of incorporation.”); John K.
Eason, 4HE 2ESTRICTED 'IFT ,IFE #YCLE OR 7HAT #OMES !ROUND 'OES !ROUND 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 693,
698, 708–09 (2007) (explaining that restricted charitable gifts give rise to trust or trust-like duties,
in particular the duty to abide by the terms of the gift, and that “[c]ontemporary donor-charity
dealings at the negotiation/documentation stage of a contribution . . . more and more frequently
result in ‘some really hairy gift agreements’ . . . specify[ing] in detail the terms upon which the
donor’s gift is to be employed by the recipient organization”).
3
Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914, 2007 WY 74 (2007). (ICKS involved Johnson County, Wyoming’s
attempted termination of a perpetual conservation easement encumbering an approximately 1,043
acre ranch located in the County. The Lowham Limited Partnership had donated the conservation
easement as a charitable gift to the Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County (“the
Board of Commissioners”) in 1993 for the purpose of preserving and protecting the conservation
values of the ranch in perpetuity. Id. at 916. The easement, which prohibits subdivision and other
inconsistent uses of the ranch, was estimated to have reduced the ranch’s value by more than a million
dollars, and the Lowhams claimed a federal charitable income tax deduction based on that amount.
See Conservation Easements, www.shifting-ground.com/conservation_easements.html (last visited
Nov. 20, 2008). In 2002, at the request of the new owners of the ranch (“the Dowds”), who had
purchased the ranch subject to the perpetual easement, the Board of Commissioners executed a
deed transferring the easement to the Dowds, intending to thereby terminate the easement. (ICKS,
157 P.3d at 916–17. The Board of Commissioners did not obtain court approval of the transfer
and apparently did not request or receive compensation in exchange for the transfer. Id. at 917. A
resident of Johnson County (“Hicks”) ﬁled suit alleging, inter alia, that the conservation easement
was held in trust for the beneﬁt of the public, the Board of Commissioners could not terminate
the easement without receiving court approval in a cy pres proceeding, and the purpose of the
easement had not become impossible or impracticable as required under the cy pres doctrine to
terminate the easement. See, e.g., Mem. in Opp’n to Defs’. Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of
Pls’. Mot. for Summ. J. at 5–14, Hicks v. Dowd, No. 2003-0057 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2003).
On May 9, 2007, the Wyoming Supreme Court dismissed the case on the ground that Hicks
did not have standing to sue to enforce a charitable trust, but the Court invited the Wyoming
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0ERPETUITY), C. Timothy Lindstrom asserts that government entities and land trusts
have the right to modify and terminate the perpetual conservation easements they
hold “on their own” and as they “see ﬁt,” subject only to the agreement of the
owner of the encumbered land and the general constraints imposed by federal
tax law on the operations of charitable organizations.4 In other words, 4HE %ND OF
0ERPETUITY asserts that perpetual conservation easements donated to government
entities or land trusts are unrestricted charitable gifts, and, thus, that the holders
of such easements are not obligated under state law to administer the easements
in accordance with their stated terms or purposes.5
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY deﬁnes “improper” terminations or modiﬁcations of
conservation easements as “those terminations or modiﬁcations that confer a
net ﬁnancial beneﬁt on a private person or entity and/or fail to meaningfully
advance land conservation on the protected property or some other property in
Attorney General, as supervisor of charitable trusts in the state of Wyoming, “to reassess his
position” with regard to the case. (ICKS 157 P.3d at 921. In July of 2008, the Wyoming Attorney
General ﬁled a complaint in District Court requesting that the deed transferring the conservation
easement to the Dowds be cancelled and declared null and void. See Salzburg v. Dowd, Compl.
for Declaratory J. Charitable Trust, Mandamus Relief, Breach of Fiduciary Duties, Violation of
Constitutional Provisions 13 (July 8, 2008). In the complaint, the Attorney General alleges, inter
alia, that the Board of Commissioners (i) violated its ﬁduciary duty to assure the Ranch’s protection
and preservation, (ii) had a contractual and mandatory obligation to have a judicial determination
made of the impossibility of the continuation of the easement before terminating the easement, and
(iii) violated its ﬁduciary duty and Wyoming’s constitution by transferring the easement to the
Dowds for less than market value. Id. at 7–13.
4
C. Timothy Lindstrom, (ICKS V $OWD 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY?, 8 WYO. L. REV. 25, 62 (2008)
[hereinafter 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY] (asserting that holders have the right to terminate or modify
conservation easements “on their own”); id. at 67 (asserting that holders have the authority to modify
or terminate conservation easements as they “see ﬁt,” taking into account the constraints on such
decisions imposed by the common law of real property and federal tax law). Under the common
law of real property, the owner of an easement can unilaterally release the easement, in whole or in
part, and can agree with the owner of the burdened land to modify or terminate the easement. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 7.1, 7.3 (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY]. Accordingly, such law does not place any meaningful constraint on a holder’s decision to
modify or terminate a conservation easement. See also infra Part II.H (explaining that federal tax law
does not ensure that government entities and charitable organizations comply with their ﬁduciary
obligations under state law to administer charitable gifts in accordance with their stated terms and
purposes, and that state attorneys general and state courts, rather than the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”), are the proper enforcers of such state law ﬁduciary obligations).
5

Although 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY draws no distinction, the analysis in this article focuses on
conservation easements conveyed in whole or in part as charitable gifts to land trusts or state or
local government entities, as was the case with the conservation easement at issue in (ICKS. The
rules governing the administration of conservation easements conveyed to agencies of the federal
government are beyond the scope of this article, as are the rules governing the administration of
conservation easements purchased for their full value with general (unrestricted) funds, exacted
as part of development approval processes, or acquired in the context of mitigation. Cf. Part II.J.
(explaining that the fact that some conservation easements are not conveyed as charitable gifts is not
a justiﬁcation for permitting government or land trust holders to avoid their ﬁduciary obligations
with regard to those that are).
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the vicinity of the protected property.”6 Pursuant to this deﬁnition, the holder of
a conservation easement could properly agree with the owner of the encumbered
land to extinguish the easement, or amend it to permit the subdivision and
development of the land, provided the holder received appropriate compensation
(and therefore did not confer a net ﬁnancial beneﬁt on a private person or entity),
and used that compensation to “meaningfully advance land conservation on
. . . some other property in the vicinity.” In other words, the quoted deﬁnition
would permit governmental and nonproﬁt holders to liquidate conservation
easements in whole or in part to fund, for example, the purchase of different
easements encumbering other property in the vicinity, the purchase of fee title
to other property in the vicinity, or even increases in a holder’s operating budget
or stewardship endowment, all of which would arguably “meaningfully advance
land conservation . . . in the vicinity.” Moreover, if the only restrictions on the
administration of donated conservation easements were those alleged in 4HE %ND
OF 0ERPETUITY governmental and nonproﬁt holders of easements would actually
have far greater discretion. As with any unrestricted charitable gift, the holder of a
conservation easement could agree to sell, trade, release, extinguish, or otherwise
dispose of the easement, in whole or in part, and use the compensation received
in any manner consistent with its general public or charitable mission.7 In other
words, despite their detailed terms and purposes, conservation easements would be
fungible or liquid assets in the hands of their government and land trust holders.
The %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS implicit assertion that donated conservation easements
are unrestricted charitable gifts is not supportable. Conservation easements are
not donated to government entities and land trusts to be sold, traded, released,
extinguished, or otherwise used or disposed of, in whole or in part, by such entities
as they may see ﬁt from time to time in the accomplishment of their general public
or charitable missions. Rather, conservation easements are donated to government
entities and land trusts to be used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose—the protection
of the particular land encumbered by the easement for the conservation purposes
speciﬁed in the deed of conveyance, generally in perpetuity. The conservation
easement at issue in (ICKS V $OWD is a case in point, having been donated to
Johnson County, Wyoming, for the express purpose of preserving and protecting
the natural, agricultural, ecological, wildlife habitat, open space, scenic and
aesthetic features and values of the Meadowood Ranch in perpetuity.8

6

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, supra note 4, at 25, n. 1.

7

See supra notes 4 and 5 accompanying text. See also supra note 2.

8

Deed of Conservation Easement between the Lowham Limited Partnership, Grantor, and
the Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County, Wyoming, Grantee 2 (Dec. 29, 1993)
[hereinafter Lowham Easement]. The Board of Commissioners apparently later transferred the
Lowham Easement to the Scenic Preserve Trust, a charitable organization created by the Board of
Commissioners for the purpose of preserving and enhancing the scenic resources of Johnson County.
3EE (ICKS, 157 P.3d at 915–18. The Scenic Preserve Trust is governed by a Board of Trustees, the
members of which are the same as the members of the Board of Commissioners. Id. at 916.
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Because conservation easements are donated to government entities and land
trusts to be used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose, their donation should create a
charitable trust or its functional equivalent under state law, even though the deeds
of conveyance typically do not contain the words “trust” or “trustee,”9 and even
though many easement donors may not know that the intended relationship is
called a trust.10 As explained in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts:
An outright devise or donation to a . . . charitable institution,
expressly or impliedly to be used for its general purposes, is
charitable but does not create a trust . . . . A disposition to such
an institution for a speciﬁc purpose, however, such as to support
medical research, perhaps on a particular disease, or to establish
a scholarship fund in a certain ﬁeld of study, creates a charitable
trust of which the institution is the trustee . . . .11
In some jurisdictions courts refer to gifts made to government entities or
charitable organizations to be used for speciﬁc charitable purposes, not as charitable
trusts, but as implied trusts, quasi-trusts, restricted charitable gifts, or public trusts.
Regardless of how such gifts are characterized, however, the substantive rules
governing the administration of charitable trusts generally apply.12 Accordingly, as

9

See infra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining that no magical incantation is necessary
to create a charitable trust).
10

See infra notes 67–76 and accompanying text (explaining that all that is required to create a
trust is an intention to create a ﬁduciary relationship in which one person holds a property interest
subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use that interest for the beneﬁt of another, and that it
is immaterial whether or not the settlor knows that the intended relationship is called a trust). See
also infra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining that the status of a conservation easement as a
partial interest in real property does not prevent it from being held in trust).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a. (2003) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS]. These principles also generally apply to charitable gifts made to state and local government
entities. See, e.g., In re Estate of Heil v. Nevada, 259 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (devise
of residue of decedent’s estate to the state of Nevada to be used for the preservation of wild horses
created a charitable trust); Tinkham v. Town of Mattapoisett, 22 Mass. L. Rep. 635 (2007) (gift of
land to a town to be used for conservation purposes created a charitable trust); State v. Rand, 366
A.2d. 183 (Me. 1976) (gift of land to a city to be forever held and maintained as a public park
created a charitable trust); Lancaster v. City of Columbus, 333 F. Supp. 1012, 1024 (N.D. Miss.
1971) (“It is settled state law that lands taken and held by a municipality as a gift for a speciﬁc
purpose are subject to the law of trusts, and any use inconsistent with that intended by the dedicator
constitutes a breach of trust.”).
11

12
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS] (“Property may be devoted to charitable purposes not only by transferring
it to individual trustees to hold it for such purposes, but also by transferring it to a charitable
corporation. . . . Where property is given to a charitable corporation, particularly where restrictions
are imposed by the donor, it is sometimes said by the courts that a charitable trust is created and
that the corporation is a trustee. It is sometimes said, however, that a charitable trust is not created.
This is a mere matter of terminology. . . . Ordinarily the principles and rules applicable to charitable
trusts are applicable to charitable corporations . . . .”); id. Reporter’s Notes cmt. f (“Where restricted
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with other gifts conveyed to government entities or charitable organizations to be
used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose, the holder of a conservation easement should
not be permitted to use the easement for a purpose other than that for which it
was granted without receiving judicial approval in a cy pres proceeding. Thus, the
holder of a conservation easement should not be permitted to release, extinguish,
or otherwise terminate the easement (which would clearly be contrary to its stated
purpose), or amend the easement in manners contrary to its stated purpose (such
as to permit the subdivision and development of the land), without receiving
judicial approval in a cy pres proceeding. The holder could, however, agree to
amendments that are consistent with the purpose of the easement pursuant to the
holder’s express or implied power to agree to such amendments or, in the absence
of such powers, with judicial approval obtained in a more ﬂexible administrative
(or equitable) deviation proceeding.13
A variety of authoritative sources support the application of charitable trust
principles to conservation easements, including the Uniform Conservation

gifts are made to charitable corporations, the restrictions are enforceable at the suit of the Attorney
General.”); AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 348.1
(4th ed. 1989) (“Certainly many of the principles applicable to charitable trusts are applicable
to charitable corporations. In both cases the Attorney General can maintain a suit to prevent a
diversion of the property to purposes other than those for which it was given; and in both cases
the doctrine of cy pres is applicable.”). See also, e.g., Blumenthal v. White, 683 A.2d 410, 412–13
(Conn. 1996) (applying charitable trust principles to a gift of land to a city with instructions that
the land be used as a public park and explaining that, while the conveyance did not create a trust “in
strict sense, it may be so regarded,” and the city held the land as a “quasi-trustee”); Carl J. Herzog
Found. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 998 n. 2 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (explaining that
the law governing the enforcement of charitable gifts is derived from the law of charitable trusts
and “‘The theory underlying the power of the attorney general to enforce gifts for a stated purpose
is that a donor who attaches conditions to his gift has a right to have his intention enforced’”
(citing Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 417 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979))); 4INKHAM, 22
Mass. L. Rep. at 635 (applying charitable trust principles to a gift of land to a town to be used for
conservation purposes and describing the gift as having created both a public trust and a charitable
trust); Town of Cody v. Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n, 196 P.2d 369, 377 (Wyo. 1948) (applying
charitable trust principles to a gift of land to a charitable association to be used to memorialize the
memory of William F. “Buffalo Bill” Cody and explaining, “Grants made to a charitable corporation
may, of course, be of various kinds. They may be absolute or, on the other hand, proper terms,
conditions and directions may be annexed thereto. In the latter case, the terms, conditions and
directions annexed must be carried out”). For law review commentators, see, for example, Katz,
supra note 2; Eason, supra note 2. A few of the procedural rules applicable to trusts do not apply in
the case of charitable gifts made for speciﬁc purposes. See, e.g., SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra, § 348.1
(“The circumstances under which and the proceedings by which creditors can reach the property
are different . . . .”); Evelyn Brody, &ROM THE $EAD (AND TO THE ,IVING $EAD 4HE #ONUNDRUM OF
Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1209 (2007) (“[A] restricted gift . . . does not
impose on the corporate charity the trust law procedural requirements for providing information
to beneﬁciaries (although the charity would have to respond to a request for information from the
attorney general) and for judicial accounting.”).
13
See infra Part II.D. (explaining the legal principles governing the administration of charitable
trusts and how those principles should apply to conservation easements).
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Easement Act (adopted by Wyoming in 2005),14 the Uniform Trust Code (adopted
by Wyoming in 2003),15 the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes,16 and
federal tax law,17 all of which are discussed in more detail below.18 In addition,
state attorneys general in a growing number of states are recognizing both their
right and their obligation, as supervisors of charitable trusts, to protect the public
interest and investment in conservation easements.19

14

Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 3
cmt. (2007), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucea/2007_ﬁnal.htm (last visited Nov.
20, 2008) [hereinafter UCEA] (“[B]ecause conservation easements are conveyed to governmental
bodies and charitable organizations to be held and enforced for a speciﬁc public or charitable
purpose . . . the existing case and statute law of adopting states as it relates to the enforcement of
charitable trusts should apply to conservation easements.”). Wyoming’s version of the UCEA can be
found at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1-201 to -207 (2008).
15

Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Trust Code § 414 cmt. (2005),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uta/2005ﬁnal.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2008)
[hereinafter UTC] (explaining that the creation of a conservation easement will frequently create
a charitable trust and the organization to which the easement was conveyed will be deemed to
be acting as trustee of what will ostensibly appear to be a contractual or property arrangement).
Wyoming’s version of the UTC can be found at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-101 to -1103.
16
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 7.11 (providing that the substantial modiﬁcation
or termination of conservation easements held by government entities and charitable organizations
is governed, not by the real property law doctrine of changed conditions, but by a special set of rules
modeled on the charitable trust doctrine of cy pres).
17
See infra notes 302–306 and accompanying text (explaining that tax-deductible conservation
easements must be, inter alia, transferable by their holders only to other government entities or
charitable organizations that agree to continue to enforce the easements, and extinguishable by their
holders only in what essentially is a cy pres proceeding).

See also Nancy A. McLaughlin, #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS 0ERPETUITY AND "EYOND, 34 ECOLOGY
L. Q. 673 (2007) [hereinafter 0ERPETUITY AND "EYOND] (discussing the support for applying charitable
trust principles to conservation easements, including case activity on the issue to date).
18

19
See, e.g., supra note 3 (discussing the complaint ﬁled by the Wyoming Attorney General
seeking to enforce the conservation easement at issue in (ICKS on behalf of the public); infra notes
131–143 and accompanying text (describing a case in which the Maryland Attorney General sought
to enforce a perpetual conservation easement on behalf of the public on the ground that the gift
of the easement had created a charitable trust); Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, Order on State’s
Motion to Intervene (Cumberland Sup. Ct. Jan. 2, 2008) (granting the Maine Attorney General’s
motion to intervene in a case involving the enforcement of a conservation easement, which motion
was requested in part based on the attorney general’s right to enforce gifts made to charities); Nancy
A. McLaughlin !MENDING 0ERPETUAL #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS ! #ASE 3TUDY OF THE -YRTLE 'ROVE
Controversy, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1031, 1069–70 [hereinafter !MENDING 0ERPETUAL #ONSERVATION
%ASEMENTS] (noting that state attorneys general in a number of states, including Maryland, California,
Pennsylvania, Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts are beginning to recognize that they have the
right and the obligation to enforce conservation easements on behalf of the public, and quoting, for
example, Belinda J. Johns, Senior Assistant Attorney General in the California Attorney General’s
Ofﬁce, as stating “It is our position that conservation easements are donor-restricted charitable assets
and that modiﬁcation would be governed by the cy pres doctrine,” and Larry Barth, Senior Deputy
Attorney General for the State of Pennsylvania, as stating that “we regard [conservation easements]
as we would any other charitable trust . . . under Common Law and those of our statutes that give
the AG authority over charities and charitable trusts”). The New Hampshire Attorney General has
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" ,AND 4RUST 0RACTICES
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS assertion that government entities and land trusts
are free to amend or terminate the conservation easements they hold “on their
own” and as they may “see ﬁt” is also inconsistent with (i) the representations
the Land Trust Alliance and individual land trusts make to easement grantors,
funders, and the general public regarding the perpetual nature of conservation
easements, (ii) the guidelines promulgated by the Land Trust Alliance for the
responsible operation of land trusts, and (iii) the manner in which land trusts
generally account for the easements they acquire on their ﬁnancial books. The
Land Trust Alliance is a nonproﬁt umbrella organization that provides training
and education to, and develops policies and standards for, the over 1,700 local,
state, and regional land trusts operating in the United States.20

 2EPRESENTATIONS -ADE
The promise of permanent protection of the speciﬁc land encumbered by a
conservation easement has always been, and continues to be, a key selling point for
land trusts soliciting conservation easement donations. The Land Trust Alliance,
in conjunction with the Trust for Public Land, ﬁrst published the Conservation
Easement Handbook in 1988 (“the 1988 Handbook”).21 One purpose of the 1988
Handbook was to provide land trust and public agency personnel with detailed
guidance for operating successful conservation easement acquisition programs.22
The 1988 Handbook lists the ability to promise permanent protection of the
encumbered land as one of the “Four Key Selling Points” of a conservation easement

likewise taken the position that conservation easements are charitable trusts enforceable by the
Attorney General. Personal Communication between Terry Knowles, past President of the National
Association of State Charity Ofﬁcials and Assistant Director of the Charitable Trusts Unit of the
New Hampshire Attorney General’s Ofﬁce, and Nancy A. McLaughlin on September 5, 2008.
The New Hampshire Attorney General is working with land trusts in New Hampshire to develop
guidelines regarding Attorney General and court oversight of conservation easement modiﬁcations
and terminations. Id. The New Hampshire Attorney General has also participated in two minor
cases involving cy pres petitions ﬁled with the court to correct problems in conservation easement
deeds, and both cases were resolved “quickly and efﬁciently.” Id.
20
See Land Trust Alliance, www.lta.org/about-us (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). The charitable
mission of the Alliance is “[t]o save the places people love by strengthening land conservation across
America.” Land Trust Alliance, Who We Are, www.lta.org/about-us/who-we-are (last visited Nov.
20, 2008).

CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK: MANAGING LAND CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC
PRESERVATION EASEMENT PROGRAMS (Janet Diehl & Thomas S. Barrett eds., 1988) [hereinafter
1988 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK]. The Trust for Public Land is a national nonproﬁt land
conservation organization that “conserves land for people to enjoy as parks, community gardens,
historic sites, rural lands, and other natural places, ensuring livable communities for generations to
come.” The Trust For Public Land, www.tpl.org/tier2_sa.cfm?folder_id=170 (last visited Nov. 20,
2008).
21

22

1988 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK supra note 21, at xi.
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program.23 The 1988 Handbook also cautions that program administrators not
get so involved in describing the technicalities of conservation easements that
they “forget to emphasize the main reason why people grant them: to protect their
property forever.”24
In answer to the question “(OW ,ONG $OES AN %ASEMENT ,AST” the 1988
Handbook explains “[a]n easement can be written so that it lasts forever. This is
known as a perpetual easement,” and “[a]n easement runs with the land—that
is, the original owner and all subsequent owners are bound by the [easement’s]
restrictions . . . .”25 And in discussing an easement holder’s responsibilities, the
1988 Handbook provides “[t]he grantee organization or agency is responsible
for enforcing the restrictions that the easement document spells out.”26 These
representations were carried forward in only slightly modiﬁed form to the most
recent edition of the Conservation Easement Handbook, published in 2005 (“the
2005 Handbook”), which explains, in part, “[w]hen the easement holder accepts
an easement, it accepts responsibility for enforcing the restrictions set forth in the
easement document, typically in perpetuity.”27 The 2005 Handbook also opens
with the following statement by Rand Wentworth, President of the Land Trust
Alliance, “For many people who love their land, [a conservation easement] is the
best way to ensure that it will be preserved for all time.” 28
In a recently published brochure detailing its philosophy, the Land Trust
Alliance similarly deﬁnes a conservation easement as
a legal agreement between a landowner and a land trust (or
other eligible entity) that restricts future activities on the land
to protect its conservation values. When people donate a
conservation easement to a land trust, they give up some of the
rights associated with the land. For example, they might give up
23

Id. at 37.

24

Id. (emphasis added).

25

Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).

26

Id. More than 15,000 copies of the 1988 Handbook were sold and it served “as a critical
source of information that led to the drafting of thousands of conservation easements, protecting
millions of acres.” ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK ix (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK].
2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 22. In answer to the question
“(OW ,ONG $OES AN %ASEMENT ,AST” the 2005 Handbook similarly explains “[c]onservation easements
are usually intended to last forever—these are known as perpetual easements” and “[a] perpetual
easement runs with the land—that is, the original owner and all subsequent owners are bound by
its restrictions.” Id. at 21 (emphasis in original).
27

28
Id. at 7. The 2005 Handbook goes on to describe an easement donor who “expressed
sentiments about his land that are similar to those of other landowners across the country: ‘I placed
an easement on [my farm] because 52 years ago I found it to be a beautiful piece of property and
wanted it to remain so forever.’” Id.
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the right to build additional structures, while retaining the right
to live on the land and grow crops. &UTURE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY
WILL BE BOUND BY THE EASEMENTS TERMS 4HE LAND TRUST IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR MAKING SURE THE EASEMENTS TERMS ARE FOLLOWED IN PERPETUITY29
And in its 2007 Annual Report, under the heading “%NSURING THE 0ERMANENCE
of Conservation,” the Land Trust Alliance noted that its recently launched
conservation defense program will help land trusts “make sure that conserved
land stays protected forever.”30 The Report explains that this new program “will
give land trust staff, volunteers and board members the legal backup they need
to assure the public that we do have the resources, knowledge and capability to
defend conserved land forever.”31
Similar representations regarding the nature of a perpetual conservation
easement can be found in the solicitation materials of virtually every land trust
operating in this country. To provide just a few examples, in describing conservation
easements on its website, The Nature Conservancy32 explains:
Most easements “run with the land,” remaining with the
property even if it is sold or passed on to heirs, thus binding
in perpetuity the original owner and all subsequent owners to
the easement’s restrictions. The organization or agency that
holds the conservation easement is responsible for making sure
the easement’s terms are followed into the future. . . . Often
landowners have no intention of subdividing their properties for
development. But a conservation easement is still attractive to
them because it reaches beyond their own lifetimes to ensure
the conservation purposes are met forever. An easement binds
heirs and other future landowners to comply with the easement’s
terms. . . . It can give peace-of-mind to current landowners
worried about the future of a beloved property, whether forest or
ranch, stretch of river or family farm.33
29
PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAND TRUST ALLIANCE 4 (Land Trust Alliance), available at www.lta.org/
about-us/who-we-are/alliance-philosophy.pdf/view (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) (emphasis added).

LAND TRUST ALLIANCE 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 20, available at www.lta.org/about-us/who-weare/annual-report-2007.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008)
30

31

Id.

32

The Nature Conservancy is a land trust that operates on a national and international level
and its charitable mission is “to preserve the plants, animals and natural communities that represent
the diversity of life on Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive.” The Nature
Conservancy, How We Work, www.nature.org/aboutus/howwework/?src=t2 (last visited Nov. 20,
2008).
33
The Nature Conservancy, How We Work, Conservation Easements—All About Conservation
Easements, http://www.nature.org/aboutus/howwework/conservationmethods/privatelands/conser
vationeasements/about/allabout.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
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In explaining “Easement Basics” to prospective easement grantors, funders,
and other members of the public on its website, the Jackson Hole Land Trust34
(which has employed the author of 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY as its Director of
Protection and Staff Attorney since 200035), provides:
A conservation easement is a voluntary contract between a
landowner and a land trust, government agency, or another
qualiﬁed organization in which the owner places permanent
restrictions on the future uses of some or all of their [sic]
property to protect scenic, wildlife, or agricultural resources. . . .
4HE EASEMENT IS DONATED BY THE LANDOWNER TO THE LAND TRUST WHICH
then has the authority and obligation to enforce the terms of the
easement in perpetuity. The landowner still owns the property
and can use it, sell it, or leave it to heirs, but the restrictions of the
EASEMENT STAY WITH THE LAND FOREVER.36
And in deﬁning conservation easements on its website, the Teton Regional
Land Trust37 similarly provides:
A conservation easement is a voluntary agreement a willing
landowner makes to permanently restrict the type and amount
of development that may take place on his or her property in
the future. . . . The landowner continues to own the property;
he or she may sell it, live on it, use it, or leave it to heirs, but the
AGREED UPON RESTRICTIONS REMAIN WITH THE LAND FOREVER. The Land
34

The Jackson Hole Land Trust is a local land trust and its charitable mission is “to preserve
open space and the scenic, ranching and wildlife values of Jackson Hole by assisting landowners who
wish to protect their land in perpetuity.” Jackson Hole Land Trust, www.jhlandtrust.org (last visited
Nov. 20, 2008) (emphasis added).
35
See Jackson Hole Land Trust, Our Board & Staff, http://jhlandtrust.org/about/
ctimothylindstrom.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
36
Jackson Hole Land Trust, Easement Basics, http://jhlandtrust.org/protection/easement.
htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) (emphasis added). Jean Hocker, past President of the Land Trust
Alliance and a founder of the Jackson Hole Land Trust, similarly describes perpetual conservation
easements as follows:

Questions often arise regarding the concept of “perpetual.” The terms of an easement,
of course, stay in place even when the land is sold, no matter how many times it is
sold. An easement is attached to the deed, and the property’s subsequent buyers are
well aware of an easement’s terms and limitations.
Jean Hocker, ,AND 4RUSTS +EY %LEMENTS IN THE 3TRUGGLE !GAINST 3PRAWL, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T
244, 245 (2001).
37

The Teton Regional Land Trust is a regional land trust and its charitable mission is “to
conserve agricultural and natural lands and to encourage land stewardship in the Upper Snake River
Watershed for the beneﬁt of today’s communities and as a legacy for future generations.” Teton
Regional Land Trust, Mission & Values, www.tetonlandtrust.org/about_mission.htm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2008).
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Trust accepts the responsibility for the regulation of the easement
agreement. . . . While the tax beneﬁts are helpful, many people
HAVE FOUND THE GREATEST SATISFACTION IN WORKING WITH ,AND 4RUSTS IS
THE ASSURANCE THAT THE LAND THEY CHERISH WILL ALWAYS BE PROTECTED.38
These representations regarding the perpetual nature of conservation
easements are also often memorialized in the deeds of conveyance. For example,
the easement at issue in (ICKS V $OWD provides
The Grantee . . . intends, by acceptance of the grant made
hereby, forever to honor the intentions of the Grantor stated
herein to preserve and protect in perpetuity the natural elements
38

Teton Regional Land Trust, Easements Deﬁned, www.tetonlandtrust.org/easement_deﬁned.
htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) (emphasis added). Additional examples abound. For example, the
Montana Land Reliance (“MLR”), a well-respected state-wide land trust, explains on its website
A conservation easement is the legal glue that binds a property owner’s good
intentions to the land in perpetuity. . . . A conservation easement runs with the title
to the property regardless of changes in future ownership . . . .
MLR only takes conservation easements in perpetuity, which gives the donor
the comfort of knowing that their property will remain as they describe in the
conservation easement document.
Montana Land Reliance, An Introduction to Conservation Easements, www.mtlandreliance.org/
easment.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2008); Montana Land Reliance, FAQs, www.mtlandreliance.org/
faq.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
And in its “Landowner Information Series,” the Vermont Land Trust (“VLT”), another wellrespected state-wide land trust, explains
A donation of a conservation easement protects your land from development for
all future generations. The land continues to be privately owned but it carries with
it protective restrictions that limit some future uses. These protections are forever
upheld by the Vermont Land Trust through its stewardship staff . . . .
Conservation easements offer several advantages to landowners. . . . Easements are
permanent. Conservation easements remain in force even after the land changes
hands. Unlike deed restrictions, a conservation easement is forever upheld by VLT
as an interested party whose goal is to protect the easement . . . .
[U]nanticipated future uses that are inconsistent with the original owner’s
conservation goals are prohibited. This ensures that VLT has the ability to carry out
the original landowner’s intent in perpetuity.
Vermont Land Trust, VLT Landowner Information Series, Conservation Easement Donations,
available at www.vlt.org/Conservation_Easement_Donations.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). See
also 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 143 (in which Darby Bradley,
then President of the Vermont Land Trust, explains “[a]fter the deal is done, the ribbon cut, and the
celebration is over, the marathon begins. 7EVE PROMISED TO LOOK AFTER THE LAND FOREVER AND THAT PROMISE
outlives us”) (emphasis added). The perpetual nature of conservation easements is similarly described
in the popular press. See, e.g., Christopher West Davis, 0USHING THE 3PRAWL "ACK ,ANDOWNERS 4URN TO
Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at 14WC, p.1 (“[C]onservation easements allow landowners to
keep their raw land but donate its development rights to a neutral land trust that will keep it locked
up forever.”); C. Woodrow Irvin, ,AND 4RUST 4OUTS 3UCCESS IN 0RESERVING 6IRGINIA 0ROPERTIES WASH.
POST, Jan. 23, 2005, at T11 (“Conservation easements are agreements between landowners and
governments to limit development on the land in perpetuity, no matter who the owner is.”).
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and ecological and aesthetic values of the Ranch, and further
intends to enforce the terms of this instrument . . . .39
....
This Easement shall be a burden upon and shall run with
the Ranch in perpetuity and shall bind the Grantor [and] its
successors and assigns forever40
There is no mention in any of these representations of the donee’s reserved
right to later agree to amend or terminate the perpetual conservation easements it
holds “on its own” and as it may “see ﬁt.” Rather, the representations are directly
to the contrary. Accordingly, as with any other property donated to a government
entity or charitable organization to be used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose, a
landowner who donates a conservation easement quite reasonably expects that
the donee entity or organization will enforce the easement in accordance with its
stated purpose and carefully negotiated terms.
An excerpt from a posting on the Land Trust listserv eloquently illustrates the
perspective of many easement grantors:
I know donors (and am myself such a donor) whose purpose in
the donation is the ultimate protection of beloved land. If I were
to see a casual attitude toward amendments, I would be inclined
not to donate to the land trust in question or, perhaps, to any
land trust because the [conservation easement] or fee donation
would not achieve my purpose. For example, one restriction I
have used in my donations is that no living standing redwoods
may be cut. A future board could conclude that it could safely
log and sell every ﬁfth redwood tree because the board decides
the harm to my preserve would be relatively small and the dollar
value of the cut trees would be enormous and could be used to
preserve other land or to do other good work. I can see how
someone who was not passionate about my land could think
cutting “just a few” trees would be ok given the “greater good”
to be achieved.
I don’t care. I am the one making the donation and giving up
the more comfortable life the sale price could bring me, and I

39

Lowham Easement, supra note 8, at 2.

40

Id. at 9.
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get to decide. If the land trust can amend away the protections I
placed on my land, then I might as well sell the land and have a
more comfortable life.41
These same sentiments are reﬂected in surveys of easement donors, which
indicate that many landowners are willing to donate conservation easements in
large part because of a personal attachment to the particular land encumbered by
the easement and a desire to see that land permanently preserved.42 In an interview
with a New York Times reporter, Stephen J. Small, a Boston-based attorney who
specializes in conservation easement transactions and was a principal drafter of the
Treasury Regulations interpreting § 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code (which
authorizes a charitable income tax deduction for the donation of a conservation
easement), “summed it up: ‘Most people who donate conservation easements do
so for three reasons: they love their land; they love their land; they love their
land.’”43
Many in the land trust community are cognizant of the ﬁduciary duties land
trusts owe to easement donors. For example, in its recently published research
report on amendments to conservation easements (“the Amendment Report”),
the Land Trust Alliance cautions land trusts about the dangers of fraudulent

41
E-mail to Land Trust Listserv from Ann Taylor Schwing, Land Trust Accreditation
Commissioner, Past President of The Land Trust of Napa County, Trustee of the American Inns
of Court Foundation, and a principal drafter of the Land Trust Alliance’s recently published report
on conservation easement amendments (Nov. 13, 2006, 1:13pm MST) (on ﬁle with authors). For
similar sentiments expressed by the daughter of a deceased easement donor, see infra note 134 and
accompanying text.
42
See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, )NCREASING THE 4AX )NCENTIVES FOR #ONSERVATION %ASEMENT
$ONATIONS! 2ESPONSIBLE !PPROACH 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 45 (2004) [hereinafter Tax Incentives]
(“[T]he surveys indicate that for most easement donors, a strong personal attachment to and concern
about the long-term stewardship of their land is the primary factor motivating their donations,
while tax incentives generally play a subsidiary or supplemental role.”); Darby Bradley, President,
Vermont Land Trust, ,AND #ONSERVATION 4HE #ASE FOR 0ERPETUAL %ASEMENTS (Jan. 2003) (noting, with
regard to easements granted to the Vermont Land Trust, “[a]lthough the tax and ﬁnancial beneﬁts
were usually important considerations, the owner’s primary motivation for conserving the property
was to ensure that the land would be protected and cared for, even after their own ownership
ends”), available at www.vlt.org/perpetual_easements.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). See also Tax
Incentives, supra, at 45 (noting that the survey results “are not surprising given that the federal tax
incentives compensate the typical easement donor for only a modest percentage of the reduction
in the value of his or her land resulting from an easement donation. Any charitable donation that
requires a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial sacriﬁce must be motivated by factors other than, or in addition to,
the anticipated tax savings”).
43
Christopher West Davis, 0USHING THE 3PRAWL "ACK ,ANDOWNERS 4URN TO 4RUSTS N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2003, 14WC, p. 1. See also, e.g., Lorna Thackery, ,ANDOWNERS SEEK SECURITY !GREEMENTS USUALLY
ban surface mining, subdivisions, THE BILLINGS GAZETTE, Feb. 26, 2006 (“Preservation of muchloved landscapes ranks high among the motivating factors for increasingly popular conservation
easements.”).
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solicitation,44 and explains that land trusts are both legally and ethically bound
by the representations they make to donors.45 All land trusts would do well
to heed these warnings. In a 2003 case, -ADIGAN V 4ELEMARKETING !SSOCIATES,
the United States Supreme Court sided with the Attorney General of Illinois
in holding “States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or
misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations
will be used.”46 Although -ADIGAN involved solicitations for donations of money,
the same principles should apply to land trusts that make false or misleading
representations that deceive landowners about how their conservation easement
donations will be used (e.g., representing that “the restrictions of the easement
stay with the land forever” and the land trust has the “obligation to enforce the
terms of the easement in perpetuity,” when the land trust intends or believes it is
free to amend or terminate the easement on its own and as it may see ﬁt from time
to time).47

 ,EGAL AND %THICAL 'UIDELINES
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS assertion that government entities and land trusts are
free to amend or terminate the conservation easements they hold “on their own”
and as they may “see ﬁt” is also inconsistent with the Land Trust Alliance’s legal
and ethical guidelines for the responsible operation of land trusts (“the Standards
and Practices”),48 the Conservation Easement Handbook, and the Alliance’s
Amendment Report. The Standards and Practices, which must be adopted by all of
the Alliance’s member land trusts, provide, in relevant part, that “amendments [to

44
See !MENDING #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS %VOLVING 0RACTICES AND ,EGAL 0RINCIPLES, RESEARCH REPT.
(Land Trust Alliance, Wash. D.C.), Aug. 2007, at 30 [hereinafter, ,4! !MENDMENT 2EPORT] (noting
that “a land trust that publicly describes its conservation easements as perpetual while occasionally
granting amendments that diminish easement protections of conservation values risks running afoul
of fraudulent solicitation or other provisions”).
45
Id. at 33. (“Whether a donor gives money or an interest in land, representations by the land
trust upon soliciting funds and accepting gifts are binding, both legally and ethically.”).
46

Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, 538 U.S. 600, 624 (2003). See also 0RINCIPLES FOR 'OOD
'OVERNANCE AND %THICAL 0RACTICE ! 'UIDE FOR #HARITIES AND &OUNDATIONS 2EFERENCE %DITION (Panel on
the Nonproﬁt Sector), October 2007, at 28, available at http://www.nonproﬁtpanel.org/report/
principles/Principles_Reference.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2008) (“An organization’s communications
while it is soliciting contributions may also create a legally binding restriction that can be enforced
under state and federal fraudulent solicitation prohibitions.”).
47

See supra note 36 and accompanying text (quoting the representations made by the Jackson
Hole Land Trust to prospective easement grantors, funders, and the general public).
48

,AND 4RUST 3TANDARDS AND 0RACTICES (Land Trust Alliance, Wash. D.C.), revised 2004, available
at www.lta.org/learning/sp/lt-standards-practices07.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter
,4! 3TANDARDS AND 0RACTICES]. See also Land Trust Alliance, Land Trust Standards and Practices, www.
lta.org/learning/sp (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) (describing the Standards and Practices as “guidelines
for the responsible operation of a land trust, which is run legally, ethically and in the public interest
and conducts a sound program of land transactions and stewardship”).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss1/1

16

McLaughlin and Weeks: In Defense of Conservation Easements: A Response to the End of Pe

2009

IN DEFENSE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

17

conservation easements] are not routine, but can serve to strengthen an easement
or improve its enforceability” and “all amendments [must] result in either a
positive or not less than neutral conservation outcome . . . .”49 In commentary
explaining this practice, the Alliance warns that “[a] land trust that accepts and
holds conservation easements commits itself to their annual stewardship in
perpetuity, [and to] enforcement of their terms,”50 and “[s]tate laws governing
conservation easements, charitable trust law, contract law, nonproﬁt corporation
law and public trust law, and federal and state tax laws all might have something
to say about if and how amendments are permitted.”51
The Conservation Easement Handbook similarly recommends a conservative
approach to amendments. Both the 1988 and 2005 editions of the Handbook
provide that a conservation easement amendment should change the easement
for the better (i.e., strengthen the protective terms of the easement document), or
at least be neutral, and that an amendment must never result in net degradation
of the conservation values of the land the easement is designed to protect.52 The
2005 Handbook also warns that “[a]ll applicable state laws, charitable trust law,
contract laws, nonproﬁt corporation laws, public trust laws, and federal tax laws
must be followed when amendments are made.”53
In addition, the Land Trust Alliance’s recently published Amendment Report
provides, as two of its “seven deﬁnitive principles that should guide all easement
amendment decisions,”54 that any amendment should be “consistent with the
conservation purpose(s) and intent of the easement,”55 and “consistent with

49

,4! 3TANDARDS AND 0RACTICES, supra note 48, at 14 (Practice 11I. Amendments).
See also Land Trust Alliance, Adoption Requirements, www.lta.org/learning/sp/adoptionrequirements/?searchterm=None (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) (“The Land Trust Alliance requires
that all member land trusts adopt ,AND 4RUST 3TANDARDS AND 0RACTICES as the guiding principles for
their operations.”).
50

"ACKGROUND TO THE  REVISIONS OF ,AND 4RUST 3TANDARDS AND 0RACTICES (Land Trust Alliance,
Wash. D.C.), 2004, at 21.
51
#OMMENTARY ON ,AND 4RUST !LLIANCE 3TANDARDS AND 0RACTICES  3TANDARD  #ONSERVATION
%ASEMENT 3TEWARDSHIP 0RACTICE ) !MENDMENTS (Land Trust Alliance, Wash. D.C.), available from
the Land Trust Alliance and on ﬁle with authors [hereinafter #OMMENTARY ON 0RACTICE )].

1988 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 122; 2005 CONSERVATION
EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 184.
52

53

2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 188.

54

,4! !MENDMENT 2EPORT, supra note 44, at 7. The Amendment Report further provides, “[n]o
amendment policy should be more permissive than these Principles allow, but some land trusts may
choose to adopt more conservative amendment guidelines.” Id. at 17.
55
Id. at 32. This principle requires that a land trust “ensure that an amendment will not erode
the overarching purposes and intent of the original easement.” Id. at 33.
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the documented intent of the donor . . . and any direct funding source.”56 The
Amendment Report lists a litany of potential legal constraints on amendments,
including federal tax law, state and federal laws governing the administration of
restricted gifts and charitable trusts, and state laws on fraudulent solicitation and
misrepresentation to donors.57 And, although the purpose of the Amendment
Report is to provide guidance on easement amendments, and not easement
terminations, the report instructs that tax-deductible conservation easements can
be extinguished by the holder only through a judicial proceeding and upon a
ﬁnding that continued use of the encumbered land for conservation purposes has
become “impossible or impractical,” and to the extent an amendment amounts to
an extinguishment, the land trust must satisfy these requirements.58 Accordingly,
the aggressive approach to the amendment and termination of conservation
easements advocated in 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY is inconsistent not only with the
law governing restricted charitable gifts, but also with the land trust community’s
longstanding position with regard to amendments and terminations.

 !CCOUNTING 0RACTICES
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS assertion that government entities and land trusts
are free to amend or terminate the conservation easements they hold “on their
own” and as they may “see ﬁt” is also inconsistent with the manner in which
many land trusts account for the easements they acquire. Many land trusts record
the easements they acquire on their books as having a “zero value” because they
recognize that they are not free to sell, trade, release, extinguish, or otherwise
dispose of such easements in whole or in part (except for transfers made to a
government entity or land trust that agrees to continue to enforce the easement).59
Indeed, most land trusts view the conservation easements they acquire as net
liabilities due to the costs associated with monitoring and enforcing the easements
in perpetuity. As one commentator notes
the typical conservation easement . . . furnish[es] little or no
measurable beneﬁt to the donee. . . . [I]ndeed, most nonproﬁt
easement managers are all too aware that monitoring and
56

Id. at 32. This principle “protects the land trust against claims of fraudulent solicitation and
violation of the terms of the donation of the easement or funds to acquire the easement.” Id. at 33.
The Amendment Report warns “[l]and trusts become bound by obligations to easement donors,
grantors, and funders as part of the donation process.” Id. at 43.
57

Id. at 23.

58

Id. at 24 and n. 7 (explaining that “[s]igniﬁcant amendments may be viewed as partial
extinguishments”). See also infra notes 302–306 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements that must be met to qualify for a federal charitable income deduction upon the donation of
a conservation easement).
59
See, e.g., 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 67 (“Since a typical
conservation easement . . . has no measurable value to the holder, many nonproﬁts use the ‘zerovalue’ approach when recording the easement on their books.”).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss1/1

18

McLaughlin and Weeks: In Defense of Conservation Easements: A Response to the End of Pe

2009

IN DEFENSE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

19

enforcement of easement obligations create net balance sheet
liabilities. . . . From the donee’s perspective, then, the donated
silk purse is transformed, at the moment of conveyance, into a
sow’s ear destined for perpetual care.60
This zero value phenomenon is, of course, not particular to conservation easements.
Any property donated to a government entity or charitable organization to be used
be used for a speciﬁc public or charitable purpose (i.e., as a restricted charitable
gift) has a reduced or perhaps even zero value from the holder’s perspective because
it cannot be freely sold or exchanged.61
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY ultimately acknowledges that “there is likely to be
sufﬁcient legal basis” for applying charitable trust principles to conservation
easements conveyed as charitable gifts.62 The article nonetheless suggests that
courts create a special judicial exemption from the application of charitable trust
principles for this particular form of restricted charitable gift. The arguments
offered in support of this suggestion are, however, unconvincing and based on an
incorrect analysis of both the relevant facts and the relevant law. To set the record
straight, and to help ensure that the development of the law and policy in this area
is not inﬂuenced by an incorrect analysis of the facts or the law, Part II explains
the ﬂaws in each of 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS arguments. Part II also examines the
policies underlying the well-settled role of state attorneys general and the courts in
supervising the administration of restricted charitable gifts and charitable trusts,
and explains how such supervision can and should operate to protect the public
interest and investment in conservation easements. Part III takes a short detour
to discuss the problems with proposals to change state law to permit politicallyappointed state boards to authorize the substantial modiﬁcation or termination of
conservation easements. Part IV then provides a brief summary and conclusion.

60
William T. Hutton, %ASEMENTS AS 0UBLIC 3UPPORT 4HE h:ERO 6ALUEv !PPROACH, in 1988
CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 135–36.
61
For example, land donated to a government entity or charitable organization to be used as
a public park or nature preserve has a reduced value from the holder’s perspective because it cannot
be freely sold or exchanged and it must be maintained. This phenomenon is discussed in Nancy A.
McLaughlin, #ONDEMNING #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS 0ROTECTING THE 0UBLIC )NTEREST AND )NVESTMENT IN
Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1897, 1939–42 (2008) [hereinafter Condemning Conservation
%ASEMENTS]. The article explains that, when such land is condemned so that it can be put to a
different public use, the entity or organization holding the land on behalf of the public is generally
entitled to compensation based on the value of the land as if it were not subject to the use restriction
(i.e., based on its unrestricted value), but that such value lies dormant and inaccessible by the entity
or organization until the restriction is lifted in the context of a condemnation or cy pres proceeding.
The article also explains that the entity or organization must generally use the compensation to
accomplish similar charitable purposes in some other manner or location.
62

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, supra note 4, at 62. See also infra note 312 and accompanying text.
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II. ADDRESSING THE ARGUMENTS IN THE END OF PERPETUITY
A. Intention to Create a Charitable Trust
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY asserts that a “hurdle to ﬁnding that the conveyance
of a conservation easement creates a charitable trust is the requirement that for a
trust to exist there must be a clear intention on the part of the putative settlor to
create a trust.”63 The article cites to the Uniform Trust Code (sometimes referred
to hereinafter as the UTC), which provides that a trust is created only if “[t]he
settlor indicates an intention to create the trust.”64 The article then concludes
“[t]he notion that the conservation easement that they have negotiated with a
speciﬁc land trust constitutes a trust the beneﬁciaries of which are the general
public would be startling to many easement donors.”65 As discussed below, The
%ND OF 0ERPETUITYS analysis of this issue is inconsistent with the law governing the
creation of charitable trusts, the facts surrounding the creation of conservation
easements, and the speciﬁc language of conservation easement deeds. Landowners
who convey conservation easements to government entities and land trusts as
charitable gifts clearly manifest the intent needed to create a charitable trust or its
functional equivalent.
It is well-settled that no magical incantation, such as use of the word “trust”
or “trustee,” is required to create a trust.66 Indeed, the settlor need not even
understand precisely what a trust is. All that is required to create a trust is an
63
Id. at 60. Another “hurdle” to which 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY refers is the requirement that the
court determine that the donor had a general charitable intent. Id. at 59–60. Characterizing the
requirement of general charitable intent as a hurdle to the creation of a charitable trust is improper.
A charitable trust can be created whether the donor has a speciﬁc or a general charitable intent. See,
e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, 2ETHINKING THE 0ERPETUAL .ATURE OF #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS, 29 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 478–80 (2005) [hereinafter 2ETHINKING THE 0ERPETUAL .ATURE OF #ONSERVATION
%ASEMENTS] (explaining that the donor of a restricted charitable gift or charitable trust can have
either a speciﬁc or a general charitable intent, and that such intent is relevant only when applying
the doctrine of cy pres and only in some jurisdictions). See also infra Part II.D.1.c.(2) (discussing the
doctrine of cy pres).

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, supra note 4, at 61 (citing UTC § 402(a)(2) and WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-10-403(a)(2) (2007)). The UTC was approved by NCCUSL in 2000 and has since been adopted
in twenty-one states, including Wyoming. See Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws,
Uniform Trust Code, www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utc2000.asp
(last visited Nov. 20, 2008) (listing the following as having adopted the UTC: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
Wyoming, and the District of Columbia).
64

65

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 61.

Tinkham v. Town of Mattapoisett, 22 Mass. L. Rep. 635 (2007). See also SCOTT & FRATCHER,
supra note 12, § 351 (“The settlor need not . . . use any particular language in showing his intention
to create a charitable trust; he need not use the word ‘trust’ or ‘trustee.’”); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 498 (7th ed. 2005) (“No particular form of words is necessary to create
a trust. The words trust or trustee need not be used.”) (emphasis in original).
66
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intention to create a ﬁduciary relationship in which one person holds a property
interest subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use that interest for the
beneﬁt of another.67 As explained in a leading treatise on trust law
an express trust may arise even though the parties in their own
minds did not intend to create a trust. . . . An express trust may
be created even though the parties do not call it a trust, and even
though they do not understand precisely what a trust is; it is
sufﬁcient if what they appear to have in mind is in its essentials
what the courts mean when they speak of a trust.68
....
. . . The question in each case is whether the settlor manifested
an intention to create the kind of relationship that to lawyers is
known as a trust, that is to say, whether the settlor manifested
an intention to impose upon himself or upon a transferee of
the property equitable duties to deal with the property for the
beneﬁt of another person.69
In explaining § 402(a)(2) of the Uniform Trust Code, which provides that a
trust is created only if “the settlor indicates an intention to create the trust,” the
drafters of the UTC refer to § 23 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959)
and § 13 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved
1996), both of which incorporate the foregoing well-settled understanding of the
intent needed to create a trust.70
Section 23 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides “[a] trust is created
only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a trust,”71 and the

GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (West 2007); see also
Scotti’s Drive In Restaurants, Inc. v. Mile High-Dart In Corp., 526 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Wyo. 1974).
67

68

SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 2.8.

69

Id. § 24. See also, e.g., King v. Richardson, 136 F.2d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1943) (“We attach no
importance to the fact that technical language creating a trust was not used. . . . Technical language
is not required. A trust arises when property is given to one with the direction that it be used and
applied for the beneﬁt of another.”); Chattowah Open Land Trust v. Jones, 636 S.E.2d 523, 524–26
(Ga. 2006) (holding that the devise of decedent’s home and surrounding acreage to a land trust for
the purpose of maintaining the property in perpetuity exclusively for conservation purposes within
the meaning of Internal Revenue Code § 170(h) “unambiguously created a charitable trust” and the
decedent’s failure to use the terms “trust” and “trustee” did not alter the outcome because the strict
use of those terms is not required to establish a trust); Lux v. Lux, 288 A.2d 701, 704 (R.I. 1972)
(“It is an elementary proposition of law that a trust is created when legal title to property is held by
one person for the beneﬁt of another.”).
70

See UTC, supra note 15, § 402 cmt.

71

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 23.
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comments to that section explain “[i]t is immaterial whether or not the settlor
knows that the intended relationship is called a trust, and whether or not he
knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust.”72
With regard to the intention needed to create a charitable trust in particular,
§ 351 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides that the rule is the same as
that applicable to private trusts in § 2373 and adds “No particular form of words
or conduct is necessary for the manifestation of intention to create a charitable
trust. . . . A charitable trust may be created although the settlor does not use the
word ‘trust’ or ‘trustee.’”74
Section 13 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (Tentative Draft No. 1,
approved 1996) similarly provides “[a] trust is created only if the settlor properly
manifests an intention to create a trust relationship,”75 and the comments to
that section explain “[i]t is immaterial whether or not the settlor knows that the
intended relationship is called a trust, and whether or not the settlor knows the
precise characteristics of a trust relationship.”76 Moreover, the comments to § 28
of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (2003) provide speciﬁc guidance on the type
of conveyance that creates a charitable trust. As noted in the Introduction, the
Restatement explains that, while an outright devise or donation to a charitable
institution to be used for its general purposes is charitable but does not create a
trust, a disposition to such an institution for a speciﬁc charitable purpose, such as
to support medical research on a particular disease or establish a scholarship fund
in a certain ﬁeld of study, creates a charitable trust of which the institution is the
trustee.77
Moreover, the drafters of the Uniform Trust Code speciﬁcally contemplated
that the conveyance of a conservation easement “will frequently create a
charitable trust.” The UTC and Wyoming’s version of the UTC both provide
that the section of the UTC that allows for the modiﬁcation or termination
of certain uneconomic trusts “does not apply to an easement for conservation
or preservation”—thereby implying that other UTC sections do apply to such
easements in appropriate circumstances.78 In their commentary, the UTC drafters
conﬁrm this interpretation, explaining:
72

Id. § 23 cmt. a.

73

Id. § 351 cmt. a.

74

Id. § 351 cmt. b.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13 (Tentative Draft No. 1, April 5, 1996). This same
language is included in the ﬁnal version of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS, supra note 11, § 13.
75

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1 1996). This same
language is included in the ﬁnal version of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS, supra note 11, § 13 cmt. a.
76

77

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 11, § 28 cmt. a.

78

See UTC, supra note 15, § 414(d); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-415(c) (2008).
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Even though not accompanied by the usual trappings of a
trust, the creation and transfer of an easement for conservation
or preservation will frequently create a charitable trust. The
organization to whom the easement was conveyed will be deemed
to be acting as trustee of what will ostensibly appear to be a
contractual or property arrangement. Because of the ﬁduciary
obligation imposed, the termination or substantial modiﬁcation
of the easement by the “trustee” could constitute a breach of
trust.79
As with the comments to any Uniform Act, these comments to the UTC should
be relied upon as a guide in interpreting the act so as to achieve uniformity among
the states that enact it.80
Accordingly, the question of whether the conveyance of a conservation
easement creates a charitable trust does not turn on the presence or absence of the
word “trust” or “trustee” in the deed of conveyance (most conservation easement
deeds do not contain those words). Also irrelevant is the fact that the easement
donor may not have known that the intended relationship is called a trust. All that
is required is what is present in any charitable donation of a perpetual conservation
easement: the donation of property (the easement) to a government entity or
charitable organization to be used, not for that entity’s or organization’s general

UTC, supra note 15, § 414 cmt. By providing that the conveyance of a conservation easement
will “frequently” create a charitable trust, the drafters of the UTC were leaving open the question
of whether perpetual conservation easements not acquired as charitable gifts (i.e., those purchased
with general (unrestricted) funds, exacted as part of development approval processes, or acquired
in the context of mitigation) should be governed by similar equitable principles. E-mail to Nancy
A. McLaughlin from K. King Burnett, member and past president of NCCUSL (Aug. 17, 2008,
10:51am MST) (on ﬁle with authors). For a brief discussion of conservation easements acquired in
such nondonative contexts, see infra Part II.J.
79

80

See UTC, supra note 15, § 1101 (“In applying and construing this Uniform Act, consideration
must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among
States that enact it.”). As explained by the Connecticut Supreme Court:
Only if the intent of the drafters of a uniform act becomes the intent of the legislature
in adopting it can uniformity be achieved. . . . Otherwise, there would be as many
variations of a uniform act as there are legislatures that adopt it. Such a situation
would completely thwart the purpose of uniform laws.
Yale University v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Conn. 1993). See also UTC, supra note 15,
§ 106 cmt. (explaining that the statutory text of the UTC is supplemented by the Comments thereto,
“which, like the Comments to any Uniform Act, may be relied on as a guide for interpretation”).
Wyoming’s version of the UTC is similarly intended to be applied and construed so as to make the
law uniform among that states that adopt it. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-1101 (2007) (“In applying
and construing this act, consideration shall be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law
with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.”); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-103(a)
(vii) (2008) (“Any uniform act shall be interpreted and construed to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it.”).
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purposes, but for a speciﬁc charitable purpose—the protection of the particular
land encumbered by the easement for the conservation purposes speciﬁed in the
deed of conveyance in perpetuity. As explained in the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts, the Uniform Trust Code, and the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
(discussed in Part II.B below), this type of conveyance creates a charitable trust
of which the holder of the easement should be deemed to be acting as trustee.
And even in those jurisdictions where such gifts are not technically referred to
as charitable trusts, the substantive principles governing the administration of
charitable trusts, including the doctrine of cy pres, should nonetheless apply.81
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS assertion that conservation easement donors would be
“startled” to learn that their easements are effectively held in trust for the beneﬁt
of the public is also unsupportable. First, it can be assumed that landowners
donating conservation easements to government entities or land trusts in exchange
for sizable federal and state charitable income tax deductions understand that
they are making charitable gifts intended to beneﬁt the public. Most conservation
easement deeds expressly state that the conveyance of the easement is intended
to beneﬁt the public,82 and it can be assumed that easement donors understand
that the generous tax beneﬁts they receive are in exchange for the beneﬁts their
easements are intended to provide to the public. In fact, in a later section of the
article, 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY acknowledges “Clearly, the grantor of [a conservation
easement] intends that the [easement] be used . . . for the beneﬁt of the public (if
any intent to gain tax beneﬁts is part of the donor’s motivation).”83

81

See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining that, regardless of how gifts made
to government entities or charitable organizations to be used for speciﬁc charitable purposes are
characterized—as charitable trusts, implied trusts, quasi-trusts, restricted charitable gifts, or public
trusts—the substantive rules governing the administration of charitable trusts generally apply). The
analysis in this section is not limited to, or dependent upon, a conservation easement being granted
in perpetuity. A landowner who makes a charitable gift of a conservation easement to a government
entity or land trust for the purpose of protecting the particular land encumbered by the easement
for a speciﬁed term, such as thirty years, should also be viewed as having created a charitable trust or
the functional equivalent thereof. In such case, there similarly would be a donation of property (the
term easement) to a government entity or charitable organization to be used, not for that entity’s or
organization’s general purposes, but for a speciﬁc charitable purpose. Accordingly, in such case the
holder should be deemed to be acting as trustee of the easement for the speciﬁed term, and should
be required to administer and enforce the easement in accordance with its stated terms and purpose
for the duration of the term.
82

For example, the conservation easement involved in (ICKS provides:
The Ranch contains substantial ranching, agricultural, natural, wildlife, wildlife
habitat, ecological, scenic, aesthetics, and recreational values . . . of great importance
to the residents, guests, ranch guests, and visitors of Johnson County, and the people
of Wyoming, and its protection will yield a signiﬁcant public beneﬁt.

Lowham Easement, supra note 8, at 1.
83

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 73–74. Even absent the receipt of tax beneﬁts it can
be assumed that a landowner who donates a conservation easement to a charitable organization or
government entity understands that the easement will be held and enforced for the beneﬁt of the
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It can also be assumed that a landowner who donates a conservation easement
for the express purpose of protecting a particular parcel of land from development
and other environmentally harmful uses believes that the donee will administer
the easement in accordance with its stated purpose and other carefully negotiated
terms.84 This belief is reinforced by the representations made to easement grantors
regarding the nature of a perpetual conservation easement (e.g., “the restrictions
of the easement stay with the land forever,” “the land trust has the obligation to
enforce the terms of the easement in perpetuity,” and a conservation easement
assures that cherished land “will always be protected”).85 Even 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY
acknowledges “Clearly, the grantor of [a conservation easement] intends that the
[easement] be used in a certain way (i.e., according to the typically elaborate
provisions of the easement document) . . . .”86 Accordingly, what would be startling
to conservation easement donors is not that the donee government entity or land
trust effectively holds the easements it acquires in trust for the beneﬁt of the
public and, thus, may agree to terminate such easements only with court approval
obtained in a cy pres proceeding—as is contemplated by federal tax law 87 and set
forth in many conservation easement deeds in any event.88 Rather, what would be

public. See, e.g., Town of Cody v. Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n, 196 P.2d 369, 377 (Wyo. 1948)
(noting that “the very nature of a charitable corporation indicates that its property is intended to be
administered for the beneﬁt of others than the corporation itself. It is of its essence to do so for the
beneﬁt of the public or a part thereof ”). The same can be said of government entities, which exist
to serve the public. It can also be assumed that a landowner who sells a conservation easement to
a government entity or charitable organization understands that the easement is being purchased
with public or charitable funds by such entity or organization because the easement is intended to
provide beneﬁts to the public.
84

Karin F. Marchetti, co-author of the 2005 edition of the Conservation Easement Handbook
and General Counsel of the Maine Coast Heritage Trust, explains
it is unlikely that a conservation easement was granted with the expectation that
the land trust might at its pleasure dispose of the easement and apply the proceeds
to its general conservation purposes, as with trade lands. It is implicit in a perpetual
easement that the purposes of the gift, the preservation of that particular parcel of land,
will be honored barring unforeseeable or extremely improbable circumstances.
Karin F. Marchetti, 0LANNING AND -ANAGING #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS 4HE ,EGAL 0ERSPECTIVE 37 (Oct.
20, 2000) (on ﬁle with authors) (second emphasis added).
85
See supra notes 36 & 38 and accompanying text. See also generally supra Part I.B.1 (discussing
the representations made to easement grantors regarding the nature of perpetual conservation
easements).
86

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 73–74.

87

See infra note 304 and accompanying text.

88

See, e.g., Lowham Easement, supra note 8, at 9 (providing “[t]he Grantor wishes to express
again its intent that this Easement be maintained in perpetuity for the purposes expressed herein.
However, if . . . a ﬁnal binding non-appealable judicial determination is made that continuation of
this Easement is impossible . . . then Grantor and Grantee, with the approval of the Court, may agree
to transfer their respective interests in the Ranch . . .”); 1988 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK,
supra note 21, at 160 (providing, in its Model Conservation Easement, “[i]f circumstances arise in
the future such as render the purpose of this Easement impossible to accomplish, this Easement can
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startling is that the donee might later take the position that it is free to agree with
subsequent owners of the land to liquidate such easements, in whole or in part, as
it may see ﬁt to fund other land protection activities or add to its operating budget
or stewardship endowment. In other words, what would be startling to easement
donors is that a government entity or land trust might take the position that the
perpetual conservation easements it holds are fungible or liquid assets.
Whether a conservation easement is interpreted using the rules of construction
applicable to charitable trusts, to deeds, to contracts, or (as would be appropriate)
a combination thereof, the universal rule is that the parties’ intent must generally
be ascertained from the language of the instrument itself 89—and virtually all
conservation easement deeds manifest a clear intent to protect the particular land
encumbered by the easement for the conservation purposes speciﬁed in the deed,
generally in perpetuity. The stated purpose of a conservation easement,90 as well as

only be terminated or extinguished, whether in whole or in part, by judicial proceedings in a court
of competent jurisdiction . . .”); 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 375
(providing, in its sample conservation easement provisions, “should [this Conservation Easement]
be extinguished, which may be accomplished only by judicial proceedings . . .”).
89
Many conservation easement deeds contain an “integration clause,” providing that the deed
sets forth the entire agreement of the parties and supersedes all prior discussions, negotiations,
understandings or agreements relating to the easement. See, e.g., 1988 CONSERVATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 162 (including an integration clause in its Model Conservation
Easement); 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 379 (including an
integration clause in its sample conservation easement provisions); see also, e.g., Rock Springs &
Timber, Inc., v. Lore, 75 P.3d 614, 619–20 (Wyo. 2003) (“‘The rules of construction of a trust
agreement are simple. A trust agreement is governed by the plain meaning contained in the four
corners of the document.’ . . . The courts strive to ascertain and effect the intent of the settlor,
but parole evidence may not be considered ‘where there is no ambiguity and the language of a
declaration of trust is clear and plainly susceptible to only one construction . . . .’”); Kerper v.
Kerper, 780 P.2d 923, 934 (Wyo. 1989) (explaining that, pursuant to “[e]stablished contract law
of Wyoming . . . [t]he intent of the parties to a clear and unambiguous written agreement will be
derived from the entire writing and determined as a matter of law. . . . Extrinsic evidence will not be
used to contradict the plain meaning of a clear and unambiguous written agreement”); First Nat’l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Wyo. 1973) (“In construing a trust agreement
the intention of the settlor must govern and if possible be ascertained from the trust instrument.
Every word is to be given effect if it does not defeat the general purpose.”).
90
See, e.g., Lowham Easement, supra note 8, at 2 (“It is the purpose of this Easement to
preserve and protect in perpetuity the natural, agricultural, ecological, wildlife habitat, open space,
scenic and aesthetic features and values of the Ranch.”); 1988 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK,
supra note 21, at 157 (providing, in its Model Conservation Easement, “[i]t is the purpose of this
Easement to assure that the Property will be retained forever [predominantly] in its [e.g., natural,
scenic, historic, agricultural, forested, and/or open space] condition and to prevent any use of the
Property that will signiﬁcantly impair or interfere with the conservation values of the Property.”)
(second and third alterations and emphasis in original); 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK,
supra note 26, at 318–19 (providing, as the Purpose Statement to be included in conservation
easement deeds, “[t]he purpose of this Conservation Easement is to forever conserve the Protected
Property for the following conservation purposes: . . . [and] Grantor and Holder intend that this
Conservation Easement will conﬁne the use of the Protected Property to activities that are consistent
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the detailed provisions specifying the conservation values of the encumbered land
and the activities permitted and prohibited on that land,91 provide compelling
evidence of the parties’ intent to protect that land, and not to provide the holder
with a fungible or liquid asset. When such intent is clearly expressed in a document,
evidence purporting to show a contrary intent should not be admissible. Thus, a
donee, years after the donor has died or sold the encumbered land, should not be
heard to say that the donor did not actually intend to protect the land as speciﬁed
in the easement deed, and instead intended to grant the donee a fungible or liquid
asset.92
Government entities and land trusts could, of course, negotiate for freely
terminable conservation easements, which would grant them the discretion to
agree to modify or terminate the easements, in whole or in part, as they may see
ﬁt from time to time in the accomplishment of their general public or charitable
missions.93 The donation of such an easement would not create a charitable trust
because it would constitute an “outright . . . donation to a . . . charitable institution
. . . to be used for its general purposes . . . .”94 Whether Congress would be willing
to grant tax incentives for the donation of such freely terminable easements,95

with the Purposes of this Conservation Easement and will prohibit and prevent any use of the
Protected Property that will materially impair or interfere with the Protected Conservation Values
of the Protected Property”).
91
For examples of the detailed provisions included in conservation easement deeds, see, e.g.,
Lowham Easement supra note 8, at 1–10; 1988 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note
21, at 156–63; 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 317–84.
92
The Land Trust Alliance’s Amendment Report provides the following guidance to land trusts
“[w]ith a well-drafted easement, there is no need to look beyond the easement itself and the clear
import of its words. At the time the easement is signed, the intent of all parties including the land
trust should be expressed fully and clearly in the written easement.” ,4! !MENDMENT 2EPORT supra
note 44, at 43 (emphasis added).
93
Such terminable easements would be valid and enforceable property interests under most
easement-enabling statutes because most such statutes do not require that conservation easements
be perpetual. See, e.g., UCEA supra note 14, § 2(c) (“[A] conservation easement is unlimited in
duration unless the instrument creating it otherwise provides.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-202(c)
(2008) (same). 3EE ALSO 0ERPETUITY AND "EYOND SUPRA note 18, at 707–12 (discussing terminable
conservation easements). Even in the few jurisdictions where the easement-enabling statute validates
only perpetual conservation easements, terminable conservation easements could be created if they
were held appurtenant to a small anchor parcel or recognized under the common law. See id. at 707
n.117.
94
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 11, § 28 cmt. a. #F 0ERPETUITY AND "EYOND
supra note 18, at 711–12 (explaining that, similar to the deaccessioning of unrestricted gifts of
artwork from a museum’s collection, the substantial modiﬁcation or termination of a terminable
conservation easement that is providing signiﬁcant beneﬁts to the public could be controversial).
95

See infra notes 347 and 348 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress intended
to subsidize the acquisition of conservation easements only if such easements protect unique or
otherwise signiﬁcant land areas or structures in perpetuity, and Congress anticipated that the need
to substantially modify or terminate such easements would be rare).
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and whether landowners would be willing to donate such easements, are open
questions. Congress’s decision to limit federal tax incentives to the donation of
expressly perpetual conservation easements was not irrational, however, given
that a system that would allow government and nonproﬁt holders to substantially
modify or terminate tax-deductible easements as they might see ﬁt from time to
time would be vulnerable to manipulation, error, and abuse.96 It is also doubtful
that conservation easement donors would be willing to grant government or land
trust holders such broad modiﬁcation and termination discretion.97
In sum, the notion that land trusts or government entities are free to
substantially modify or terminate the perpetual conservation easements they
hold “on their own” and as they may “see ﬁt” is contrary to state law governing
the administration of charitable gifts conveyed for speciﬁc charitable purposes.
All entities and organizations that solicit and accept such gifts are required to
administer them in accordance with their stated terms and purposes pursuant
to charitable trust or similar equitable principles, and there is nothing about the
particular character or condition of conservation easements or land trusts that
suggests that either should be exempted from these principles. The status of a
conservation easement as a partial interest in real property does not prevent it
from being held in trust for the beneﬁt of the public.98 Moreover, any charitable

96
(ICKS V $OWD illustrates the manipulation, error, and abuse that could occur if government
and nonproﬁt holders of tax-deductible conservation easements were permitted to simply agree with
the owners of the encumbered land to substantially modify or terminate those easements (i.e., without
oversight by those charged with protecting the public interest and investment in charitable assets).
See supra note 3. For other examples see infra notes 131–143 and accompanying text (describing the
Myrtle Grove controversy) and infra note 237 (describing the Wal-Mart controversy). See also infra
note 310, in which one of the principal authors of the Treasury Regulations interpreting Internal
Revenue Code § 170(h) explains “the decision to terminate [a conservation easement] should not be
made solely by interested parties. With the decision-making process pushed into a court of law, the
legal tension created by such judicial review will generally tend to create a fair result.”
97
See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining that many landowners donate conservation easements in
large part because of a personal attachment to the particular land encumbered by the easement and
a desire to see that land permanently preserved). Even in the purchase context it is not clear that
landowners would be willing to grant holders such broad modiﬁcation or termination discretion.
See 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 15–17 (“A landowner survey
conducted in three northern California counties—where many easements are purchased—found
that landowners participating in easement programs appreciated not only the cash infusion, but also
that their land would be preserved for continuing farming and open space use.”).
98
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 11, § 40 (“[A] trustee may hold in trust
any interest in any type of property.”) (emphasis added); id. § 40 cmt. b. (“Subject to requirements
of lawful purpose and administration . . . , no policy of the trust law restricts the types of property
interests a trustee may hold in that ﬁduciary capacity.”). Interests in real property for life or for a
term of years, reversionary interests, executory interests, remainders (whether contingent, vested,
or vested subject to being divested), interests held in co-ownership, and even a right to enforce a
restrictive covenant can be the subject matter of a trust. See id.; GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 112 (West 2008). The status of a conservation easement as a partial
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organization could make the same complaints about the application of charitable
trust principles as are made on behalf of land trusts in 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY—that
the doctrines of administrative deviation and cy pres, as well as attorney general
and court oversight, are inconvenient, costly, and time consuming.99 Indeed,
many museums, universities, and social welfare, religious, or other charitable
organizations might prefer to be able to solicit large donations by promising to
abide by the stated terms and purposes of the gifts in perpetuity, but then have
the freedom to later alter the terms and purposes of the gifts as they see ﬁt, and
without regard to the intent of the donor or the inconvenience of state attorney
general or court oversight. Such is not the law, however, nor should it be, as it
would likely result in a signiﬁcant decline in charitable giving to the detriment
of the public. As explained by the forty-ﬁve states that ﬁled an amici brief in
-ADIGAN, the fraudulent solicitation case:100
Charitable contributions represent a signiﬁcant public resource.
They promote a wide range of important initiatives in areas such
as medical and scientiﬁc research, social services, public health,
education, the environment, civil rights, and legal aid. Yet these
initiatives cannot succeed without popular support, and such
support will come only where the public trusts that its donations
will be used for purposes that donors intend to sponsor and are
led to believe their donations will in fact sponsor.101

interest in real property does mean that the owner of the encumbered land would be a necessary
party to any administrative deviation or cy pres action. However, while this complicates, it should
not negate the application of charitable trust principles to donated easements since all manner of
partial interests in property can be held in trust despite the possibility of similar complications.
99
3EE 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 66 (complaining that application of the doctrine of
cy pres to conservation easements “will complicate the enforcement of easements because enforcement
may involve multiple parties and the attendant increase in the time and cost of litigation”); id. at 81
(complaining that litigation is “costly and time consuming”). As explained in Part II.D, infra, due
to a misunderstanding of the law, 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY signiﬁcantly overstates the extent to which
holders of conservation easements would be required to seek court approval to amend easements in
manners consistent with their stated purposes.
100

See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing -ADIGAN).

101

Amici Brief of Fla. Attorney Gen. et al., Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 2001 U.S. Briefs
1806, 2002 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 734, at 2 (Dec. 24, 2002). According to a recent nationwide
survey by Zogby International, (i) 97 percent of the respondents said they consider it a “very”
or “somewhat” serious matter if charities are spending money donated to them on unauthorized
projects, while 78.7 percent said they would “deﬁnitely” or “probably” stop giving to any nonproﬁt
organization that accepts contributions for one purpose and uses the money for another, (ii) 72.4
percent said that, when a nonproﬁt organization uses money “for a purpose other than the one
for which it was given,” the managers of the recipient organization “should be held legally or
criminally liable for acting in a fraudulent manner,” and (iii) 97.4 percent said that respecting a
donor’s wishes was “very” or “somewhat” important to the “ethical governance” of a nonproﬁt.
0UBLIC WILL 0UNISH .ONPROlTS THAT -ISUSE $ESIGNATED 'RANTS .EW :OGBY 3URVEY &INDS 1 (Dec. 15,
2005) (on ﬁle with authors) (explaining the results of the survey commissioned by the plaintiffs in
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" #HARITABLE 4RUST ,AW 0ROPERTY ,AW AND THE -YTH OF THE 4WO 0ARTY
Contract
In support of its suggestion that charitable gifts of conservation easements
be exempted from the rules that apply to all other charitable gifts made for
speciﬁc purposes, 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY asserts “the doctrine of cy pres applies to
the law governing charitable trusts, which makes the doctrine part of the law of
trusts. Conservation easements are governed by the law pertaining to easements,
which is property law.”102 This assertion is not grounded on a careful analysis of
the law. First, as previously discussed, charitable trust principles (including the
doctrine of cy pres) apply to gifts made to government entities and charitable
organizations to be used for speciﬁc charitable purposes as well as to formally
designated charitable trusts.103 Second, fee title to land, being the quintessential
form of property and, thus, obviously governed by property law, is not thereby
removed from the overlapping law governing charitable trusts. Rather, gifts of
fee title to land to a government entity or charitable organization to be used for
a speciﬁc charitable purpose (such as the site of a hospital, library, public park,
or memorial) are subject to both property law and charitable trust law, and the
case law applying charitable trust principles to the administration of such gifts
is voluminous.104 In one recent example, the Georgia Supreme Court held that

the Robertson v. Princeton University case). See also John Hechinger, "IG -ONEY $ONORS -OVE TO
#URB #OLLEGES $ISCRETION TO 3PEND 'IFTS, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2007, at B1 (explaining that, upset
by the apparent disregard for donor intent on the part of many colleges and universities, several
philanthropists—including the billionaire founder of Home Depot Inc.—are launching a nonproﬁt
that will advise donors on how to attach legally enforceable restrictions to their gifts).
102

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 59.

103

See supra notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text.

104

See, e.g., Estate of Zahn, 93 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (applying the doctrine of
cy pres to bequests of real property to be used for speciﬁc charitable purposes when neither of the
parcels was suitable for carrying out the testatrix’s declared intention at her death); Blumenthal v.
White, 683 A.2d 410 (Conn. 1996) (applying charitable trust principles to a city’s proposed transfer
of land that had been donated to the city to be used as a public park); Village of Hinsdale v. Chicago
City Missionary Soc’y, 30 N.E.2d 657 (Ill. 1940) (applying charitable trust principles to a village’s
sale of lots that had been donated to the village for the purpose of constructing a library); Cohen v.
City of Lynn, 598 N.E.2d 682 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (applying charitable trust principles to declare
null and void a city’s conveyance to a developer of land that had been conveyed to the city to be
used forever for park purposes); Tinkham v. Town of Mattapoisett, 22 Mass. L. Rptr. 635 (2007)
(applying charitable trust principles to invalidate a town’s attempt to convey property received as
a gift to be used for conservation purposes to a developer in exchange for other property); State v.
Rand, 366 A.2d 183 (Me. 1976) (applying charitable trust principles to a city’s use of the proceeds
from the condemnation of land that had been donated to the city to be used as public park); In re
Neher, 18 N.E.2d 625 (N.Y. 1939) (applying charitable trust principles to a village’s proposed use
of a homestead that had been devised to the village to be used as a hospital and as a memorial to the
textratix’s husband); Town of Cody v. Buffalo Bill Mem’l Ass’n, 196 P.2d 369 (Wyo. 1948) (applying
charitable trust principles to void a charitable association’s transfer of land that had been donated to
the association to be used to memorialize the memory of Buffalo Bill).
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a devise of a testator’s residence and surrounding acreage to a land trust for the
purpose of maintaining the property in perpetuity exclusively for conservation
purposes within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code § 170(h) “unambiguously
created a charitable trust,” and the land trust was therefore not entitled to receive
the property outright as it “vociferously contended.”105
As Professor McLaughlin explained in a previous article:
Those who argue that donated perpetual conservation easements
can be modiﬁed or terminated in the same manner as other
easements—i.e., by agreement of the holder of the easement
and the owner of the encumbered land . . . —are viewing
such easements solely through a real property law prism, and
ignoring the fact that such easements are also charitable gifts
made for a speciﬁc charitable purpose. Whenever any interest
in real property, whether it be fee title to land or a conservation
easement, is donated to a municipality or charity for a speciﬁc
charitable purpose, both state real property law and state charitable
trust law should apply. State real property law prescribes the
procedural mechanisms by which real property interests can be
transferred and, in the case of easements, modiﬁed or terminated.
State charitable trust law governs a donee’s use and disposition
of property conveyed to it for a speciﬁc charitable purpose.
In other words, although state real property law may provide
that a conservation easement can be modiﬁed or terminated by
agreement of the holder of the easement and the owner of the
encumbered land . . . , the holder of a perpetual conservation
easement, in its capacity as trustee, may not agree to modify or
terminate the easement in contravention of its stated purpose
without ﬁrst obtaining court approval in a cy pres proceeding.106
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY also asserts that “as easements, conservation easements
have been seen primarily as two-party contracts,” and cites to an article written
by Mary Ann King and Sally K. Fairfax in support of this assertion.107 4HE %ND
105

Chattowah Open Land Trust v. Jones, 636 S.E.2d 523, 525–26 (Ga. 2006). See also infra
note 302 and accompanying text (discussing Internal Revenue Code § 170(h)).
106
0ERPETUITY AND "EYOND SUPRA note 18, at 683. As discussed in detail in Part II.D, infra, holders
of conservation easements treated as charitable trusts (or the functional equivalent thereof ) would
not be required to obtain court approval in a cy pres proceeding for amendments that are consistent
with the purpose of a conservation easement. Rather, a holder could agree to such amendments
pursuant to its express or implied power to amend, or with court approval obtained in a more
ﬂexible administrative deviation proceeding.
107

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 67 (citing Mary Ann King & Sally K. Fairfax, 0UBLIC
!CCOUNTABILITY AND #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS ,EARNING FROM THE 5NIFORM #ONSERVATION %ASEMENT !CT
Debates, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 65 (2006)).
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OF 0ERPETUITYS reliance on the King and Fairfax article as support for its argument
that land trusts should be deemed to have the right to modify and terminate the
easements they hold on their own and as they may see ﬁt is ironic given that the
thrust of the King and Fairfax article is a call for greater accountability on the part
of the land trusts. King and Fairfax speciﬁcally provide:
We argue that [conservation easements (“CEs”)] are much
more public than either the [Uniform Conservation Easement
Act (“UCEA”)] or land trusts often frame them and that the
public nature of CEs warrants more explicit attention to public
accountability than the private ordering system prescribed by
the UCEA.108
....
Clearly the public interest in CEs is sufﬁcient to justify efforts to
constrain easement and fee holders from modifying the terms of
the agreement at will.109
Moreover, although expressing concern about the manner in which charitable trust
principles might apply to conservation easements,110 King and Fairfax note that
commentators “present compelling arguments that application of the charitable

108

Mary Ann King & Sally K. Fairfax, 0UBLIC !CCOUNTABILITY AND #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS
,EARNING FROM THE 5NIFORM #ONSERVATION %ASEMENT !CT $EBATES 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 65, 67
(2006).
109

Id. at 109.

110

In their discussion of charitable trust law, Mary Ann King (a Ph.D. student in the
Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management at the University of California,
Berkeley) and Sally K. Fairfax (Henry J. Vaux Distinguished Professor of Forest Policy in that
department) make a number of assumptions about the application of charitable trust principles to
conservation easements that are incorrect. They mistakenly assume that charitable trust principles
would require holders of conservation easements to “disclose fully to the beneﬁciary [in this context,
the public] about transactions.” Id. at 107. That is not the case. See Brody, supra note 12 (explaining
that a restricted gift does not impose on a corporate charity the trust law procedural requirements
for providing information to beneﬁciaries, although the charity would have to respond to a request
for information from the attorney general). They also mistakenly assume that the doctrine of cy
pres would apply to all amendments to conservation easements, including those that are consistent
with the purpose of an easement. See King & Fairfax, supra note 108, at 108–09. That also is not
the case. See infra Part II.D (discussing a holder’s express and implied powers and the more ﬂexible
doctrine of administrative deviation). In addition, King and Fairfax do not discuss the interests of
conservation easement donors or the reasons underlying the deference accorded to donor intent
under charitable trust law—namely, a deeply rooted tradition of respecting an individual’s right to
control the use and disposition of his or her property and a concern that failing to honor the wishes
of charitable donors would chill future charitable donations. See supra note 101 and accompanying
text (discussing the consequences of disregarding donor intent). They also do not acknowledge that
the Treasury Department has already determined that court oversight in what essentially is a cy pres
proceeding is the appropriate oversight mechanism for the termination, presumably in whole or
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trust doctrine may be the best and even perhaps the only available viable option
for existing easements.”111 They also quote one of the NCCUSL commissioners
who participated in the drafting of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
(sometimes referred to hereinafter as the UCEA), who stated:
The intent . . . was to include principles involving trust and
cy-pres . . . and because under Section 1 a charitable type of
relationship is invoked . . . any court which is going to be
confronted with a modiﬁcation or termination problem has
got to consider not only the law of easements with respect to
modiﬁcation and termination, but also trust implications, such
as cy-pres.112
The UCEA was approved by NCCUSL in 1981 and has since been adopted
in whole or in substantial part by twenty-four states, including Wyoming.113
Although the application of charitable trust principles to conservation easements
was not directly addressed in the UCEA, the act has always contemplated that
conservation easements are more than simply two-party contracts or property
arrangements. While the UCEA provides that a conservation easement may be
modiﬁed or terminated “in the same manner as other easements”114 (i.e., by
agreement of the holder of the easement and the owner of the encumbered land),
it also conﬁrms that “[t]his Act does not affect the power of a court to modify

in part, of tax-deductible conservation easements. See supra notes 303 and 309 and accompanying
text (discussing the federal tax law extinguishment requirement). King and Fairfax further note that
“[a]n understaffed attorney general’s ofﬁce cannot be counted on to provide the kind of oversight
that land trusts and conservation easements require.” King & Fairfax, supra note 108, at 110. As
discussed in Part II.F, infra, however, repeated law suits by state attorneys general may be unnecessary
because a credible threat of enforcement alone may both discourage holders from agreeing to
inappropriate modiﬁcations or terminations and reduce the incidence of landowner violations and
requests to substantially modify or terminate easements in manners contrary to donor intent and
the public interest. In the end, if correctly interpreted and applied in the conservation easement
context, charitable trust principles will provide precisely the kind of accountability to the public on
the part of land trusts that King and Fairfax desire.
111

King & Fairfax, supra note 108, at 110 n.196.

112

Id. at 108 (citing Proceedings in Comm. of the Whole, Uniform Conservation Easement
Act of the NCCUSL, 32 (Aug. 4–5, 1981) (remarks of Bullivant)).
113
See generally UCEA, supra note 14; see also Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Uniform State
Laws, Uniform Conservation Easement Act, www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/
uniformacts-fs-ucea.asp (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) (listing the following as having adopted the
UCEA: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, as well as the District of Columbia and the
U.S. Virgin Islands). Georgia and Oklahoma have also effectively adopted the UCEA. See GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-10-1 to 44-10-5 (West 2008); 60 OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 49.1 to 49.7 (West
2008).
114

UCEA supra note 14, § 2(a); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-202(a) (2008).
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or terminate a conservation easement in accordance with the principles of law
and equity.”115 In the original comments to the UCEA the drafters explained
“[t]he Act leaves intact the existing case and statute law of adopting states as it
relates to the modiﬁcation and termination of easements and the enforcement
of charitable trusts” and “independently of the Act, the Attorney General could
have standing [to enforce a conservation easement] in his capacity as supervisor
of charitable trusts . . . .”116 In other words, the UCEA does not and was never
intended to abrogate the well-settled principles that apply when property, such as
a conservation easement, is conveyed as a charitable gift to a government entity or
charitable organization to be used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose.117
To address any lingering confusion on this point, on February 3, 2007,
NCCUSL approved amendments to the comments to the UCEA to clarify
its intention that conservation easements be enforced as charitable trusts in
appropriate circumstances. The amended comment to section 3 of the UCEA
explains:
The Act does not directly address the application of charitable
trust principles to conservation easements because (i) the Act
has the relatively narrow purpose of sweeping away certain
common law impediments that might otherwise undermine
a conservation easement’s validity, and researching the law
relating to charitable trusts and how such law would apply to
conservation easements in each state was beyond the scope of
the drafting committee’s charge, and (ii) the Act is intended to
be placed in the real property law of adopting states and states
generally would not permit charitable trust law to be addressed
in the real property provisions of their state codes. (OWEVER
because conservation easements are conveyed to governmental
BODIES AND CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS TO BE HELD AND ENFORCED FOR
a speciﬁc public or charitable purpose—i.e., the protection of the
land encumbered by the easement for one or more conservation or
PRESERVATION PURPOSESTHE EXISTING CASE AND STATUTE LAW OF ADOPTING
states as it relates to the enforcement of charitable trusts should apply
to conservation easements.118

115

UCEA supra note 14, § 3(b); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-203(b).

116

UCEA supra note 14, § 3 cmt. (emphasis added).

117

As previously discussed, conservation easements could be created and conveyed in a manner
that does not create a charitable trust relationship. See supra notes 93 and 94 and accompanying text
(discussing freely terminable conservation easements).
118

UCEA supra note 14, § 3 cmt. (emphasis added).
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The amended comment to section 3 of the UCEA concludes
while Section 2(a) [of the Act] provides that a conservation
easement may be modiﬁed or terminated “in the same manner
as other easements,” the governmental body or charitable
organization holding a conservation easement, in its capacity
as trustee, may be prohibited from agreeing to terminate the
easement (or modify it in contravention of its purpose) without
ﬁrst obtaining court approval in a cy pres proceeding.119
As with the comments to the Uniform Trust Code, these comments should be
relied upon as a guide in interpreting the UCEA so as to achieve uniformity
among the states that have enacted it.120
The Uniform Trust Code, federal tax law, and the Restatement (Third)
of Property: Servitudes (“Restatement of Property”) also treat conservation
easements as more than two-party contracts or property arrangements that can
be modiﬁed or terminated at the will of the parties. As previously noted, the
Uniform Trust Code explains that the creation and transfer of a conservation
easement will frequently create a charitable trust with the holder of the easement
acting as trustee of what will ostensibly appear to be a contractual or property
arrangement.121 The Treasury Regulations provide, inter alia, that tax-deductible
conservation easements can be (i) transferred by their holders only to other
government entities or charitable organizations that agree to continue to enforce
the easements and (ii) extinguished by their holders only in what essentially is
a judicial cy pres proceeding.122 And the Restatement of Property provides that
the substantial modiﬁcation or termination of conservation easements held by

119
Id. By providing that a holder “may” be prohibited from agreeing to terminate an easement
(or modify it in contravention of its purpose) without ﬁrst obtaining court approval in a cy pres
proceeding, NCCUSL was leaving open the question of whether conservation easements not
acquired as charitable gifts (i.e., purchased with general (unrestricted) funds, exacted as part of
development approval processes, or acquired in the context of mitigation) should be governed by
similar equitable principles. E-mail to Nancy A. McLaughlin from K. King Burnett, member and
past president of NCCUSL (Aug. 17, 2008, 10:51am MST) (on ﬁle with authors). For a brief
discussion of conservation easements acquired in such nondonative contexts, see infra Part II.J.
120

See supra note 80 (explaining that uniformity can be achieved only if the intent of the
drafters of a uniform act becomes the intent of the state legislatures in adopting it); see also UCEA,
supra note 14, § 6 (“This Act shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the laws with respect to the subject of the Act among states enacting it.”); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1-206 (2008) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-103(a)(vii) (2008) (providing that
any uniform act shall be interpreted and construed to make uniform the law of the states that enact
it). As of August 2008, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia had adopted either the UTC
or the UCEA, or both.
121

See supra note 79 and accompanying text.

122

See infra notes 303 and 304 and accompanying text.
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governmental bodies or charitable organizations is governed, not by the real
property law doctrine of changed conditions, but by a special set of rules based on
the charitable trust doctrine of cy pres.123 In their commentary, the drafters of the
Restatement of Property explain “[b]ecause of the public interests involved, these
servitudes are afforded more stringent protection than privately held conservation
servitudes . . . .”124 Accordingly, contrary to the assertions made in 4HE %ND OF
0ERPETUITY, conservation easements have not been seen as two-party contracts or
as governed solely by property law. Rather, the various sources of law and legal
analysis discussed above speciﬁcally contemplate the application of charitable
trust principles to conservation easements.

# #HARITABLE 4RUST 0RINCIPLES !RE .OT A .EW #ONTROL
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY asserts that the application of charitable trust principles
to conservation easements would constitute a new and unanticipated control or
burden on easement modiﬁcation and termination.125 This assertion also is not
supportable.
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act has contemplated the application of
charitable trust principles to conservation easements since 1981, the year in which
it was approved by NCCUSL;126 the Treasury Regulations have contemplated the
application of charitable trust principles to tax-deductible conservation easements
since 1986;127 the Restatement of Property has, since 2000, recommended that the
modiﬁcation and termination of conservation easements be governed by a special
set of rules based on the charitable trust doctrine of cy pres; 128 and the Uniform
Trust Code has, since 2000, explained that creation and transfer of a conservation
easement will frequently create a charitable trust.129 Accordingly, the prospect that

123

See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 7.11.

124

Id. § 7.11 cmt. a.

125

3EE 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 56, 79.

126

See supra notes 113–119 and accompanying text.

127

See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Tax Incentives, supra note 42, at 15
(explaining that the Treasury published ﬁnal regulations interpreting Internal Revenue Code
§170(h) in 1986 and those regulations provide substantial guidance with regard to the meaning of
many of the concepts introduced into the Code by §170(h)).
128

See supra notes 123 and 124 and accompanying text.

129

See supra note 79 and accompanying text. See also Jeffrey A. Blackie, Note, Conservation
%ASEMENTS AND THE $OCTRINE OF #HANGED #ONDITIONS 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1216–17 (1989)
(explaining the “distinctly public nature” of conservation easements and arguing that “when a
conservation easement can no longer serve its intended purpose, a court should apply the doctrine
[of cy pres] and reform the grant to support the general goal of conservation”); Alexander R. Arpad,
Note, 0RIVATE 4RANSACTIONS 0UBLIC "ENElTS AND 0ERPETUAL #ONTROL /VER THE 5SE OF 2EAL 0ROPERTY
)NTERPRETING #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS AS #HARITABLE 4RUSTS 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 91 (2002)
(discussing the application of charitable trust principles to conservation easements and some of the
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conservation easements may be subject to charitable trust principles is not a new
concept. It has been a part of the legal landscape for over a quarter of a century,
roughly coterminous with the widespread use of conservation easements as a land
protection tool.130
It is also clear that the land trust community has been aware that charitable
trust principles may apply to conservation easements and has asserted this to its
advantage. For example, in the mid-1990’s a controversy arose when the National
Trust for Historic Preservation (“the National Trust”) approved a landowner’s
request to substantially amend a perpetual conservation easement without
adherence to charitable trust principles (“the Myrtle Grove controversy”).131 The
easement in question encumbered a 160-acre historic tobacco plantation located
on the Maryland Eastern Shore, and the amendment, which was requested by
a subsequent owner of the land after the easement-donor’s death, would have
permitted a seven-lot upscale subdivision on the property, complete with a singlefamily residence and ancillary structures, such as a pool, pool house, and tennis
courts, on each of the lots.132
The National Trust’s approval of the amendment request touched off a storm
of protest from conservation groups, the donor’s heirs, and the local and national
media.133 In objecting to the proposed amendment, the deceased donor’s daughter
explained her “sense of outrage and betrayal” at the proposed subdivision of the
protected property:
The distinction the [National] Trust now makes between a
“historic core” and the rest of the property would have made
no sense to [my mother] and makes no sense to my sister
and me. Had [my mother] been primarily preoccupied with

implications); Jeffrey Tapick, Note, 4HREATS TO THE #ONTINUED %XISTENCE OF #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS
27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 257, 287–89 (2002) (discussing the factors that “strongly suggest” a
statutory conservation easement functions as a charitable trust, and noting that “the argument that
a conservation easement is a ‘charitable trust’ could be an effective defense against opportunistic or
ill-conceived efforts to destroy an easement”).
130
See Tax Incentives, supra note 42 at 20–21 (explaining the conservation easements began to
be used on a widespread basis in the mid-1980s).
131

For a detailed discussion of this controversy, see !MENDING 0ERPETUAL #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS
supra note 19, at 1041–63. See also id. at 1035 n. 12 (explaining that the National Trust is a
congressionally-chartered private, nonproﬁt membership organization dedicated to saving historic
places and revitalizing America’s communities).
132
Id. at 1041–42, 1046–50. At the time of the proposed amendment the easement-encumbered
land was owned by a prominent Washington D.C. developer. See id. at 1044–45. The donor’s heirs
had sold the encumbered land to the developer after the donor’s death, but only after receiving
assurances from the National Trust that the restrictions on development and use in the easement
would run with the land and bind all future owners. See id.
133

Id. at 1050–52.
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architecture—with the eighteenth century buildings at Myrtle
Grove—she could have kept the right to sell some of the
farmlands and thus insured herself a much easier old age than
she had. She was not a rich woman but chose to deny herself in
order to preserve the land.
....
Those who have given easements to the Trust or are thinking of
doing so will surely be horriﬁed to ﬁnd out about the transfer
of development rights[,] which a preservationist like my mother
sacriﬁced for herself and her heirs[,] to the next and current owner
of Myrtle Grove. Under the proposed amendment, the family of
a Washington real estate developer will reap the proﬁts from sale
of two-thirds of the farm, a proﬁt which my mother had denied
to her own family for the sake of historic preservation. I doubt
that such a transfer of development rights is what Congress
and the American taxpayer think they are supporting in their
appropriations to the Trust.134
The National Trust soon acknowledged it had made a mistake and withdrew
its approval to amend the conservation easement, and the developer sued the
National Trust for breach of contract.135 The National Trust then sought the
assistance of the Maryland Attorney General in defending the conservation
easement on charitable trust grounds.136 In July of 1998, the Maryland Attorney
General ﬁled suit objecting to the amendment and asserting that, because the
donation of the easement created a charitable trust for the beneﬁt of the people
of Maryland, the easement could not be amended as proposed without receiving
court approval in a cy pres proceeding.137
In October 1998, the Land Trust Alliance and a number of other conservation
and historic preservation organizations ﬁled an amici brief in support of the
Maryland Attorney General’s position that conveyance of the conservation
134

Id. at 1051.

135

Id. at 1054–55.

136

Id. at 1056.

137

Id. at 1056–59. The Attorney General asserted that, although in general an easement is an
agreement that may be modiﬁed with the consent of the holder of the easement and the owner of
the encumbered land, “Myrtle Grove is not a mere conservation agreement but a gift in perpetuity
to a charitable corporation for the beneﬁt of the people of Maryland” and “[a]s such, it is subject
to a charitable trust.” Id. at 1057. The Attorney General also pointed out that, even though the
Maryland easement-enabling statute provides that a conservation easement may be extinguished or
released, in whole or in part, in the same manner as other easements, nothing in the statute or its
legislative history indicates that the legislature intended to abrogate the application of well-settled
charitable principles when a conservation easement is gifted to a charitable corporation. Id.
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easement had created a charitable trust.138 They pointed out that the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act “speciﬁcally recognizes the validity of existing
charitable trust principles and speciﬁcally declines to abrogate existing state law
concerning the enforcement of charitable trusts.”139 They also cautioned that the
court’s decision on the charitable trust issue would have consequences reaching
far beyond the controversy at issue and that “[o]nly by providing potential and
existing [conservation easement] donors with assurance that the protection they
place on their land will be, as they intend, permanent can a voluntary conservation
program succeed.”140
A month later The Nature Conservancy and the Eastern Shore Land
Conservancy ﬁled a motion to intervene in the case, asserting that the easement
clearly created a charitable trust, and that “[t]he charitable trust doctrine has as
its underpinning not only the desire to further charitable and public purposes by
being certain that the gift itself is dedicated to those purposes, but it also serves
the purpose of encouraging others to make similar gifts based on the assurance
that their wishes will be carried out.”141 They warned that the case would establish
“extremely important precedent” because, if conservation easements are not
enforced according to their terms, it would chill future easement donations and
adversely affect the activities of all land trusts.142
The Myrtle Grove controversy was settled in December of 1998, with the
National Trust agreeing to pay the developer $225,000, and the parties agreeing
that (i) subdivision of the property is prohibited; (ii) any action contrary to the
express terms and stated purposes of the easement is prohibited; and (iii) amending,
releasing (in whole or in part), or extinguishing the easement without the express
written consent of the Maryland Attorney General is prohibited, except that prior
written approval of the attorney general is not required for approvals carried out
pursuant to the ordinary administration of the easement in accordance with its
terms.143
A year later, in 1999, the Land Trust Alliance published an article on
conservation easement amendments in its quarterly professional journal.144
138

Id. at 1060–61.

139

Id. at 1061 n.131.

140

Id. at 1061.

141

Id. at 1061–62. The Eastern Shore Land Conservancy is a regional land trust that works
in six Maryland counties “to sustain the Eastern Shore’s rich landscapes through strategic land
conservation and sound land use planning.” Eastern Shore Land Conservancy, http://www.eslc.org
(last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
142

!MENDING 0ERPETUAL #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS SUPRA note 19, at 1062.

143

Id. at 1062–63.

144

William P. O’Connor, !MENDING #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS ,EGAL AND 0OLICY #ONSIDERATIONS
EXCHANGE: J. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, Spring 1999, at 8. One of the beneﬁts provided to land trust
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The article ﬁrst describes the donation of a conservation easement by Alice, a
widowed physician approaching eighty years of age, who was a “knowledgeable
and committed conservationist,” spent “several months developing the easement,”
and for whom, like many easement donors, permanent protection of her land
was the “transcendent goal.”145 After noting that land trusts can expect to face
increasing requests to amend conservation easements as protected lands change
hands, the article discusses four potential legal constraints on amendments, one
of which is charitable trust law.146 The article explains:
Amendments to conservation easements may . . . be limited by
charitable trust law. Generally speaking, charitable trust law aims
to ensure that the public beneﬁts of charitable contributions are
enforced to accomplish their intended purposes. A court may
terminate a conservation easement restriction only where its
particular purpose becomes impracticable and (in that case) only
upon payment of appropriate damages to compensate for the
loss of the public beneﬁts involved. . . .
State attorneys general may have standing to participate in a
conservation easement case based on their capacity as supervisors
of charitable trusts. Under that authority, an attorney general
could challenge an amendment to a conservation easement he
or she determined to violate the state’s charitable trust law.147
The article concludes “[a]s the use of conservation easements becomes mainstream,
land trusts should expect requests for amendments to become more common.
With so much at stake, many easement amendment issues will probably be
resolved by the courts.”148
Finally, as discussed in Part I.B. above, the Land Trust Alliance’s Standards
and Practices, the 2005 Conservation Easement Handbook, and the Alliance’s
Amendment Report all discuss charitable trust law as a potential legal constraint

members of the Alliance is a subscription to this journal. See Land Trust Alliance, Beneﬁts for Land
Trust Membership, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/get-involved/membership/land-trust/beneﬁts
(last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
145

O’Connor, supra note 144, at 8.

146

Id. at 8–10. The other three constraints discussed in the article are (i) state easementenabling statutes, (ii) federal tax law, and (iii) the provisions of the easement deed (i.e., the typical
amendment provision included in a conservation easement deed that grants the holder the discretion
to agree only to amendments that are “consistent with the purposes of the easement”). Id. at 9–10.
For a discussion of amendment provisions included in conservation easement deeds, see infra Part
II.D.1.a.
147

O’Connor, supra note 144, at 10.

148

Id. at 31.
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on conservation easement amendments.149 Accordingly, 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS
characterization of the application of charitable trust principles to conservation
easements as a new or unanticipated control or burden is not supportable. What
is new is 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS assertion that perpetual conservation easements
should be treated as fungible or liquid assets in the hands of their governmental
and nonproﬁt holders.

$ #HARITABLE 4RUST 0RINCIPLES $O .OT 0RECLUDE !MENDMENTS
In support of its suggestion that charitable gifts of conservation easements be
specially exempted from the application of charitable trust principles, 4HE %ND
OF 0ERPETUITY asserts that such principles (i) deny easement holders the right to
amend or terminate conservation easements “on their own,”150 (ii) require judicial
approval of every amendment in a cy pres proceeding,151 and (iii) preclude most
typical, salutary, and reasonable amendments even with judicial review.152 None of
these assertions is correct. As a threshold matter, and as explained in the foregoing
Parts, holders of conservation easements should not be viewed as having the right
to substantially modify or terminate the conservation easements they hold “on
their own” and as they may “see ﬁt” (as was attempted, for example, in the Myrtle
Grove controversy and (ICKS V $OWD). In addition, charitable trust principles
neither require judicial approval of every amendment in a cy pres proceeding,
nor preclude typical, salutary, or reasonable amendments. As explained in the
following subparts, such principles are much more ﬂexible and nuanced than The
%ND OF 0ERPETUITY claims, and they apply to conservation easements in a manner
that is consistent with both the Land Trust Alliance’s legal and ethical guidelines
and federal tax law requirements.

 ,EGAL 0RINCIPLES 'OVERNING !DMINISTRATION OF 2ESTRICTED #HARITABLE
'IFTS AND #HARITABLE 4RUSTS
The legal principles governing the administration and, in particular, the
modiﬁcation or termination of restricted charitable gifts and charitable trusts are
fairly straightforward. When a gift is made to a charitable organization to be used
149

See supra notes 51, 53, and 57 and accompanying text.

150

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 62. This same assertion is repeated in similar form
throughout the article. See id. at 69, 78.
151
Id. at 79 (“Every modiﬁcation . . . will be subject to the [cy pres] process because no . . .
modiﬁcation that has not been judicially sanctioned will be valid.”) (emphasis in original).
152
See id. at 68 (asserting that “few, typical conservation easement amendments” could
meet the criteria for the application of the doctrines of administrative deviation or cy pres, and,
thus, the application of such doctrines would “preclude most of these amendments,” even with
judicial review); id. at 69 (asserting that applying the doctrine of cy pres to conservation easements
would preclude “most of the easement amendments that are typical today”); id. at 81 (asserting
that applying the doctrine of cy pres to easement modiﬁcations “could preclude many salutary and
reasonable easement modiﬁcations, even after a judicial review . . .”).
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for a speciﬁc charitable purpose, except to the extent granted the discretion either
expressly or impliedly in the instrument of conveyance, the organization (i) may
not deviate from the administrative terms of the gift without receiving judicial
approval pursuant to the doctrine of administrative (or equitable) deviation and
(ii) may not deviate from the charitable purpose of the gift without receiving
judicial approval pursuant to the doctrine of cy pres.153 Similar principles generally
apply to gifts made for speciﬁc charitable purposes to states as well as cities,
counties, park districts, and other local government bodies.154
The powers of a charitable trustee can be divided into four basic categories:
express powers, implied powers, powers exercisable pursuant to the doctrine of
administrative deviation, and powers exercisable pursuant to the doctrine of cy
pres. These powers and the manner in which they should apply to the modiﬁcation
and termination of conservation easements are described below.

A %XPRESS 0OWERS
Express powers are discretionary powers conferred on a charitable trustee by
the terms of the trust or by statute.155 These powers enable trustees to administer
trusts efﬁciently, and courts do not interfere with a trustee’s exercise of such
powers unless the trustee has clearly abused its discretion. As explained in the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts:

See, e.g., SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 380 (“The trustees of a charitable trust, like
the trustees of a private trust, have such powers as are conferred on them in speciﬁc words by the
terms of the trust [express powers] or are necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the
trust and are not forbidden by the terms of the trust [implied powers].”); id. § 381 (discussing the
doctrine of administrative deviation and noting that “[t]he power of a court of equity to permit or
direct a deviation from the terms of the trust is at least as extensive in the case of charitable trusts
as it is in the case of private trusts”); id. § 399 (discussing the doctrine of cy pres generally); id.
§ 399.2 (“Where property is given in trust for a particular charitable purpose, and it is impossible
or impracticable to carry out that purpose, the trust does not fail if the testator has a more general
intention to devote the property to charitable purposes. In such a case the property will be applied
under the direction of the court to some charitable purpose falling within the general intention of
the testator.”). See also Brody, supra note 12, at 1237 (“To deal with unanticipated circumstances,
the law protects charitable trusts by the equitable saving devices of deviation and cy pres. These
venerable doctrines allow courts to modify restrictions that can no longer be carried out or that
impede the purposes of the trust; courts apply similar principles to restricted gifts made to corporate
charities.”).
153

See, e.g., cases cited in supra notes 11, 12, & 104; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS,
supra note 11, § 33 cmt. d (“The powers of a municipal corporation may be limited by the express
provision of statutes. Otherwise, a municipal corporation may act as trustee for purposes that fall
within the scope of permitted activities of municipalities. Ordinarily these include such charitable
purposes as promotion of health and education, relief of poverty, construction and maintenance of
public parks, buildings and works, and the like . . . .”).
154

155

See UTC, supra note 15, § 815(a)(1), (2)(C) (providing that a trustee, without authorization
by the court, may exercise (1) powers conferred by the terms of the trust and (2) except as limited
by the terms of the trust, any other powers conferred by the UTC); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-815(a)
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When a trustee has discretion with respect to the exercise of a
power, its exercise is subject to supervision by a court only to
prevent abuse of discretion.156
....
. . . A court will not interfere with a trustee’s exercise of
a discretionary power (or decision not to exercise the power)
when that conduct is reasonable, not based on an improper
interpretation of the terms of the trust, and not otherwise
inconsistent with the trustee’s ﬁduciary duties. . . . Thus, judicial
intervention is not warranted merely because the court would
have differently exercised the discretion.157
This rule has important ramiﬁcations in the conservation easement context. Land
trusts and government entities that negotiate for the inclusion of an amendment
provision in the easement deeds they acquire—as many do—have the express
power to agree with the current and any subsequent owners of the easementencumbered land to amend the easements in manners authorized by the provision.
Moreover, courts will not interfere with a holder’s exercise of this amendment
discretion unless there has been a clear abuse.
Although there are variations, the typical amendment provision grants the
holder of a conservation easement the power to agree to amendments that further,
or are not inconsistent with, the purpose of the easement.158 It is also generally

(i), (ii)(C) (2008) (same). See also SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 380 (discussing a trustee’s
express powers). For powers conferred by statute, see UTC, supra note 15, § 414 (modiﬁcation or
termination of uneconomic trusts), § 417 (combination and division of trusts), § 807 (delegation to
agent), and § 816 (speciﬁc statutory powers, such as power to settle a claim by or against the trust);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-415, -418, -807, -816 (same); see also SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 12,
§ 186 (discussing the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act).
156

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 11, § 87.

157

Id. § 87 cmt. b; see also UTC, supra note 15, § 814(a) (“[T]he trustee shall exercise a
discretionary power in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and
the interests of the beneﬁciaries.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-814(a) (same); MARION R. FREMONTSMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 145 (2004) (noting that trust instruments often
confer broad discretionary powers on the trustee, and “[c]ourts do not interfere with exercises of
discretion unless it can be clearly shown that the exercise was not within the bounds of reasonable
judgment. The duty of the court is not to substitute its own judgment for that of the trustee but
to consider whether [the trustee] has acted in good faith, from proper motivation, and within the
bounds of [reasonable] judgment . . .”).
158

The 2005 edition of the Conservation Easement Handbook provides the following as a
sample amendment provision:
Grantor and Holder recognize that circumstances could arise which justify
amendment of certain of the terms, covenants, or restrictions contained in this
Conservation Easement, and that some activities may require the discretionary
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assumed that this type of amendment provision is permissible under federal tax
law, which requires that the conservation purpose of a tax-deductible conservation
easement be “protected in perpetuity.”159
Although there is no data on the prevalence of the use of amendment
provisions, the Conservation Easement Handbook has discussed the wisdom of
including an amendment provision in conservation easement deeds since its ﬁrst
publication in 1988.160 The 2005 edition of the Handbook provides that “[m]any
consent of Holder. To this end, Grantor and Holder have the right to agree to
amendments and discretionary consents to this Easement without prior notice to
any other party, provided that in the sole and exclusive judgment of the Holder, such
amendment or discretionary consent FURTHERS OR IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE
of this grant.
2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 377 (emphasis added); id. at 317
(deﬁning Grantor to include the original grantor of the easement and any successors in interest to
the property). For prior iterations of the typical amendment provision, see 1988 CONSERVATION
EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 164 (authorizing amendments that are “consistent with the
purpose of [the] Easement”); Thomas S. Barrett & Stefan Nagel, MODEL CONSERVATION EASEMENT
AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION EASEMENT, 1996: REVISED EASEMENTS AND COMMENTARY FROM
“THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK” 22 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 MODEL CONSERVATION
EASEMENT] (authorizing amendments that are “consistent with the purpose of [the] Easement”).
159

See I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A). The requirement that the conservation purpose of a tax-deductible
easement be “protected in perpetuity” should establish the basic parameters for a permissible grant of
amendment discretion to the holder of the easement. The conservation purpose of an easement would
not be protected in perpetuity if the easement could be amended in manners that adversely impact
or change such purpose. Alternatively, the conservation purpose of an easement is not jeopardized if
the holder of the easement is given the discretion to agree to only those amendments that further, or
are consistent with, such purpose. Whether the typical amendment provision should be interpreted
to grant the holder the discretion to agree to “trade-off ” amendments (i.e., amendments that both
negatively impact and further the conservation purpose of an easement, but the net effect of which
could be considered to be neutral with respect to or further such purpose) is an open question. The
IRS has yet to take a formal position on the extent to which it believes tax-deductible conservation
easements may be permissibly amended. In a report on The Nature Conservancy issued in 2005,
the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee explained that “[m]odiﬁcations to an easement held by
a conservation organization may diminish or negate the intended conservation beneﬁts, and violate
the present law requirements that a conservation restriction remain in perpetuity.” STAFF OF S.
COMM. ON FINANCE, 109th Cong., REPORT ON THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, Executive Summary 9
(2005), mircoformed on CIS No. 2005-5362-27 (Cong. Info. Serv.), available at http://www.senate.
gov/~ﬁnance/sitepages/TNC%20Report.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter 2005 SENATE
FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT]. The Staff noted that “[m]odiﬁcations made to correct ministerial or
administrative errors are permitted under present law [sic] Federal tax law.” Id. at 9 n. 20. But the
Staff expressed concern with regard to trade-off amendments, such as an amendment to an easement
that would permit the owner of the encumbered land to construct a larger home on the land in
exchange for more limited use of the property for agricultural purposes. See id. at Pt. II 5. The Staff
explained that trade-off amendments “may be difﬁcult to measure from a conservation perspective,”
and that the “weighing of increases and decreases [in conservation beneﬁts] is difﬁcult to perform
by TNC and to assess by the IRS.” Id.
See 1988 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 205–06 (“Because easements
are perpetual, there are bound to be changed circumstances over time that require amendment
. . . and many consider it prudent to set the ground rules ahead of time . . . .”); 1996 MODEL
160
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easement drafters . . . consider it prudent to set the rules governing amendments,
both to provide the power to amend and to impose appropriate limitations on
that power to prevent abuses,”161 and “[a]mendment provisions are becoming
more common to assure and limit the Holder’s power to modify.”162 And in its
recently published Amendment Report, the Land Trust Alliance instructs
land trusts should negotiate with easement grantors for
the desired level of amendment discretion and include an
amendment provision in easement deeds expressly granting them
such discretion so there is no confusion or misunderstanding
regarding the land trust’s ability to agree to amendments in the
stated circumstances.163
Given the courts’ hands-off approach to a trustee’s exercise of its express
powers, the typical amendment provision grants the holder of a conservation
easement considerable discretion to agree to amendments “on its own” and as it
may “see ﬁt” (i.e., without obtaining attorney general or court approval), provided
such amendments are consistent with or further the purpose of the easement. In
some cases, of course, an easement grantor may not wish to grant the holder such
broad amendment discretion. For example, the grantor may wish to provide that
the holder’s amendment discretion does not extend to amendments that would
increase the level of subdivision or development permitted on the encumbered
land (the 2005 edition of the Conservation Easement Handbook offers this as
an option for an amendment provision).164 Alternatively, the grantor may wish to
grant the holder the discretion to agree to amendments that are consistent with the
purpose of an easement during the grantor’s lifetime, but prohibit amendments
after the grantor’s death (a well-respected land trust operating on the West Coast

CONSERVATION EASEMENT, supra note 158, at 82 (same). Both the 1988 edition of the Conservation
Easement Handbook and the 1996 Model Conservation Easement, which were published eight
years apart, confusingly note that “[u]ntil quite recently, most conservation easements have been
silent regarding amendments.” See 1988 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at
205; 1996 MODEL CONSERVATION EASEMENT, supra note 158, at 82. The 1996 Model Conservation
Easement further notes that this silence was “at least in part to avoid encouraging the notion that
[easement] terms can be easily changed.” 1996 MODEL CONSERVATION EASEMENT, supra note 158,
at 82.
161

2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 468.

162

Id. at 377 (emphasis in original omitted).

163

,4! !MENDMENT 2EPORT, supra note 44, at 31 (providing also “[t]ransparency of intent is an
ethical obligation; if land trusts wish to modify a conservation easement in certain circumstances,
land trusts should put their donors, grantors, landowners, members, funding sources and the general
public on notice that amendments may occur”).
164
See 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 377 (“Notwithstanding
the foregoing, the Holder and Grantor have no right or power to consent to any action or agree
to any amendment that would . . . increase the level of residential development permitted by the
express terms of this Conservation Easement . . . .”).
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offers this as an option to its easement grantors).165 And some grantors may not
wish to grant the holder any discretion to amend the carefully negotiated terms
of a conservation easement deed. As in all other charitable contexts, however,
the government entities and land trusts acquiring conservation easements should
decline to accept easements if the grantor refuses to grant them an appropriate
level of discretion with regard to the administration of the easement over the long
term.166
Indeed, the experience of government entities and land trusts with regard
to gifts of conservation easements is somewhat analogous to the experience of
museums with regard to gifts of artwork. In a 1994 book, Professor Malaro, a
leading commentator on museum governance issues, explained that, while in
the past museums were willing to accept gifts of artwork subject to all manner
of restrictions (such as restrictions requiring permanent display or permanent
retention), “with [the] growing interest in the role of museums, their obligations
to the public, and the collateral responsibilities of museum trustees, a more
thoughtful stand is being taken by some museums on the issue of restricted
gifts.”167 Professor Malaro offered, as an example of this more thoughtful stand,
the 1986 International Council of Museums’ Code of Professional Ethics, which
provides “[o]ffers [of gifts] that are subject to special conditions may have to be
rejected if the conditions proposed are judged to be contrary to the long-term
interest of the museum and its public.”168
Importantly, although recognizing that restrictions placed on a museum’s
use of artwork could lead to less than optimal deployment of its assets over
time, neither Professor Malaro nor the museums argued that museums and the
165
The Land Trust of Napa County provides the following amendment provision as an option
to its easement grantors:

11.5. 0ERMITTED !MENDMENT BY /RIGINAL 'RANTING /WNER /NLY. If circumstances
arise under which an amendment to or modiﬁcation of this Easement would be
appropriate, the original Granting Owner and the Trust may jointly amend this
Easement; provided, however, that (i) no amendment or modiﬁcation shall be
allowed that will adversely affect the qualiﬁcation of this Easement or the status
of the Trust under any applicable laws . . . , (ii) any amendment or modiﬁcation
shall not harm Conservation Values, shall be consistent with the purposes of this
Easement, and shall not affect its perpetual duration, (iii) the original Granting
Owner must consent to the amendment, whether or not that original Granting
Owner continues to own the __Easement Area/Property__, and (iv) no amendment
is permitted once the original Granting Owner is deceased.
Land Trust of Napa County Model Conservation Easement Form (January 2008 draft) (on ﬁle
with authors).
166

See, e.g., Brody, supra note 12, at 1233 (noting that “[p]hilanthropic institutions are under
constant pressures to obtain funds and to yield to donor demands in doing so, but charities have the
obligation to accept restrictions carefully”).
167

MARIE C. MALARO, MUSEUM GOVERNANCE 79–80 (1994).

168

Id.
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gifts or artwork they accept should be exempted from the rules that govern the
administration of all other forms of restricted charitable gifts. Rather, museums
developed institutional policies regarding the acceptance of restricted gifts and
began to refuse gifts subject to use restrictions that might conﬂict with their
basic education goals.169 The Land Trust Alliance’s strong recommendation in its
recently published Amendment Report that land trusts negotiate for the ﬂexibility
to amend conservation easements consistent with their stated purposes reﬂects
a similar evolution; a recognition that land trusts should not bind themselves
to enforcing restrictions in a conservation easement deed that might, over time,
conﬂict with the conservation purpose of the easement and the land trust’s basic
conservation goals.170

B )MPLIED 0OWERS
Charitable trustees are also deemed to have certain “implied powers” to do
what is “necessary or appropriate” to carry out the purposes of a trust and not
forbidden by the terms of the trust.171 The Uniform Trust Code and Wyoming’s
version of the Uniform Trust Code provide that, without authorization by the
court and except as limited by the terms of the trust, a trustee may exercise (i) “all
powers over the trust property which an unmarried competent owner has over
individually owned property” and (ii) “any other powers appropriate to achieve
the proper . . . management . . . of the trust property.”172 In their commentary, the
drafters of the Uniform Trust Code explain that this section is “intended to grant
trustees the broadest possible powers, but to be exercised always in accordance with
the duties of the trustee and any limitations stated in the terms of the trust.”173

169

Id. at 80–81, 106.

170

Government entities and land trusts also have a responsibility to consider ex ante when it is
(and is not) appropriate to protect land in perpetuity with a conservation easement. In appropriate
circumstances, land protection tools that are more easily modiﬁable and terminable, such as leases or
management agreements, should be employed. 3EE 0ERPETUITY AND "EYOND SUPRA note 18, at 704–07
(discussing the circumstances in which it may (and may not) be appropriate to acquire perpetual
conservation easements).
See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 186; GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS
551 (West 2008) (“Implied powers are those which are not clearly and directly given
by the settlor or a court or by statute but which equity believes the creator of the trust or a court
granting express powers intended should exist. They are implied or inferred from the terms and
purposes of the trust. If a settlor has directed the trustee to accomplish a certain objective, he must
be deemed to have intended that the trustee use the ordinary and natural means for obtaining
that result.”) (emphasis in original). For an example of implied powers of a charitable trustee, see
Wilstach Estate, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 197 (1954) (holding that the trustees of an art collection had the
implied power to sell items out of the collection where such items were deemed to be making no
contribution to the collection as a whole).
171

AND TRUSTEES §

172

UTC, supra note 15, § 815(a)(2)(A), (B); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-815(a)(ii)(A), (B)

(2008).
173

UTC, supra note 15, § 815, cmt.
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One of the duties of a trustee is to administer the trust in accordance with its terms
and purposes.174 Accordingly, even in the absence of an amendment provision, the
holder of a conservation easement could be deemed to have the implied power
to agree to amendments that further the purpose and proper management of the
easement and are not inconsistent with its terms.175
Despite the Uniform Trust Code’s broad grant of power to a trustee to manage
trust property, courts traditionally have been reluctant to ﬁnd that a trustee
has powers not expressly granted in the trust instrument.176 The boundaries of
a holder’s implied power to agree to amendments that are consistent with the
purpose of a conservation easement are therefore uncertain. To increase clarity
and reduce litigation, government entities and land trusts should, at the time
of the acquisition of a conservation easement, negotiate for the express power
to agree to amendments that are consistent with the purpose of the easement
and memorialize that grant of discretion in the conservation easement deed
(as recommended by the Land Trust Alliance).177 And with regard to existing
conservation easements that do not contain an amendment provision, judicial or
legislative clariﬁcation of the extent of a holder’s power to simply agree to such
amendments may be desirable.178

174

See id. § 801; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-801.

175

3EE ALSO !MENDING 0ERPETUAL #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS SUPRA note 19, at 1075–77 (explaining
that conservation easements could be interpreted to grant their holders the implied power to agree
to amendments that are clearly neutral with respect to or enhance the charitable purposes of the
easements, and that such an interpretation would be consistent with the goals underlying the
charitable trust rules).
176
See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 186 (noting that, as a result, it is customary in
well-drawn instruments to make provisions in express words conferring upon the trustee powers
that are or may become necessary or appropriate for the efﬁcient administration of the trust).
177

Some land trusts reportedly do not negotiate for the inclusion of an amendment provision
in the conservation easement deeds they accept because they want to avoid giving easement grantors,
subsequent landowners, and the public the impression that conservation easements can be amended.
If a land trust intends to amend the easements it holds, it should negotiate for the discretion to do
so in good faith at the time it acquires easements and memorialize that grant of discretion in the
easement deeds. To do otherwise raises serious questions about the extent of the land trust’s legal
power to simply agree to amendments and potentially exposes the land trust to claims of fraudulent
solicitation. See also supra note 163 (noting the Land Trust Alliance’s admonition in its Amendment
Report that transparency of intent is also an ethical obligation).
178

See, e.g., UTC, supra note 15, § 201(c) (providing that a judicial proceeding involving a trust
may relate to any matter involving the trust’s administration, including a request for instructions
and an action to declare rights); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-201(c) (same). The comments to the UTC
provide in relevant part:
The jurisdiction of the court with respect to trust matters is inherent and historical
and also includes the ability to . . . provide a trustee with instructions even in the
absence of an actual dispute. . . . Traditionally, courts in equity have heard petitions
for instructions and have issued declaratory judgments if there is a reasonable doubt
as to the extent of the trustee’s powers or duties.
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Formal amendments may also be unnecessary in some cases. Letters of
interpretation from the holder are occasionally used in lieu of amendments to
clarify points of confusion or ambiguity.179 Strengthening the development or
use restrictions in an existing easement or adding land to an existing easement
should be viewed as an additional charitable gift (as opposed to an amendment
to the terms of an existing gift), and such an additional gift can be accomplished
through a separate instrument rather than an amendment in any event. Moreover,
as noted in the Land Trust Alliance’s recently published Amendment Report,
“[m]any future amendment requests can be avoided by careful drafting of
easements in the ﬁrst instance.”180

c. Doctrines of Administrative Deviation and Cy Pres
To the extent changed circumstances necessitate amendments to a
conservation easement that exceed the holder’s express or implied powers, the
holder can seek judicial approval of such amendments pursuant to the doctrine
of administrative deviation or the doctrine of cy pres, as the case may be. These
doctrines are distinct. The doctrine of administrative deviation applies to the
modiﬁcation of an administrative term (but not the purpose) of a trust, and is
sometimes described as permitting a court to modify the means by which the
purpose is to be accomplished.181 The doctrine of cy pres, on the other hand,
applies to the modiﬁcation of the charitable purpose of a trust.182

UTC, supra note 15, § 201 cmt. See also Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (1972)
and Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (2006), both of which allow for
the removal of restrictions placed by donors on the use of institutional funds outside of a court
proceeding in carefully prescribed circumstances. See Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Uniform State
Laws, Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (1972), available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1970s/umifa72.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2008); Nat’l Conf. of
Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (2006),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/umoifa/2006ﬁnal_act.htm (last visited Nov.
20, 2008) [hereinafter UPMIFA]. Cf. Part III infra, (explaining that there are constitutional limits
on the ability of state legislatures to control the administration of restricted charitable gifts and
charitable trusts).
179

See Sheila McGrory-Klyza, !N /UNCE OF 0REVENTION (EAD /FF &UTURE 6IOLATIONS 7ITH !N
)NTERPRETATION ,ETTER 27 SAVING LAND: J. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, Spring 2008, at 26 (discussing
the use of interpretation letters in lieu of amendments); see also O’Connor, supra note 144, at 9
(“Sometimes amendment of the easement is necessary to clarify points of confusion, although letters
of understanding between the easement holder and landowner should sufﬁce in many cases.”).
180

,4! !MENDMENT 2EPORT, supra note 44, at 19.

See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 157, at 182–84 (describing the doctrine of administrative
deviation and noting it is a complement to the doctrine of cy pres); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS,
supra note 11, § 67 cmt. a (describing the doctrine of administrative deviation as allowing courts, in
certain circumstances, to modify the means of accomplishing a trust purpose).
181

182
See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 157, at 173–82 (describing the doctrine of cy pres);
id. at 183 (“The power of the courts to permit deviations [from the terms of a trust] should not be
confused with the cy pres power. The latter is applicable when the purposes are no longer capable of
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Courts have traditionally been more willing to permit trustees to deviate
from the administrative terms (as opposed to the charitable purpose) of a trust.183
This is presumably because courts recognize that charitable donors are less likely
to be wedded to the administrative terms of their trusts, particularly if altering
administrative terms will better accomplish the donor’s overall charitable purpose.
In other words, courts presumably recognize that altering the administrative terms
of a trust is less likely to chill future charitable donations than altering the donor’s
speciﬁed charitable purpose.184

(1) Administrative Deviation
To the extent a holder wishes to amend the means by which the conservation
purpose of an easement is pursued, but the holder has neither the express nor
implied power to agree to the amendment, the holder should seek court approval
of the amendment pursuant to the doctrine of administrative deviation. Under
the traditional formulation of the doctrine of administrative deviation, a court
could authorize a trustee to deviate from an administrative term only if, owing to
circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him, compliance
with the term would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the
purposes of the trust.185 The modern tendency, however, has been to permit a trustee
to deviate from an administrative term in situations where continued compliance
with the term is deemed to be undesirable, inexpedient, or inappropriate, and
regardless of whether the settlor had foreseen the circumstances.186

being accomplished. The power to permit deviations does not usually extend to the purposes of the
trust, but is conﬁned to matters relating solely to administration.”).
183

See, e.g., Brody, supra note 12, at 1237 n. 171 (“If the restriction relates to the donor’s
charitable purpose, the courts apply the doctrine of cy pres. . . . By contrast, when the restriction is
merely administrative, the courts apply the more ﬂexible trust doctrine of equitable deviation.”).
See, e.g., BOGERT ET AL., supra note 171, § 561 (“The terms of the trust having to do with
the manner in which the trustee should act in order to obtain the primary objectives are not on the
same level of importance but are rather minor and auxiliary. The jurisdiction of equity to enforce
trusts should and does include the power to vary the details of administration which the settlor
has prescribed in order to secure the more important result of obtaining for the beneﬁciaries the
advantages which the settlor stated he wished them to have.”).
184

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 167. In re Pulitzer, 249 N.Y.S. 87
(N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1931), aff ’d mem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932), is a classic example of the
application of the doctrine of administrative deviation. Mr. Pulitzer created a trust for the beneﬁt of
his descendants, funded it with stock in a corporation that published a newspaper to which he had
devoted his life, and expressly forbade the trustees from selling the stock. When the newspaper later
became unproﬁtable and the prohibition on the sale of the stock threatened the trust corpus, the
trustees sought and received judicial approval to sell the stock. In approving the deviation from the
“no sale of stock” administrative term, the court explained “[t]he dominant purpose of Mr. Pulitzer
must have been the maintenance of a fair income for his children and the ultimate reception of the
unimpaired corpus by the remaindermen.” Id. at 94.
185

186
3EE !MENDING 0ERPETUAL #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS SUPRA note 19, at 1039; S.C. Dep’t of Mental
Health v. McMaster, 642 S.E.2d 552, 557 (S.C. 2007) (applying the doctrine of administrative
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Under the UTC and Wyoming’s version of the UTC, the standard for
administrative deviation is similarly liberal while not being unbridled. Both ﬁrst
provide that a court may modify the administrative terms of a trust if, because
of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modiﬁcation will further the
purposes of the trust.187 The comments to the UTC explain that the purpose of
this provision “is not to disregard the settlor’s intent but to modify inopportune
details to effectuate better the settlor’s broader purposes.”188 Both the UTC
and Wyoming’s version of the UTC also provide that a court may modify the
administrative terms of a trust if continuation of the trust on its existing terms
would be impracticable or wasteful or impair the trust’s administration.189 The
comments to the UTC explain that this provision “broadens the court’s ability to
modify the administrative terms of a trust” and “is an application of the requirement
. . . that a trust and its terms must be for the beneﬁt of its beneﬁciaries,” which,
in the conservation easement context, is the public.190 The comments further
explain that, “[a]lthough the settlor is granted considerable latitude in deﬁning
the purposes of the trust, the principle that a trust have a purpose which is for
the beneﬁt of its beneﬁciaries precludes unreasonable restrictions on the use of
trust property.”191 The UTC and Wyoming’s version of the UTC also speciﬁcally
authorize a court to (i) modify a trust to achieve the settlor’s tax objectives,
provided the modiﬁcation is not contrary to the settlor’s probable intention,192
and (ii) reform a trust to correct mistakes of fact or law.193
As the foregoing discussion indicates, courts in both common law and
UTC jurisdictions have fairly broad discretion to authorize a deviation from the
terms of a conservation easement, provided such deviation is consistent with the
easement’s overall purpose.

deviation to alter an administrative term of a charitable trust and explaining “[c]onsiderable
ﬂexibility will always be allowed in the details of the execution of a trust, so as to adapt it to the
changed conditions”).
187

UTC, supra note 15, § 412(a); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-413(a) (2008).

188

UTC, supra note 15, § 412 cmt. (noting also that, while it is necessary that there be
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, the circumstances may have been in existence when
the trust was created).
189

Id. § 412(b); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-413(b).

190

See UTC, supra note 15, § 412 cmt.

191

Id. See also David M. English, 4HE 5NIFORM 4RUST #ODE   3IGNIlCANT 0ROVISIONS AND
0OLICY )SSUES, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 169 (2002) (“The UTC provides for this increased ﬂexibility but
without disturbing the principle that the primary objective of trust law is to carry out the settlor’s
intent. The result is a liberalizing nudge, but one founded in traditional doctrine.”).
192

UTC, supra note 15, § 416; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-417.

193

UTC, supra note 15, § 415; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-416.
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(2) Cy Pres
To the extent a holder wishes to amend a conservation easement in a manner
contrary to its purpose (such as to permit subdivision and development of the
land),194 or to terminate the easement (which would clearly be contrary to its
purpose),195 the holder should be required to obtain court approval pursuant to
the doctrine of cy pres. Under the traditional formulation of the doctrine of cy
pres, if (i) the charitable purpose of a gift or trust becomes illegal, impossible, or
impracticable, and (ii) the donor is determined to have had a general charitable
intent, then (iii) a court can formulate a substitute plan for the use of the gift
or trust assets for a charitable purpose that is as near as possible to the purpose
speciﬁed by the donor.196
Courts and legislatures have made some modest changes to the traditional
formulation of the doctrine of cy pres.197 In states that have adopted the UTC, the
doctrine can now be applied if the charitable purpose of a trust becomes unlawful,
impossible, impracticable, or wasteful.198 The requirement of general charitable
intent is also generally no longer a barrier to the application of the doctrine.
Courts almost invariably ﬁnd that a donor had a general charitable intent if the
gift or trust fails after it has been in existence for some period of time, the UTC

194

See supra notes 131–143 and accompanying text (discussing the Myrtle Grove contro-

versy).
195

As previously noted, the purpose of a conservation easement generally is the protection of
the particular land encumbered by the easement for the conservation purposes speciﬁed in the deed
of conveyance in perpetuity.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 399 (“If property is given in
trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable
or illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention
to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the
application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable
intention of the settlor.”); RONALD CHESTER, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431 (3d ed. 2005) (explaining that the words “cy pres” are
Norman French for “as near,” and the phrase when expanded to its full implication was “cy pres
comme possible,” which meant “as near as possible”). Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539 (1867), is
perhaps the most famous example of the application of the doctrine of cy pres. That case involved a
charitable trust created to promote the abolition of slavery. When the purpose of the trust became
“impossible or impracticable” as a result of the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, the court applied the doctrine of cy pres and instructed the trustees to use the trust
assets to aid former slaves and assist necessitous persons of African descent.
196

197
Changes have been modest because of the principle of stare decisis and constitutional limits
on the ability of state legislatures to encroach upon the judicial cy pres power. See infra notes 331–341
and accompanying text.
198
UTC, supra note 15, § 413(a); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-414 (2008). See also infra note 281
(explaining that the wasteful standard was added to the UTC primarily to deal with the problem of
surplus funds and such standard should not be applied to authorize the termination of conservation
easements when purportedly “better” conservation opportunities present themselves).
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and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts apply a presumption of general charitable
intent, and some states have eliminated the requirement entirely.199 And courts
increasingly have determined that, upon the modiﬁcation of a trust pursuant to
the doctrine of cy pres, the substitute charitable purpose need not be the one
that is as near as possible to the donor’s original purpose, but simply one that
is “reasonably similar or close to” such purpose, or “‘falling within the general
charitable purpose’” of the settlor.200

2. The End of Perpetuity’s Incorrect Interpretation of Charitable Trust
0RINCIPLES
As should, by now, be clear, 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS analysis of the manner
in which the foregoing principles affect the amendment and termination of
conservation easements is incorrect. The article fails to acknowledge that ﬂexibility
to amend conservation easements consistent with their stated purposes can be and
often is built into conservation easement deeds through the use of an amendment
provision, and that the use of such provisions is strongly recommended by the
Land Trust Alliance.201 The article references implied powers only in passing,

199

See 2ETHINKING THE 0ERPETUAL .ATURE OF #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS, supra note 63, at 478–80.
See also UTC, supra note 15, § 413 cmt. (“Subsection (a) . . . modiﬁes the doctrine of cy pres by
presuming that the settlor had a general charitable intent . . . .”). Wyoming’s version of the UTC
similarly presumes the settlor had a general charitable intent. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-414(a).
200

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 11, § 67 cmt. d.

201

See supra Part II.D.1.a (discussing amendment provisions). 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY refers to
an amendment provision only once in a footnote. See 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 68, n.
193. This footnote provides in relevant part
if the easement grantor is well-enough represented to provide an amendment clause
in his or her conservation easement, the easement will be exempt from the doctrine
of cy pres; otherwise not. One has to wonder; if application of the doctrine is so
crucial to the proper management of conservation easements [should] having a
clever lawyer should [sic] exempt a grantor from its application.
This footnote illustrates the author’s misreading of charitable trust principles. As discussed in Part
II.D.1.a, supra, the typical amendment provision grants the holder of a conservation easement
broad discretion to agree to amendments, but only if the amendments are consistent with or further
the purpose of the easement. Accordingly, the typical amendment provision does not exempt a
conservation easement from the doctrine of cy pres, and it would be contrary to the requirements
for tax-deductible easements under federal tax law if it did. Rather, the holder of a conservation
easement containing a typical amendment provision would still be required to obtain court approval
in a cy pres proceeding to (i) terminate the easement (which would clearly be contrary to its purpose)
or (ii) amend it in a manner that is not consistent with its purpose (such as was attempted in the
Myrtle Grove controversy). Also, given the discussion of the wisdom of using amendment provisions
in the various iterations of the Conservation Easement Handbook, the Land Trust Alliance’s strong
recommendation in favor of the use of such provisions in its Amendment Report, and the increasing
focus of state attorneys general and the IRS on the issue of amendments (see supra note 19 and infra
notes 295 and 296 and accompanying text), any reasonably well-prepared attorney involved in a
conservation easement transaction would consider the issue of amendments to be a key component
of the negotiation process.
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quickly dismissing them as having little relevance,202 and conﬂates the doctrines
of administrative deviation and cy pres.203 The article also lumps all amendments
together, claiming, incorrectly, that charitable trust principles both require judicial
approval of every amendment in a cy pres proceeding and preclude most typical,
salutary, and reasonable amendments even with judicial review.204
As the discussion in the previous subpart indicates, charitable trust
principles should apply differently to different types of amendments—namely
(i) amendments that are consistent with or further the purpose of an easement
and (ii) amendments that are contrary to the purpose of an easement. The holder
of a conservation easement should be permitted to agree to amendments that are
consistent with or further the purpose of a conservation easement in one of three
ways:


pursuant to an express power granted to the holder in an amendment provision
included in the easement deed, the exercise of which should not be secondguessed by a court unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion;205



pursuant to the holder’s implied power to do what is necessary or appropriate
to carry out the terms of the easement;206 or



in the absence of an express or implied power, with court approval obtained
pursuant to the doctrine of administrative deviation, which is more ﬂexible
than the doctrine of cy pres.207

On the other hand, the holder of a conservation easement should be permitted
to agree to amendments that are contrary to the purpose of the easement (such as
those attempted in the Myrtle Grove controversy), or to the outright termination
of the easement (which would clearly be contrary to its purpose), only with court
approval in a cy pres proceeding.208
These principles do not unduly constrain the discretion of holders of
conservation easements given that (i) the Land Trust Alliance sanctions only
amendments that are consistent with or further the purpose of an easement
in its Standards and Practices, its Amendment Report, and the Conservation

202

See 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 68–69.

203

See id. at 68.

204

See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text.

205

See supra Part II.D.1.a.

206

See supra Part II.D.1.b.

207

See supra Part II.D.1.c.

208

See id.
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Easement Handbook,209 (ii) land trusts that have adopted formal amendment
policies generally authorize only such amendments,210 (iii) it is generally assumed
that only such amendments comply with federal tax law requirements,211 and
(iv) government entities and land trusts can and often do negotiate for the
inclusion of an amendment provision in conservation easement deeds that
expressly grants them the discretion to agree to such amendments.212 Indeed,
most of the “typical” amendments that 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY claims would be
precluded by the application of charitable trust principles are those that are likely
to be consistent with or further the purpose of a conservation easement and,
thus, could be agreed to by the holder pursuant to the discretion granted to it
in an amendment provision.213 Moreover, the requirement under state charitable

209

See supra notes 49–58 and accompanying text.

210

For example, The Vermont Land Trust’s amendment policy provides that amendments that
“have a better or at least neutral effect on the resources conserved” may be recommended to the
Board for approval, and lists consistency with “the overall purposes of the conservation easement”
and “any other written expressions of the original Grantor’s intent” as amendment principles.
,4! !MENDMENT 2EPORT, supra note 44, at Appendix A-1. The Nature Conservancy’s amendment
policy provides that, before authorizing an amendment, its staff must “make a determination
that the proposed changes would not in any way diminish the overall goals and objectives of the
original conservation easement” and “the Conservancy is bound by the conservation purposes as
outlined in the original conservation easement.” Id. at Appendix A-2. The Colorado Open Lands
amendment policy provides that “[a]n amendment must have either a beneﬁcial or neutral effect
on the conservation values protected by the conservation easement.” Id. at Appendix A-3. The
Marin Agricultural Land Trust’s amendment policy provides “[t]he proposed amendment [must]
strengthen or have a neutral effect on the Protected Values of the easement. No amendment will
be considered that could result in a net degradation of the Protected Values” and “[t]he proposed
amendment [must be] consistent with the purpose of the easement.” Id. at Appendix A-4. The
Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests’s amendment policy provides that an
amendment must not be inconsistent with the purposes of the original easement and the policy
does not permit modiﬁcations “where additional land outside the easement Property is protected
in return for modiﬁcation of the easement.” Id. at Appendix A-5. The Brandywine Conservancy’s
amendment policy provides that “an amendment must be consistent with the conservation purposes
of the existing easement” and, “if the landowner initiates the amendment, it must provide a net
conservation beneﬁt.” Id. at Appendix A-6.
211

See supra note 159 and accompanying text.

212

See supra Part II.D.1.a.

213

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY refers to the following as typical amendments, “the correction of
technical errors in the easement document; clariﬁcation of ambiguities; tightening of restrictions;
expansion of the area covered by the easement; relocation or modiﬁcation of reserved development
rights; increase in [a landowner’s] reserved rights in exchange for increased conservation on the
easement parcel; . . . and modiﬁcations to reﬂect changes in the law, or to improve enforcement
and management of the easement.” 3EE 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 67–68. All such
amendments could, in the right circumstances, be consistent with or further the purpose of a
conservation easement. The extent to which any of these amendments are “typical,” however, is
unclear. See, e.g., infra notes 231–233 and accompanying text (discussing the low reported rate of
amendments agreed to by land trusts); supra note 159 (discussing the Senate Finance Committee’s
concern with “trade-off ” amendments due to the difﬁculty in weighing increases and decreases in
conservation beneﬁts).
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trust law of court approval in a cy pres proceeding for the outright termination
of a conservation easement, or for amendments that are contrary to the purpose
of an easement, is consistent with federal tax law requirements applicable to taxdeductible conservation easements.214
It may, of course, sometimes be unclear whether a proposed amendment is
consistent with or contrary to the purpose of a conservation easement. As previously
explained, however, courts should not second-guess a holder’s exercise of its power
to amend a conservation easement pursuant to an amendment provision included
in the easement deed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.215 On the other hand,
highly questionable calls should be subject to state attorney general and court
oversight to ensure that the public interest and investment in the conservation
easement is protected.216
To summarize, contrary to the assertions made in 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY,
applying charitable trust principles to conservation easements would not
(i) categorically deny easement holders the right to amend conservation easements
“on their own”; (ii) require holders to obtain judicial sanction of every amendment
in a cy pres proceeding; or (iii) preclude most typical, salutary, and reasonable
amendments even with judicial review. Rather, amendments that are consistent
with or further the charitable purpose of an easement could be agreed to through
the exercise of a holder’s express or implied powers, or with court approval
obtained in a more ﬂexible administrative deviation proceeding. It is only when
a holder wishes to terminate a conservation easement, or modify it in a manner
contrary to its stated purpose (as was attempted in the Myrtle Grove controversy),
that court approval in a cy pres proceeding would be required.

% !MENDMENTS ARE .OT A 2ELATIVELY #OMMON /CCURRENCE
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY asserts that “[e]asement modiﬁcation (amendment)
is a relatively common occurrence.”217 This representation is inconsistent with
what appears to be both reported and common knowledge in the land trust

214

See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing federal tax law requirements as they
relate to amendments); infra notes 302–306 and accompanying text (discussing federal tax law
requirements generally).
215

See supra Part II.D.1.a.

216

The Myrtle Grove controversy is a case in point. See supra notes 131–143 and accompanying

217

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 26 n.3.

text.
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community.218 While some land trusts have written amendment policies,219 and,
as discussed above, negotiate for the inclusion of an amendment provision in the
easement deeds they accept, amendments are, in fact, not a relatively common
occurrence.
The Land Trust Alliance’s Standards and Practices speciﬁcally provide that
easement amendments “are not routine,”220 and the commentary thereto explains
that amendments “are not common.”221 The 2005 edition of the Conservation
Easement Handbook explains:
When the terms of an easement are negotiated, both the
landowner and the holder should consider those provisions
unchangeable. Although altered circumstances and conditions
may someday justify an amendment to the document, an
organization or landowner should never agree to a conservation
easement with the idea that its terms will be changed later.222
The Land Trust Alliance’s recently published Amendment Report similarly
provides that conservation easements should be amended only in “exceptional
circumstances.”223 And the Amendment Report concludes by providing the
following “key points” to land trusts regarding amendments:

218
While adding land to, or strengthening the development and use restrictions in, existing
conservation easements may be relatively common and uncontroversial, as noted in Part II.D.1.b,
supra, those actions should be viewed as the making of additional charitable gifts rather than
modiﬁcations to the terms or purposes of existing gifts.
219

See supra note 210 (describing a number of land trust amendment policies); Jason B. van
Doren, 3UMMARY OF THE  #ONSERVATION %ASEMENT 6IOLATIONS  !MENDMENTS 3TUDY EXCHANGE:
J. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, Summer 2005, 24, 25 (noting that forty-ﬁve percent of the land trusts
surveyed had a written amendment policy).
220

,4! 3TANDARDS AND 0RACTICES, supra note 48, at 14 (Practice 11I. Amendments).

221

#OMMENTARY ON 0RACTICE ) supra note 51.

2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 183. This language was
carried forward in only slightly modiﬁed form from the 1988 edition of the Conservation Easement
Handbook, which provides:
222

When the terms of an easement are negotiated, both the grantor and the grantee
should consider those provisions unchangeable. Although altered circumstances
and conditions may someday justify an amendment to the document, amendments
should be viewed with extreme caution. No organization or property owner should
ever agree to a conservation easement with the idea that its terms will be changed
later.
1988 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 121 (emphasis in original).
223
,4! !MENDMENT 2EPORT, supra note 44, at 9 (“Exceptional circumstances sometimes warrant
easement amendments . . . .”); id. at 32 (“To minimize risks, the land trust’s amendment policy and
supporting materials should underscore that easements are perpetual, amended only in exceptional
circumstances, and that all amendments must clearly serve the public interest—not solely the interests
of the landowner.”) (emphasis added).
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Focus on good initial easement drafting to avoid the need for
future amendments to the greatest extent possible. Adopt and
use standard easement format and boilerplate provisions that
reduce errors and ambiguity.
Discuss the land trust’s amendment policy with the easement
donor/grantor and any direct funders of the project and include
in the easement deed an amendment provision that expressly
grants the land trust the desired level of amendment discretion.
Consider amendments with great caution; amendments should
NEVER BE VIEWED AS THE NORM.224
The amendment policies adopted by many land trusts reﬂect a similarly
conservative approach to amendments. In addition to limiting amendments to
those that are consistent with or further the purpose of a conservation easement,225
such policies generally provide that amendments are reserved for exceptional,
extraordinary, and very limited, special circumstances. For example, The Nature
Conservancy (“TNC”), which held conservation easements encumbering over
2.3 million acres as of 2008,226 provides in its amendment policy:
Conservation easements held by the Conservancy should be
designed and written so as to avoid the need for an amendment
or modiﬁcation of the easement terms. It is the Conservancy’s
presumption that a conservation easement will not be amended
or modiﬁed. In exceptional cases or in unforeseen circumstances,
this presumption may be rebutted provided [TNC’s amendment
procedures, which comply with charitable trust principles, are
followed].227
The Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests (“SPNHF”), a wellrespected state-wide land trust, provides in its amendment policy:

224

Id. at 85 (emphasis added).

225

See supra note 210 and accompanying text.

226

Conservation Easement Modiﬁcations—The Nature Conservancy’s Approach and Experience, Philip Tabas, VP/General Counsel, February 15, 2008 (on ﬁle with authors).
227
,4! !MENDMENT 2EPORT, supra note 44, at Appendix A-2. TNC’s amendment procedures
require that, other than with respect to amendments that are de minimis, involve the imposition
of additional restrictions on the encumbered property, or are in the nature of a clariﬁcation of the
terms of an easement rather than a change thereto, the organization must secure the approval of
the relevant state authority that provides oversight of charitable organizations in the state where the
property is located (generally the state attorney general) and seek court approval when appropriate.
Id.
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SPNHF’s conservation easements are achieved through
voluntary agreements with landowners. Once an easement is
executed, SPNHF is bound to uphold the terms of the easement
as negotiated. SPNHF’s record in upholding the terms and
purposes of the original easement will determine whether future
donors will put their trust in SPNHF.
It is SPNHF’s policy to hold and enforce conservation easements
as written. Amendments to conservation easements will be
authorized only under exceptional circumstances and then only
under [SPNHF’s amendment guidelines].228
The Brandywine Conservancy, a well-respected regional land trust, provides in its
amendment policy:
Amendment is an extraordinary procedure and not available to
a landowner as a matter of right, unless the easement itself or
Federal, state, or local law mandates that a particular amendment
must be adopted.229
And the Little Traverse Conservancy, another well-respected regional land trust,
provides in its amendment policy:
The Little Traverse Conservancy acquires and holds conservation
easements for the purpose of protecting land for the beneﬁt of
current and future generations. Prior to donating or selling their
conservation easement, landowners are assured that the easement
is permanent. The Conservancy has an obligation to monitor,
enforce, and uphold conservation easements to assure that these
conservation easements will stand the test of time.
Conservation easement amendments are viewed by the
Conservancy as being appropriate in only very limited, special
circumstances.230

228

Id. at Appendix A-5. The New Hampshire Attorney General is working with SPNHF
to develop guidelines regarding Attorney General and court oversight of conservation easement
modiﬁcations and terminations pursuant to charitable trust principles. See supra note 19.
229

,4! !MENDMENT 2EPORT, supra note 44, at Appendix A-6. The mission of the Brandywine
Conservancy, which is located in Chadds Ford, Pennsylvania, is “to conserve the natural and cultural
resources of the Brandywine River watershed and other selected areas with a primary emphasis on
conservation of water quantity and quality.” Brandywine Conservancy, Environmental Management
Center, Our Mission, http://www.brandywineconservancy.org/conserving.html (last visited Nov.
21, 2008).
230

Little Traverse Conservancy Land Protection Policy: Policy For Amendments to Conservation Easements (on ﬁle with authors), available at http://learningcenter.lta.org/attached-
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Finally, studies conducted by the Land Trust Alliance conﬁrm that conservation
easement amendments are relatively rare.231 The more recent study, which was
based on data gathered from the over 1,000 land trusts that responded to the
Land Trust Alliance’s 2003 National Land Trust Census, reports that “[t]he total
number of conservation easement amendments reported . . . [represents] about
2.5 percent of the total 17,847 easements [held by land trusts].”232 The earlier
study, conducted in 1999, found that only “[a]pproximately 4 percent of the more
than 7,400 conservation easements held by local and regional land trusts ha[d]
been amended . . . .”233 Accordingly, contrary to the assertion made in 4HE %ND OF
0ERPETUITY, amendments to conservation easements are not a “relatively common
occurrence.” Rather, amendments are the exception rather than the rule, and are
reserved for exceptional, extraordinary, and very limited, special circumstances.

F. Standing to Sue
The standing rules that apply in the charitable context are designed to
balance the need to protect charitable organizations from nuisance suits with the
need for organizational accountability.234 In the conservation easement context,
this balancing can be described as follows. Government and nonproﬁt holders
of conservation easements need the freedom to administer the easements they
hold without fear of possible nuisance suits by neighboring landowners or
ﬁles/0/50/5086/12_03.doc (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). The mission of the Little Traverse Conservancy is “to protect the natural diversity and beauty of northern Michigan by preserving signiﬁcant
land and scenic areas, and fostering appreciation and understanding of the environment.” Little
Traverse Conservancy, About Us, Mission Statement, http://landtrust.org/LTC/aboutusTABLE.
htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
231

See van Doren, supra note 219; René Wieser, #ONSERVATION %ASEMENT !MENDMENTS 2ESULTS
FROM A 3TUDY OF ,AND 4RUSTS EXCHANGE: J. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, Spring 2000, 9.
232

See van Doren, supra note 219, at 26.

233

See Wieser, supra note 231, at 9 (quoting Jean Hocker, then President of the Land Trust
Alliance, as stating “[t]he fact that so few easements have been amended indicates that land trusts
have been appropriately cautious about making amendments”).
234

As explained by the Panel on the Nonproﬁt Sector:
Courts and state legislatures have been unwilling to subject charitable organizations
to the risk of unrestricted claims of breach of trust by members of the public for
good reason: the potential for nuisance lawsuits would deter service on charitable
boards and the cost of defending such claims would come out of charitable funds.
States have addressed the need to balance protection from such lawsuits with
organizational accountability by granting standing to sue to a limited number of
persons . . . .

3TRENGTHENING THE 4RANSPARENCY 'OVERNANCE AND !CCOUNTABILITY OF #HARITABLE /RGANIZATIONS !
3UPPLEMENT TO THE &INAL 2EPORT TO #ONGRESS AND THE .ONPROlT 3ECTOR (Panel on the Nonproﬁt Sector),
April 2006, at 29, available at www.nonproﬁtpanel.org/Report/index.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2008) [hereinafter 3UPPLEMENT TO .ONPROlT 2EPORT]. The Panel on the Nonproﬁt Sector was convened
in October 2004 at the encouragement of the leaders of the Senate Finance Committee to consider
and recommend actions to strengthen good governance and ethical conduct within public charities
and private foundations. See id. at 3.
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other members of the public because such suits could entail the expenditure of
signiﬁcant public or charitable funds on unwarranted litigation and discourage
service on land trust boards. On the other hand, as evidenced by (ICKS V $OWD,235
the Myrtle Grove controversy,236 and the Wal-Mart controversy,237 there must be
a means by which grantees of conservation easements can be held accountable for
actions taken or not taken that are in violation of their ﬁduciary obligations to
both easement grantors and the public. Negligence, malfeasance, and the use of
assets for purposes other than those speciﬁed by the donor are not unknown in the
charitable context,238 and there is no reason to believe that the government entities
and land trusts holding conservation easements will be the ﬁrst class of entities in
history to be immune to such abuses. In fact, a variety of factors would support
the view that such entities should be subject to more oversight than the typical
holder of charitable assets, rather than less, including (i) the signiﬁcant public
investment in conservation easements and the conservation and historic values
they protect,239 (ii) the enormous economic value inherent in the development and
use rights restricted by conservation easements,240 (iii) the political, ﬁnancial, and

235

See supra note 3.

236

See supra notes 131–143 and accompanying text.

237

In the Wal-Mart controversy, Chattanooga County, Tennessee, which held a perpetual
conservation easement, permitted the construction of a four-lane road across the protected land to
provide access to a Wal-Mart SuperCenter. 3EE 0ERPETUITY AND "EYOND SUPRA note 18, at 695–700.
Several environmental groups and a citizen ﬁled suit alleging, inter alia, that the road violated
the terms of the easement. See id. at 696–97. The case settled on terms favorable to the public, as
beneﬁciary of the easement, and in accordance with charitable trust principles. See id. at 698.
238
See FREMONT-SMITH supra note 157, at 19–115 (describing the history of charitable trust
law and the need, evident from almost the ﬁrst emergence of charities as legal entities, for the
supervision of those entrusted with charitable assets to help prevent negligence, maladministration,
and diversion of such assets to purposes contrary to those speciﬁed by the donors). See also Marion
Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, 7RONGDOING BY /FlCERS AND $IRECTORS OF #HARITIES ! 3URVEY OF
0RESS 2EPORTS  , 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25 (Oct. 2003); Marion R. Fremont-Smith,
0ILLAGING OF #HARITABLE !SSETS %MBEZZLEMENT AND &RAUD, 46 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REVIEW 333 (Dec.
2004); Stephanie Strom, 2EPORT 3KETCHES #RIME #OSTING "ILLIONS 4HEFT &ROM #HARITIES N.Y. TIMES,
March 29, 2008, at A10.
239
The public investment in conservation easements is substantial and takes many forms,
including (i) the generous federal (and, in some cases, state) tax beneﬁts provided to easement
donors, (ii) the signiﬁcant public funds being appropriated for easement purchase programs, (iii) the
tax-exempt status of the land trusts acquiring easements, and (iv) public funding of the operations
of the government entities acquiring and enforcing easements.
240

A conservation easement can reduce the fair market value of the land it encumbers by
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. See, e.g., Tax Incentives, supra note 42, at 25
(noting, in 2004, that in the 17 reported conservation easement valuation cases, courts determined
that the easements had reduced the value of land they encumber at the time of their donation
by as much as $4.97 million and as little as $20,800, with an average diminution in value of
approximately 43%). See also supra note 3, noting that the conservation easement at issue in (ICKS
V $OWD had an estimated value of over $1 million at the time it was donated in 1993. Given
the increase in land values and development pressures in Wyoming since 1993, that conservation
easement is likely worth considerably more now.
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other pressures that may be brought to bear on both governmental and nonproﬁt
holders to substantially modify, release, or terminate conservation easements, and
(iv) the increasing importance of land conservation as undeveloped land becomes
more scarce.
If the only parties with standing to sue to enforce a conservation easement
were the owner of the encumbered land and the holder of the easement, as The
%ND OF 0ERPETUITY suggests,241 there would be no party able to call the holder of
a conservation easement to account if it breached the ﬁduciary duties it should
be deemed to have accepted when it accepted the easement.242 While that lack
of oversight might suit some of the governmental and land trust holders of
conservation easements, it would clearly be contrary to the public interest and
investment in such easements. 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY objects to the notion that the
state attorney general or other representative of the public might have standing to
“second guess” the decision of a land trust and landowner to substantially modify
or terminate a conservation easement.243 But in no other charitable context are
those entrusted with charitable assets to be used for speciﬁc purposes the ﬁrst,
last, and only authority on fundamental matters relating to the management and
disposition of such assets. Moreover, for the reasons noted immediately above, it
would be unwise (as well as unprecedented) to specially exempt charitable gifts of
conservation easements from the principles that govern the administration of all
other charitable gifts.
The standing rules in the charitable context are also carefully calibrated to
balance the competing needs of administrative efﬁciency and organizational
accountability. Accordingly, it is unlikely that government or nonproﬁt holders
will be subject to nuisance suits as a result of the application of charitable
principles to conservation easements. In most cases standing to enforce a restricted
charitable gift or charitable trust has been limited to the state attorney general.244

241

See 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 63–67.

242

Pursuant to the Uniform Conservation Easement Act and Wyoming’s version of that act,
an entity eligible to be a holder of a conservation easement may be granted a third-party right of
enforcement in a conservation easement deed. See UCEA, supra note 14, §§ 1(3), (3)(a)(3); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1-201(b)(iii), -203(a)(iii) (2008). Granting standing to such a third party is
optional, however, and the holder must consent to the grant as a party to the easement. Accordingly,
such third parties cannot be relied upon to call easement holders to account for breaches of their
ﬁduciary duties.
243

See 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 63–64.

244

See Susan Gary, 2EGULATING THE -ANAGEMENT OF #HARITIES 4RUST ,AW #ORPORATE ,AW AND 4AX
,AW 21 U. HAWAII L. REV. 593, 619 (1999) (“[S]tanding to enforce breaches of ﬁduciary duties
in the charitable context is still limited in most cases to the attorney general.”); FREMONT-SMITH,
supra note 157, at 324 (“The common law not only conferred supervisory powers and duties on the
attorney general to enforce charitable funds, . . . it largely excluded other members of the general
public from so doing.”).
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This is “based not on a denial of the public’s interest, but on the purely practical
consideration that it would be impossible to manage charitable funds, or even to
ﬁnd individuals to take on the task, if ﬁduciaries were to be constantly subject to
harassing litigation.”245
A leading treatise on trust law explains the rationale for granting standing to
the state attorney general in the charitable context:
The public beneﬁts arising from [a] charitable trust justify the
selection of some public ofﬁcial for its enforcement. Since the
Attorney General protects the rights of the people of the state,
he has been chosen as the protector, supervisor, and enforcer
of charitable trusts, both in England and in the several states.
This is true either because of a speciﬁc delegation of that power
by statute, by reason of a general statutory statement of his
duties, because of judicial decision, or some combination of the
above.246
The public beneﬁts arising from a conservation easement similarly justify the
selection of the Attorney General as the protector, supervisor, and enforcer of the
easement. Accordingly, the state attorney general should have standing to sue to
enforce a conservation easement on behalf of the public.247
In some cases courts have also granted standing to enforce a charitable trust
to co-trustees or co-directors of charitable organizations.248 For example, Holt v.
#OLLEGE OF /STEOPATHIC 0HYSICIANS  3URGEONS, the Supreme Court of California

245

FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 157, at 324–25.

CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 196, § 411. See also Holt v. College of Osteopathic
Physicians and Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 935 (Cal. 1964) (explaining “[b]eneﬁciaries of a charitable
trust, unlike beneﬁciaries of a private trust, are ordinarily indeﬁnite and therefore unable to enforce
the trust in their own behalf. . . . Since there is usually no one willing to assume the burdens of a
legal action, or who could properly represent the interests of the trust or the public, the Attorney
General has been empowered to oversee charities as the representative of the public, a practice
having its origin in the early common law”).
246

247

This was recognized by the drafters of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act. The act
grants standing to (i) an owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the easement, (ii) a
holder of the easement, (iii) a person having a third-party right of enforcement, and (iv) any person
authorized by other law. UCEA, supra note 14, § 3(a). The comments to the act explain “the Act also
recognizes that the state’s other applicable law may create standing in other persons. For example,
independently of the Act, the Attorney General could have standing in his capacity as supervisor of
charitable trusts, either by statute or at common law.” Id. § 3 cmt. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 391 cmt. a (noting that, in some states, the local district or county
attorney rather than the attorney general is charged with maintaining suits to enforce charitable
trusts).
See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 157, at 334. See also CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra
note 196, § 411 (“A few state statutes permit proceedings to enforce a charitable trust or to remedy
248
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granted standing to a minority of the directors of a charitable corporation to
sue to redress alleged breaches of trust by the majority.249 The court noted that,
although the Attorney General has primary responsibility for the enforcement of
charitable trusts, the need for adequate enforcement is not wholly fulﬁlled by the
authority given him.250 The court explained:
The Attorney General may not be in a position to become aware of
wrongful conduct or to be sufﬁciently familiar with the situation
to appreciate its impact, and the various responsibilities of his
ofﬁce may also tend to make it burdensome for him to institute
legal actions except in situations of serious public detriment.251
The court pointed out that, because co-trustees and co-directors are both few
in number and charged with the duty of managing the charity’s affairs, they are
unlikely to subject a charity to harassing litigation.252 They are also in the best
position to learn about breaches of trust and bring the relevant facts to a court’s
attention.253 This is certainly the case with regard to land trusts, many of which
have small boards of directors, operate at the local level, and make decisions with
regard to the easements they hold that are not readily apparent to the state attorney
general or the public because they relate to privately-owned land to which the
public may not have visual or physical access.254

a breach of trust to be commenced by one other than the Attorney General, such as a co-trustee or
an ofﬁcer or director of a charitable corporation.”).
249

See Holt, 394 P.2d at 932.

250

Id. at 936.

251

Id. at 935.

252

Id. at 936.

253

Id. (noting also that permitting suits by co-directors and co-trustees does not usurp the
responsibility of the Attorney General, since he would be a necessary party to such litigation). See
also 3UPPLEMENT TO .ONPROlT 2EPORT supra note 234, at 29 (“States have addressed the need to balance
protection from [harassing] lawsuits with organizational accountability by granting standing to sue
to a limited number of persons, such as directors and trustees, who are well-positioned to know if
the charity is not behaving appropriately and are unlikely to bring frivolous actions.”).
254
Tax-deductible conservation easements protecting habitat or an ecosystem need not grant
the public either physical or visual access to the subject property. See Treas. Reg. § 170A-14(d)(3)(iii).
Physical or visual access to property encumbered by an open-space easement donated pursuant to
a “clearly delineated governmental policy” is similarly not required unless the conservation purpose
of the donation would be “undermined or frustrated” without public access. See id. § 1.170A-14(d)
(4)(iii)(C). See also STEPHEN J. SMALL, FEDERAL TAX LAW OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 5-2 (1997)
(explaining that, when Congress was considering revisions to the federal charitable income tax
deduction provision for conservation easement donations in 1980, a number of Congressmen and
interest groups were strongly opposed to a requirement of public access to easement-encumbered
land, claiming that “donors who had to ‘open up’ their land to the public simply would not be
interested in making easement donations”).
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Courts also occasionally grant standing to private persons who are deemed to
have a “special interest” in the enforcement of a charitable trust. To obtain such
a grant of standing, however, a person generally must show that she is entitled to
receive a beneﬁt under the trust that is not merely the beneﬁt to which members of
the public in general are entitled.255 Premised on the proposition that the attorney
general is best suited to represent the interests of the public, courts traditionally
have been conservative in granting standing to parties with a special interest
((ICKS V $OWD being a case in point).256 In a review of standing cases involving
charitable trusts decided between 1980 and 2001, Marion Fremont-Smith,
author of 'OVERNING .ONPROlT /RGANIZATIONS, determined “[t]he overriding factor
in almost every one of the cases in which individuals were granted standing was
the lack of effective enforcement by the attorney general or another government
ofﬁcial.”257 As Professor Susan Gary explains:
Courts will defer to a determination previously made by the
attorney general. That is, if the attorney general has reviewed
the case and declined to pursue it, a court is unlikely to grant
standing to a private party, especially in a state with a strong
record of charitable enforcement by the attorney general. In
contrast, if the court perceives lax enforcement efforts or lack
of resources or interest on the part of the attorney general, the

255

See, e.g., SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 391.

256

In (ICKS V $OWD discussed supra note 3, the Wyoming Supreme Court denied standing
to sue to enforce a conservation easement to a resident of the county in which the protected
land is located, but invited the Wyoming Attorney General to reassess his position with regard
to the case. See also, e.g., Rhone v. Adams, 986 So. 2d 374 (Ala. 2007) (holding that a church
and a school, which were among numerous entities that could, in the trustees’ discretion, receive
charitable contributions under a charitable trust, did not have standing to maintain an action for
the enforcement of the trust because they were merely potential as opposed to actual beneﬁciaries
of the trust); In re Clement Trust, 679 N.W.2d 31 (Iowa 2004) (holding that a local community
center did not have standing to maintain an action for the enforcement of a charitable trust because
the center was merely a potential beneﬁciary of the trust); Nixon v. Hutcherson, 96 S.W.3d 81 (Mo.
2003) (holding that parents who were potential beneﬁciaries of an education trust to beneﬁt needy
children did not have standing to maintain an action for the enforcement of the trust because their
interest was no greater than the interest of all other members of the putative class); Forest Guardians
v. Powell, 24 P.3d 803 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that children attending New Mexico public
schools did not have standing to maintain an action for the enforcement of a school lands trust
created under a state statute, which constituted a charitable trust); In re Milton Hershey Sch., 911
A.2d 1258 (Pa. 2006) (holding that the alumni association of the Milton Hershey School did not
have standing to question an agreement reached between the board of managers of the school and
the Pennsylvania Attorney General regarding the administration of the school, and explaining that
the trust agreement did not contemplate the alumni association acting as a “shadow board” with
standing to challenge actions taken by the managing board).
257

FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 157, at 331, 333.
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court may be willing to supplement the “ofﬁcial” enforcement
and grant standing to a private party with special interests.258
On balance, the courts have been appropriately conservative in granting standing
to parties with a special interest. Accordingly, treating conservation easements as
charitable trusts is unlikely to expose holders of easements to harassment by such
parties.
The UTC expands the traditional common law rule regarding who has
standing to sue to enforce a charitable trust to include the settlor of a charitable
trust.259 Professor Ronald Chester explains the reason for this expansion:

258

See Gary, supra note 244, at 628. For examples of grants of standing to parties with a special
interest, see Hooker v. The Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608 (D.C. 1990) (granting standing to elderly
indigent widows eligible for admittance to a charitable home for the aged when the board of trustees
proposed to close the home and relocate the residents because the widows were members of a small
sharply deﬁned class of potential beneﬁciaries and were challenging whether the trustees’ proposed
action was compatible with the settlor’s intent rather than the day-to-day management of the trust);
Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc’y v. Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022 (Haw. 1988) (granting standing to members
of the public who used a public park to sue to enjoin the lease of a portion of the park for use as a
restaurant where the attorney general actively joined in supporting the alleged breach of trust); In
re Trust of Hill, 509 N.W. 2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (granting standing to sue to enforce
a charitable trust to an individual who was both a former trustee of the trust and a descendant of
the settlor because such individual was “in a position to understand the purpose and operation of
the trust” and the attorney general had elected not to participate in the proceedings); Paterson v.
Paterson Gen. Hosp. 235 A.2d 487, 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (granting standing to sue
to prevent the relocation of a charitable hospital corporation to a nearby township to the city in
which the corporation was located and to two individual residents and taxpayers of the city because
“[w]hile public supervision of the administration of charities remains inadequate, a liberal rule as to
the standing of a plaintiff to complain about the administration of a charitable trust or charitable
corporation seems decidedly in the public interest”). See also Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Standing To
%NFORCE 4RUSTS 2ENEWING AND %XPANDING 0ROFESSOR 'AUBATZS  $ISCUSSION OF 3ETTLOR %NFORCEMENT
62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713, 721 (2008) (arguing that, based on “the unusually comprehensive and
reﬁned, and fundamentally sound, reasoning” of the court in (OOKER, “[i]f, as has become common
in recent years, a conservation easement is granted to a governmental entity or other nonproﬁt
organization to be held upon charitable trust or the equivalent (usually, for tax reasons, perpetually),
owners of adjoining or perhaps nearby land, and in some circumstances others, such as downstream
land owners, who beneﬁt more than the public generally should be recognized as having specialinterest standing [but only] to compel adherence to the easement’s charitable purpose” and not to
question the day-to-day management of the easement).
259
See UTC, supra note 15, § 405(c) (“The settlor of a charitable trust, among others,
may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-406(c) (same). The
traditional rule regarding who has standing to sue to enforce a charitable trust is summarized in the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts:

A suit can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney
General or other public ofﬁcer, or by a co-trustee, or by a person who has a special
interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by persons who have no
special interest or by the settlor or his heirs, personal representatives or next of kin.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 391.
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Charitable trust abuses are not being effectively policed in
most jurisdictions because of lax attorney general oversight and
restrictive standing rules for “specially interested beneﬁciaries.”
More enforcement certainly is needed, which is one reason for the
[grant of standing to settlors]. . . . The grantor is a logical source
to provide such additional enforcement because of his particular
interest in the observance of the terms of the transfer.260
Pursuant to the UTC settlor standing provision, which has been adopted
in Wyoming, the donor of a conservation easement should have standing to sue
to enforce the easement.261 Of course, easement donors eventually die, and it
remains to be seen whether the donor of a conservation easement who has sold
or otherwise transferred the encumbered land would have an interest in suing to
enforce the easement. Easement donors who have sold or otherwise transferred
the encumbered land may be disinclined to expend (or simply may not have) the
time and resources required to litigate, or may have other reasons for not wishing
to enforce the easement.262
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY misconstrues the manner in which the UTC’s grant
of standing to the settlor of a charitable trust would apply in the conservation
easement context by failing to understand that the “trust” at issue is the restricted
grant of the easement rather than the entity holding the easement.263 As noted
above, the “settlor” who should be granted standing to sue to enforce a conservation
easement under the UTC is the donor of the easement. The founders of the
organization holding the easement, the successors of such founders, the original
ofﬁcers and board members of the organization and their successors, the trustees

260
Ronald Chester, 'RANTOR 3TANDING TO %NFORCE #HARITABLE 4RANSFERS 5NDER 3ECTION C OF THE
5NIFORM 4RUST #ODE AND 2ELATED ,AW (OW )MPORTANT )S )T AND (OW %XTENSIVE 3HOULD )T "E 37 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 611, 628–29 (2003).
261
Both the UTC and Wyoming’s version of the UTC provide that the “settlor” of a “charitable
trust” may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust. See UTC, supra note 15, § 405(c); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 4-10-406(c). Both deﬁne “settlor” to include a person “who creates . . . a trust.” See
UTC, supra note 15, § 103(15); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-103(a)(xviii). The comments to the
UTC provide that “the creation and transfer of an easement for conservation or preservation will
frequently create a charitable trust.” See UTC, supra note 15, § 414 cmt. Accordingly, the donor of a
conservation easement should be viewed as the settlor of a charitable trust and should have standing
to sue to enforce the easement on that ground. See also supra Parts I.A, II.A, and II.B. (explaining in
detail why the donation of a conservation easement to a government entity or charitable organization
should be viewed as creating a charitable trust or its functional equivalent).
262
The Lowhams, through the Lowham Limited Partnership, donated the easement involved
in (ICKS V $OWD to the Board of Commissioners. See supra note 3. Accordingly, the Lowhams,
through the partnership, are the “settlors” of the trust created by the conveyance of the easement and
should have standing to sue to enforce the easement on that ground. The Lowhams have, however,
declined to become involved in the case for undisclosed reasons.
263

See supra note 261.
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past, present, and future of the organization, and anyone who contributed cash
or other property to the organization are not “settlors” of the trust created by
the gift of a conservation easement.264 One can analogize to a gift of cash to
the University of Wyoming to be used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose, such as
to fund scholarships for students majoring in political science. The donation of
the cash to the University should be deemed to create a charitable trust (or its
functional equivalent) of which the University should be deemed to be acting as
trustee.265 The University should have a duty to administer the trust in accordance
with the donor’s speciﬁed purpose,266 and, under the UTC, the trust should be
enforceable by the donor as “settlor.”267 However, the myriad of other donors to
the University, the University’s founders, the successors of such founders, and the
past, present, and future ofﬁcers, board members, or trustees of the University
would not be “settlors” of the trust, and would not have standing to sue to enforce
the trust on that ground.
In short, granting standing to sue to enforce a conservation easement to the
state attorney general, a co-ﬁduciary, the donor of the easement, and, in certain
limited circumstances, a party with a “special interest” is highly unlikely to expose

264
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY asserts that such persons could have standing to sue to enforce a
conservation easement donated to a land trust as “settlors.” 3EE 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, supra note 4,
at 64–67.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 11, § 28 cmt. a (explaining that a donation
to a charitable institution to be used for a speciﬁc purpose, such as to establish a scholarship fund in a
certain ﬁeld of study, creates a charitable trust of which the institution is a trustee). In discussing the
high-proﬁle lawsuit between Princeton University and the heirs of the donors of a large charitable
gift to the University to be used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose, Professor Iris Goodwin explains:
265

Then as now, the common law rule is that, whether the charity is formed as a
corporation or as a trust, restricted gifts to a charitable entity are governed by the law
of trusts. Thus under the common law, a restricted gift to Princeton places Princeton
in the role of trustee with respect to those funds, notwithstanding that Princeton
is organized as a corporation. Princeton operated under the same constraints with
respect to a restricted gift as would the trustees of a trust. Changing the purpose to
which Robertson funds might be applied once they were in Princeton’s hands was
not an option for Princeton under the common law.
Iris J. Goodwin, !SK .OT 7HAT 9OUR #HARITY #AN $O &OR 9OU 2OBERTSON V 0RINCETON 0ROVIDES ,IBERAL
$EMOCRATIC )NSIGHTS )NTO #Y 0RES 2EFORM forthcoming in the Arizona Law Review and available on
SSRN.
266
See UTC, supra note 15, § 801 (requiring a trustee to administer the trust in good faith and
in accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the beneﬁciaries); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-10-801 (same); UTC, supra note 15, § 801 cmt. (“This section conﬁrms that the primary duty
of a trustee is to follow the terms and purposes of the trust and to do so in good faith.”). See also
American Nat’l Bank v. Miller, 899 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Wyo. 1995) (“A trustee . . . acts on behalf of
both the beneﬁciaries and the grantor of the trust. A fundamental duty of a trustee is to carry out
the terms of the trust. . . . ‘The clearly expressed intention of the settlor should be zealously guarded
. . . .’” (citing First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Wyo. 1973))).
267

See supra note 261.
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easement holders to harassing litigation. Moreover, such grants of standing are
necessary to ensure that holders of conservation easements can be held accountable
for breaches of their ﬁduciary duties. Indeed, if not even the attorney general
were granted standing, egregious breaches of trust would go unremedied to the
detriment of the public and the charitable sector as a whole.268 It would also be
unprecedented to exempt the holders of a particular subset of charitable gifts
made for speciﬁc purposes from the standing rules applicable to all other such
gifts simply because some of the holders would prefer that their actions not be
“second-guessed” by those charged under the law with protecting the public
interest and investment in charitable assets.
As a practical matter, many land trusts may be relieved to learn that the state
attorney general has standing to sue to enforce conservation easements. Negligence,
malfeasance, and the use of conservation easements for purposes other than those
speciﬁed by the donors on the part of even just a few holders could undermine the
credibility of all holders and reduce public conﬁdence in the use of conservation
easements as a land protection tool. A credible threat of enforcement by state
attorneys general can be expected to deter this type of behavior. Such a threat can
also be expected to signiﬁcantly reduce the incidence of landowner violations of
easements, as well as requests by landowners to substantially modify or terminate
easements contrary to donor intent and the public interest.

' Cy Pres 7ILL .OT BE A 3WORD IN THE (ANDS OF ,ANDOWNERS $EVELOPERS
OR 3TATE !TTORNEYS 'ENERAL
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY claims that “[i]n the hands of a well-ﬁnanced legal
team the doctrine of cy pres could be stood on its head” and become “a sword
in the hands of landowners and developers, not just a shield for conservation
interests.”269 Although it is the courts that make the ﬁnal judgment regarding
the application of the doctrine of cy pres,270 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY asserts that
“under the guise of cy pres a court may assume authority to do a number of things,
whether or not they are consistent with the theory of cy pres,”271 and that applying
charitable trust principles to conservation easements in a sensible and insightful
fashion “assumes a judiciary far more knowledgeable, patient, and sympathetic to
nuance . . . than is likely to be the case.”272 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY further asserts
that “[w]hether the ﬂexibility thus derived from an equitable proceeding should
268
For examples of the important role played by the attorney general in ensuring the
enforcement of conservation easements, see (ICKS V $OWD, discussed supra note 3, and the Myrtle
Grove controversy, discussed supra notes 131–143.
269

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, supra note 4, at 82.

See, e.g., CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 196, § 435 (explaining that the cy pres
power is vested in the courts); infra note 286 (same).
270

271

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, supra note 4, at 81.

272

Id. at 78 n. 225.
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be more a source of comfort than concern will be more dependent upon the judge
assigned to the case than the theory of the doctrine itself.”273 These assertions are
untoward, unwarranted, and unsupportable.
First, landowners have standing to sue to modify or terminate the
conservation easements encumbering their land even in the absence of charitable
trust principles.274 In addition, without the protection of charitable trust
principles, owners of easement-encumbered land would have a greater likelihood
of persuading courts to modify or terminate conservation easements. The real
property law doctrines that would likely apply to conservation easements in the
absence of charitable trust principles—the doctrines of changed conditions and
relative hardship—were developed in the context of private servitudes and are
not designed to recognize or protect the public interest in land use restrictions.275
Moreover, when such doctrines apply, there is rarely any payment made to
the holder of the extinguished land use restrictions, as there should be when a
conservation easement is extinguished to avoid unjustly enriching the owner of
the encumbered land at the public’s expense.276
Charitable trust principles, on the other hand, provide signiﬁcant protection
of both the public interest and investment in conservation easements. Charitable
gifts are particularly favored by the courts and are construed to uphold the donor’s
charitable purpose whenever possible.277 Indeed, it would be a profound departure
from settled precedent for courts to authorize the termination of a conservation
easement pursuant to the doctrine of cy pres if the easement continued to provide
signiﬁcant beneﬁts to the public. For example, in declining to apply the doctrine
273

Id. at 81.

274

See, e.g., UCEA, supra note 14, § 3(a)(1) (providing that an action affecting a conservation
easement may be brought by an owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the easement);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-203(a)(i) (2008) (same).
275
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 7.11 cmt. a (applying a special set of
rules based on the doctrine of cy pres to the modiﬁcation and termination of conservation easements
and explaining that, “[b]ecause of the public interests involved, these servitudes are afforded more
stringent protection than privately held conservation servitudes, which are subject to modiﬁcation
and termination under § 7.10 [the property law doctrine of changed conditions]”); Gerald
Korngold, 0RIVATELY (ELD #ONSERVATION 3ERVITUDES ! 0OLICY !NALYSIS IN THE #ONTEXT OF IN 'ROSS 2EAL
#OVENANTS AND %ASEMENTS 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 488 (1984) (noting that the doctrine of relative
hardship, which focuses on the conﬂict between individual landowners, is too narrow to encompass
the public interest, which must be considered in the case of conservation servitudes).
276
See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 7.11 cmt. c (“In other instances where
changed conditions lead to termination of servitudes . . . there is seldom an entitlement to damages.
The opposite is true with conservation servitudes.”).
277
See, e.g., Crippled Children’s Found. v. Cunningham, 346 So. 2d 409, 411 (Ala. 1977)
(“[C]haritable gifts are viewed with particular favor and every presumption, consistent with the
language of the instrument, should be employed to sustain them.”); Harris v. Georgia Military
Acad., 146 S.E.2d 913, 915 (Ga. 1966) (“‘Gifts or trusts for charitable purposes are favorites of
the law and the courts . . . [and] courts of equity, it is said, will go to the length of their judicial
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of cy pres to create a new class of beneﬁciaries of a charitable trust, the purpose
of which was to provide scholarships to needy students attending the University
of Wyoming and Casper Community College, the Wyoming Supreme Court
explained:
We have found no authority which authorizes a court to make
any such change merely deemed desirable. . . . The clearly
expressed intention of the settlor should be zealously guarded
by the courts, particularly when the trust instrument reveals a
careful and painstaking expression of the use and purposes to
which the settlor’s ﬁnancial accumulations shall be devoted.
A settlor must have assurance that his solemn arrangements
and instructions will not be subject to the whim or suggested
expediency of others after his death.278
A leading treatise on trust law similarly explains:
The line between impossibility and impracticability on the one
side, and inconvenience or slight undesirability on the other,
may be difﬁcult to draw. Although several of the cy pres statutes
use the word “impracticable” (and two “inexpedient”) as a basis
for cy pres application . . . , the court will not substitute a new
scheme merely because it or the trustee believes it would be a
better plan than that which the settlor provided.279
power to sustain such gifts.’”); Webb v. Webb, 172 N.E. 730, 735 (Ill. 1930) (“Gifts to charity have
always been looked upon with favor by the courts. Every presumption consistent with the language
used will be indulged to sustain them.”); In re Carlson’s Estate, 358 P.2d 669, 671–72 (Kan. 1961)
(“[C]haritable trusts, being favorites of the law, are to be upheld wherever possible, and instruments
providing for their creation will be liberally construed to carry out the beneﬁcent intention of the
donor.”); In re Estate of Homburg, 697 So. 2d 1154, 1158 (Miss. 1997) (“[C]haritable trusts are
favored and should be enforced where possible.”); Board of Trustees of Univ. of N. C. v. Unknown
Heirs, 319 S.E.2d 239, 242 (N.C. 1984) (“It is a well recognized principle that gifts and trusts
for charities are highly favored by the courts. Thus, the donor’s intentions are effectuated by the
most liberal rules of construction permitted.”); Mercy Hosp. of Williston v. Stillwell, 358 N.W.2d
506, 509 (N.D. 1984) (“It is well recognized that charitable gifts are favored by the law and by the
courts. . . . Courts will give effect to charitable gifts where it is possible to do so consistent with
recognized rules of law.”); Maxcy v. City of Oshkosh, 128 N.W. 899, 909 (Wis. 1910) (“Courts
here, as anciently, look with favor upon all donations to charitable uses, and give effect to them
where it is possible to do so consistent with rules of law, and to that end the most liberal rules the
nature of the case will admit of, within the limits of ordinary chancery jurisdiction, will be resorted
to if necessary.”); Bentley v. Whitney, 281 P. 188, 190 (Wyo. 1929) (“The provisions of instruments
creating charitable trusts are favorably regarded by the courts and are generally construed with the
utmost liberality in order to carry out the laudable purpose of the donor.”).
278

First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Wyoming v. Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Wyo. 1973).

CHESTER, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 196, § 439. See also, e.g., In re Estes Estate, 523
N.W.2d 863, 870 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (“While we have no doubt that [the trustee’s] proposed
uses for the funds are benevolent, they contradict [the settlor’s] speciﬁc purpose for the trust and,
279
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Accordingly, contrary to the assertion in 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, it is extremely
unlikely that a court, “under the guise of cy pres,” would “assume authority to
do a number of things,” such as bow to the request of a landowner to terminate
a conservation easement to allow for the development of the encumbered land.
Rather, given the traditional conservatism of the courts in applying the doctrine
of cy pres, as well as the high stakes involved in the termination of a conservation
easement,280 courts are likely to err on the side of refusing to apply the doctrine
absent compelling evidence that the conservation purpose of an easement has
become impossible or impracticable.281 Moreover, in the event circumstances
warrant the termination of a conservation easement pursuant to the doctrine of
cy pres, the public’s interest and investment in the easement would be protected.
In applying the doctrine the court would require the payment of an appropriate
share of the proceeds from the subsequent sale or development of the land to the

absent compelling evidence that this purpose is obsolete, impracticable, or inappropriate, we will
not condone a release.”); In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (N.Y. 1983) (“The court,
of course, cannot invoke its cy pres power without ﬁrst determining that the testator’s speciﬁc
charitable purpose is no longer capable of being performed by the trust.”).
280

The stakes involved in the termination of a conservation easement are high because
termination will generally result in the development and more intensive use of the underlying land
and, thus, the substantially irreversible destruction of the land’s unique ecological, aesthetic, or
historic values.
281
Courts are likely to be conservative in their application of the doctrine of cy pres to terminate
conservation easements even in jurisdictions that have added “wasteful” to the cy pres standard. The
wasteful standard was added to the UTC primarily to deal with the problem of surplus funds. See
English, supra note 191, at 179 n.164 (“Cases of waste normally involve situations where the funds
allocated to the particular charitable scheme far exceed what is needed.”). The Restatement (Third)
of Trusts, which also adds wasteful to the cy pres standard, explains:

Another type of case appropriate to the application of cy pres . . . is a situation
in which the amount of property held in the trust exceeds what is needed for the
particular charitable purpose to such an extent that the continued expenditure of all
of the funds for that purpose, although possible to do, would be wasteful. (The term
“wasteful” is used here neither in the sense of common-law waste nor to suggest that
a lesser standard of merely “better use” will sufﬁce.)
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 11, § 67 cmt. c(1). Given the purpose of adding
wasteful to the cy pres standard, the traditional conservatism of the courts in applying the doctrine of
cy pres, the high stakes involved in the termination of a conservation easement, and the deference that
should be accorded to the intent of donors so as not to chill future conservation easement donations,
courts should not apply the wasteful standard to terminate conservation easements simply because
a “better use” could arguably be made of the protected land or the holder’s share of the proceeds
from extinguishment of the easement. Of course, some government entities and land trusts might
prefer to be able to terminate conservation easements when purportedly “better” conservation or
other opportunities come along. If that is the case, however, they should not be acquiring perpetual
conservation easements. Rather, they should be negotiating in good faith with landowners for
short-term contracts, management agreements, terminable easements, or other temporary means
of the land protection. See supra notes 93 and 94 and accompanying text (discussing terminable
conservation easements).
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holder of the easement (on behalf of the public) and retain jurisdiction of the
matter until the holder reports that the proceeds have been expended toward the
accomplishment of similar conservation purposes.282
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY also conjures up the specter of development-minded
attorneys general ﬁling suit to modify or terminate easements so that developers
can build shopping centers that will strengthen the tax base and reduce
unemployment.283 While one could hypothesize without end about the potential
misuse of authority, the actions of state attorneys general to date indicate that
their inclination is to defend, rather than attempt to terminate, conservation
easements.284 Moreover, state attorneys general are charged with protecting the
public interest in charitable assets and they have fulﬁlled this role for centuries
in all manner of charitable endeavors. They also take seriously their obligation to
ensure that the intent of charitable donors is honored because they recognize that
disregarding donor intent would chill future charitable donations, which would
be contrary to the public interest.285 Thus, while state attorneys general may not
always have the resources needed to assiduously police the substantial modiﬁcation
and termination of conservation easements, there is no credible support for the
assertion that they will ﬁle suits to modify or terminate conservation easements in
favor of development interests and in contravention of donor intent. In addition,

282

3EE EG 0ERPETUITY AND "EYOND, supra note 18, at 681–82 (explaining the doctrine of cy pres
and how it should apply in the conservation easement context).
283

3EE 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, supra note 4, at 80.

284

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

285

See, e.g., supra note 101 and accompanying text (describing the amici brief ﬁled in -ADIGAN
in which forty-ﬁve states emphasized the importance of honoring the intent of charitable donors).
In a case decided by the Montana Supreme Court in April of 2008, the Montana State Attorney
General (appellant in the case) and eleven state attorneys general who ﬁled an amici brief similarly
emphasized the importance of honoring donor intent. See In re The Charles M. Bair Family Trust,
183 P.3d 61 (Mont. 2008). Bair involved a charitable trust created for the primary purpose of
establishing and maintaining a family museum. Id. at 72. The Montana Supreme Court held that
the board of advisors of the trust had breached its ﬁduciary duty by not using principal and income
from the trust necessary to establish and maintain the museum. Id. at 74–76. In their amici brief,
eleven states acknowledged that state attorneys general are both authorized and obligated under
state law to enforce the intent of charitable donors. In re The Charles M. Bair Family Trust, Brief of
Amici Curiae Michigan et al. 2 (No. DA 06-0586, Dec. 22, 2006). The states explained:
[A]merican charity law has as its foremost goal the creation and preservation of a
climate conducive to robust philanthropic activity for the beneﬁt of the public as a
whole. This goal requires the continued conﬁdence of donors that their gifts will be
used according to their charitable intentions.
Id. at 3. The states also warned of the “dangerous practical downside to repudiating donors’ legitimate
expectations”—it would discourage charitable giving to the detriment of the public as a whole. Id.
at 17–19. -ADIGAN and Bair and the amici briefs ﬁled in those cases illustrate that state attorneys
general view themselves as having a signiﬁcant role in the regulation of charities and, in particular,
in ensuring that charitable organizations and other trustees administer the assets they hold on behalf
of the public in accordance with the purposes speciﬁed by charitable donors.
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even if such a suit were ﬁled, the authority to apply the doctrine of cy pres is
vested in the courts rather than the attorney general,286 and for the reasons noted
above, it would be a profound departure from settled precedent for a court to
authorize the termination of a conservation easement (or the modiﬁcation of an
easement in contravention of its stated purpose, such as to permit the subdivision
and development of the land), if the easement continued to provide signiﬁcant
beneﬁts to the public.
In short, 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS assertion that state attorneys general and the
courts will profoundly misuse the doctrine of cy pres to modify and terminate
conservation easements in favor of development interests is both remarkable and
unsupported, and such an assertion should clearly not drive the development of
the law or policy in this context.

( &EDERAL #ONSTRAINTS $O .OT $ETER )MPROPER -ODIlCATIONS OR
Terminations
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY argues that, while courts could ﬁnd sufﬁcient legal
basis to apply charitable trust principles to conservation easements, they
nonetheless should choose not to because such principles are neither needed
nor prudent.287 It is asserted that the constraints imposed by federal tax law
on the operation of nonproﬁt organizations in general, and on holders of taxdeductible conservation easements in particular, “constitute substantial remedies
and disincentives to the improper termination or modiﬁcation of conservation
easements.”288 As explained below, however, federal tax law constraints operate
primarily to ensure that charitable organizations use their assets for charitable
purposes and refrain from conferring economic beneﬁts on private parties. Those
constraints were not intended to and do not ensure that government entities and
charitable organizations comply with their ﬁduciary obligations under state law to
(i) administer the charitable gifts they solicit and accept in accordance with
the gifts’ stated terms and purposes, and (ii) absent express or implied powers,
deviate from those stated terms or purposes only with court approval obtained in
administrative deviation or cy pres proceedings. State attorneys general and state
courts are the proper enforcers of such state law ﬁduciary obligations, not the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, supra note 11, § 67 cmt. d (“The cy pres power is
vested in the court, not in the trustee or the Attorney General, who is, however, a necessary party
entitled to notice of the proceeding.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 399,
Reporter’s Notes cmt. d (“In a proceeding for the application of the cy pres doctrine, the Attorney
General is a necessary party. But it is for the court and not the Attorney General to determine what
application should be made.”).
286

287

3EE 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, supra note 4, at 62.

288

Id. at 56.
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Indeed, 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS claim that the constraints imposed by
federal tax law constitute substantial remedies and disincentives to “improper”
terminations or modiﬁcations is colorable only if one has accepted the article’s
implicit assertion that conservation easements are unrestricted charitable gifts that
can be liquidated in whole or in part by their government or land trust holders
to fund other land conservation activities or even increase the holders’ operating
budgets or stewardship endowments. If one recognizes that government entities
and charitable organizations are bound by state law to abide by both the terms
and purposes of the charitable gifts they solicit and accept, it is clear that federal
tax law constraints cannot be relied upon to ensure that such entities comply with
these state law ﬁduciary obligations.
The federal tax law prohibitions on private beneﬁt and private inurement
and the organizational requirements for public charities operate primarily to
(i) prohibit charitable organizations from conferring economic beneﬁts on private
parties,289 and (ii) ensure that charitable organizations use their assets for charitable
purposes.290 A land trust that agrees to terminate a perpetual conservation

289
The private beneﬁt prohibition addresses transfers of value by charities to non-charities
absent receipt in exchange of cash, property, or services of at least equal value. See Joint Committee
on Taxation, (ISTORICAL $EVELOPMENT AND 0RESENT ,AW OF THE &EDERAL 4AX %XEMPTION FOR #HARITIES
AND /THER 4AX %XEMPT /RGANIZATIONS 5 (JCX-29-05), April 19, 2005, available at http://www.
house.gov/jct/x-29-05.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter *#4 #HARITIES 2EPORT]. Private
inurement, a narrower concept, arises when a person in a position to inﬂuence the decisions of
an exempt organization (an “insider”) receives beneﬁts from the organization disproportionate to
her contribution to the organization, such as unreasonable compensation. Id. at 52–53. Private
inurement can be viewed as a subset of private beneﬁt. Id. at 53. The private inurement prohibition
does not prohibit transactions between a tax-exempt organization and those who have a close
relationship to it. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 486 (8th ed.
2003). Instead, such transactions are tested against a standard of “reasonableness,” which calls for
a roughly equal exchange of beneﬁts between the parties and looks to how comparable charitable
organizations, acting prudently, conduct their affairs. Id. Both private inurement and private beneﬁt
may occur in many different forms, including, for example, the payment of excessive compensation,
the payment of excessive rent, the making of inadequately secured loans, and, important in the
conservation easement modiﬁcation and termination context, the receipt of less than fair market
value on the sale or exchange of property. See *#4 #HARITIES 2EPORT SUPRA at 53. Historically, the
only sanction for a private inurement violation was revocation of the charitable organization’s tax
exempt status. Id. at 38. However, the intermediate sanctions rules enacted in 1996 permit the IRS
to instead impose excise taxes on disqualiﬁed persons who receive excess beneﬁts and, in certain
circumstances, on organization managers who approved the transaction. Id. An “excess beneﬁt
transaction” is a transaction in which an economic beneﬁt is provided by an applicable tax-exempt
organization, directly or indirectly, to or for the use of a disqualiﬁed person, and the value of the
economic beneﬁt provided by the organization exceeds the value of the consideration (including
the performance of services) received for providing such beneﬁt. See Internal Revenue Service, 2007
Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ 16 (2007), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
i990-ez.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
290

Under the organizational test, an organization’s activities must further exempt purposes and
the organization’s assets must be dedicated to exempt purposes in perpetuity. *#4 #HARITIES 2EPORT,
supra note 289, at 48–49. Satisfaction of the organizational test may be achieved by adopting certain
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easement or amend it in a manner that transfers valuable development or use
rights to the owner of the encumbered land without receiving cash or other
compensation of equivalent value in exchange would presumably violate the
private beneﬁt or private inurement prohibition.291 On the other hand, it is not
clear that a land trust would violate the private beneﬁt, private inurement, or
organizational requirements if it agreed to terminate a conservation easement,
or modify it in a manner contrary to its terms or purpose, provided it received
appropriate compensation and used that compensation in a manner consistent
with its general charitable mission.292 Accordingly, even assuming the IRS had
sufﬁcient resources to carefully monitor the activities of the over 1,700 land trusts
operating across the nation,293 these federal tax law requirements cannot be relied
upon to ensure that land trusts administer the conservation easements they solicit
and accept in accordance with the easements’ stated terms and purposes. Rather,
state attorneys general and state courts are the proper enforcers of such state law
ﬁduciary obligations.294

formal requirements in the founding documents of the organization. Id. at 48. For example, an
organization must limit its purpose to one or more exempt purposes and must not be permitted to
engage in activities that do not further exempt purposes (except to an insubstantial extent). Id.
291

See supra note 289 (explaining that private inurement and private beneﬁt can occur when a
charitable organization receives less than fair market value on the sale or exchange of its property).
See also ,4! !MENDMENT 2EPORT, supra note 44, at 25–26 (“[A] land trust cannot participate in an
amendment that conveys either a net ﬁnancial gain (more than in incidental private beneﬁt) to any
party or any measurable beneﬁt at all to a board or staff member or other land trust ‘insider’ (other
than fair compensation for services). A land trust that does so risks losing its tax-exempt status or
suffering intermediate sanctions.”) (emphasis in original).
292
Although private inurement and private beneﬁt can involve noneconomic beneﬁts (see,
e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(iii), Example 1), the private inurement, private beneﬁt, and
organizational requirements were not designed to ensure that charitable organizations abide by their
state law ﬁduciary obligation to administer the charitable gifts they solicit and accept in accordance
with the gifts’ stated terms and purposes.
293

See Steven T. Miller, Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Government Entities, Internal
Revenue Service, Remarks at the Georgetown Law Center Seminar on Representing and Managing
Tax-Exempt Organizations (Apr. 24, 2008) (transcript on ﬁle with authors), available at http://
philanthropy.com/documents/v20/i14/gtown2008.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008)) (noting that
stafﬁng at the IRS has remained fairly constant while the nonproﬁt sector has experienced dramatic
growth—i.e., in 1998 there were approximately 650,000 § 501(c)(3) organizations with $990
billion in gross receipts, and by early 2008 there were 1.2 million § 501(c)(3) organizations and
their gross receipts had more than doubled).
294

Most state constitutions prohibit government entities from transferring their assets to
private persons without adequate consideration. See, e.g., 3 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW § 21.07, at 21–25 (“Local government property cannot be conveyed to a private
party without adequate consideration, for to do so would constitute an improper gift of public
property or the granting of a subsidy contrary to state constitutional constraints.”). Like the private
beneﬁt and private inurement prohibitions, however, these constitutional prohibitions do not
ensure that government entities administer the conservation easements they solicit and accept in
accordance with the easements’ stated terms and purposes. If all government holders were required
to do is avoid running afoul of the constitutional prohibition, they would be free to sell, trade,
release, extinguish, or otherwise dispose of conservation easements in whole or in part as they might
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The requirement that charitable organizations annually report their
conservation easement modiﬁcation or termination activities to the IRS similarly
does not ensure that land trusts will comply with their state law ﬁduciary
obligations.295 This is a reporting requirement; it does not authorize the IRS to
prevent or cure a land trust’s violation of its state law ﬁduciary obligations.296
Moreover, as acknowledged in 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, this reporting requirement,
as well as the private beneﬁt, private inurement, and organizational requirements,
are not applicable to government entities, and government entities hold thousands
of perpetual conservation easements.297

see ﬁt, provided only that they received appropriate compensation and used that compensation
consistent with their broad public missions. As with land trusts, the administration of conservation
easements in accordance with their stated terms and purposes depends on a government entity’s
ﬁduciary obligations under state law.
295

Charitable organizations are required to ﬁle Form 990 (Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax) with the IRS annually. Since 2006, charitable organizations holding conservation
easements have been required to attach a statement to Schedule A of Form 990 containing, inter
alia, the following information (i) the number of easements modiﬁed, sold, transferred, released, or
terminated during the year and the acreage of those easements; (ii) the reason for the modiﬁcation,
sale, transfer, release, or termination; and (iii) the identity of the recipient (if any) of the beneﬁt of
such modiﬁcation, sale, transfer, release, or termination, and a statement regarding whether such
recipient was a qualiﬁed organization as deﬁned in Internal Revenue Code § 170(h)(3) and the
related Treasury Regulations at the time of transfer. See Internal Revenue Service, 2006 Instructions
for Schedule A to Form 990 (2006) (on ﬁle with authors).
296

The effectiveness of this requirement even as an information gathering tool may depend
largely on voluntary compliance by the organizations holding conservation easements. This
requirement does indicate, however, that the IRS is concerned about the improper modiﬁcation
and termination of tax-deductible conservation easements. See also supra note 159 (discussing
the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee’s concerns regarding improper conservation easement
modiﬁcations).
297
See 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 8 (“Hundreds of public
agencies across the country also hold conservation easements. The total number of easements
held by federal, state, and local agencies has not been documented, although a 2004 survey by
American Farmland Trust counted 9,453 easements on nearly 1.5 million acres of farmland, held
primarily by state and local agencies.”). 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY recommends changing federal tax
law to apply the private beneﬁt, private inurement, and reporting requirements to federal, state,
and local government entities. 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 83. Even if such changes were
determined to be legally permissible, for the reasons previously discussed they would not ensure
that government entities comply with their state law ﬁduciary obligations. 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS
alternative recommendation—that the law be changed to eliminate government entities as qualiﬁed
organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible conservation easements (see id.)—is similarly unwise.
Such a change would severely curtail the well-respected easement acquisition programs of many
government entities, including the Maryland Environmental Trust (see www.dnr.state.md.us/met/
(last visited Nov. 20, 2008)), the Virginia Outdoors Foundation (see www.virginiaoutdoorsfoundation.org/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2008)), and the City of Boulder, Colorado (see http://www.ci.boulder.
co.us/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2985&Itemid=1076 (last visited Nov. 20,
2008)). Such a change would also do nothing to ensure that the remaining class of eligible donees of
tax-deductible conservation easements—charitable organizations (primarily land trusts)—comply
with their state law ﬁduciary obligations.
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Finally, the Treasury Regulation requirement that an “eligible donee” of
a tax-deductible conservation easement “have a commitment to protect the
conservation purposes of the donation”298 also does not ensure that holders of
conservation easements will comply with their state law ﬁduciary obligations.
The Treasury Regulations speciﬁcally provide that a conservation group has
the requisite commitment if the group is organized or operated primarily or
substantially for one of the conservation purposes enumerated in § 170(h) of the
Internal Revenue Code—as virtually all land trusts are.299 Moreover, even if it
were determined that a land trust or government entity did not have the requisite
commitment as a result of its amendment or termination activities and, thus,
that the entity was no longer an eligible donee, such a determination would not
ensure that the entity administered its existing easements in accordance with their
stated terms and purposes. Rather, such a determination would merely preclude
the entity from acquiring additional tax-deductible conservation easements in the
future.300
The real check that federal tax law places on the conservation easement
amendment and termination activities of both land trusts and government entities
depends on state charitable trust law. Congress is free to condition the receipt
of federal tax incentives upon the conveyance of a particular form of charitable
gift,301 and in the conservation easement context, the gift must be in the form of a
restricted charitable gift or charitable trust. That is, the easement must, inter alia,
be
(i) conveyed as a charitable gift to a government entity or
charitable organization to be held and enforced for the beneﬁt
of the public for a speciﬁc charitable purpose—the protection
of the particular land encumbered by the easement for one or
more of the conservation purposes enumerated in the Internal
Revenue Code “in perpetuity”;302

298

Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(c)(1).

299

See id.

300

The Treasury Regulations also ambiguously provide that an eligible donee “must have the
resources to enforce the [conservation easement] restrictions” but “need not set aside funds” to do
so. Id. Again, even if it were determined that a land trust or government entity did not have the
requisite resources as a result of its amendment or termination activities, and, thus, was no longer
an eligible donee, such a determination would not ensure that the entity administered its existing
easements in accordance with their stated terms and purposes.
301
See Gillespie v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 374, 378–79 (1980) (ruling that whether a particular
transfer qualiﬁes for a federal estate tax charitable deduction is a matter of federal concern, and
Congress may prescribe requirements for tax-deductible gifts to charity).
302

See generally I.R.C. § 170(h); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14. A tax-deductible conservation
easement must be “granted in perpetuity” and its conservation purpose must be “protected in
perpetuity.” See I.R.C. §§ 170(h)(1)(C), (2)(C), (5)(A). The conservation purposes enumerated
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(ii) expressly transferable only to another government entity or
charitable organization that agrees to continue to enforce the
easement;303 and
(iii) extinguishable by the holder only in what essentially is a
cy pres proceeding—in a judicial proceeding, upon a ﬁnding
that the continued use of the encumbered land for conservation
purposes has become “impossible or impractical,” and with the
payment of a share of the proceeds from the subsequent sale or
development of the land to the holder to be used for similar
conservation purposes.304
The interest in the property retained by the easement donor must also be subject
to legally enforceable restrictions that will prevent any uses of the property that
are inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the easement.305 And, at the
time of the donation, the possibility that the conservation easement will be
“defeated” by the performance of some act or the happening of some event must
be so remote as to be negligible.306 To satisfy these various requirements, most
conservation easement deeds expressly provide, among other things, that the
easement is granted in perpetuity and can be transferred or extinguished only in
the manner described above.307
in the Internal Revenue Code are (i) protection of open space, including farmland and forestland;
(ii) protection of wildlife habitat; (iii) historic preservation; and (iv) protection of land for public
recreation or education. See id § 170(h)(4). For a history and explanation of Internal Revenue Code
§ 170(h), see Tax Incentives, supra note 42, at 10–17.
303

See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2) (“A deduction shall be allowed for . . . [the donation of
a conservation easement] only if in the instrument of conveyance the donor prohibits the donee
from subsequently transferring the easement . . . whether or not for consideration, unless the donee
organization, as a condition of the subsequent transfer, requires that the conservation purposes
which the contribution was originally intended to advance continue to be carried out. Moreover,
subsequent transfers must be restricted to organizations qualifying, at the time of the subsequent
transfer, as an eligible donee . . . .”).
304
See id. § 1.170A-14(g)(6); see also I.R.S. Priv. Lt. Rul. 200836014 (June 3, 2008) (providing
that the easement at issue met the requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6) because it
“provides for no means to extinguish the restrictions other than by judicial proceeding and all
proceeds received by the Donee are to be used in a manner consistent with the original conservation
purposes of the Easement”). For a discussion of how the donee’s share of the proceeds should be
calculated upon extinguishment of a conservation easement, see 0ERPETUITY AND "EYOND SUPRA note
18, at 682; #ONDEMNING #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS SUPRA note 61, at 1933–59.
305

See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1).

306

See id. §§ 1.170-1(e), -14(g)(3).

307

See, e.g., Lowham Easement, supra note 8, at 8 (restriction on transfer provision); id. at
9 (extinguishment and perpetuity provisions). 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY dismisses the federal tax law
requirements as ineffectual. 3EE 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 46 (“Of course . . . even
though a conservation easement meets all of these requirements, that will not prevent the parties
from ignoring these requirements and terminating or modifying an easement as they see ﬁt.”). As
the Myrtle Grove controversy, the Wal-Mart controversy, and (ICKS V $OWD illustrate, however,
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It is clear from both the foregoing requirements and the legislative history
to Internal Revenue Code § 170(h) that neither Congress nor the Treasury
Department intended that government and nonproﬁt holders would be able
to substantially modify or terminate tax-deductible perpetual conservation
easements “on their own” and as they might “see ﬁt” from time to time.308 As
previously discussed, however, the authority of the IRS to require that holders
enforce conservation easements consistent with their terms and stated purposes
over the long term is uncertain.309 Accordingly, in conditioning deductibility on

landowners and holders of easements ignore these requirements, which are consistent with state
charitable trust law, at their peril. Moreover, to the extent land trusts advocate for an interpretation
of state law that would render these federal tax law requirements ineffectual (as does 4HE %ND OF
0ERPETUITY), they put at signiﬁcant risk the federal tax beneﬁts provided to conservation easement
donors.
308

For example, the Senate Report discussing § 170(h) provides:
By requiring that the conservation purpose be protected in perpetuity, the
committee intends that the perpetual restrictions must be enforceable by the donee
organization (and successors in interest) against all other parties in interest (including
successors in interest) . . . .
. . . The requirement that the conservation purpose be protected in perpetuity
also is intended to limit deductible contributions to those transfers which require that
the donee (or successor in interest) hold the conservation easement . . . exclusively
for conservation purposes (i.e., that [the easement] not be transferable by the donee
except to other qualiﬁed organizations that also will hold the perpetual restriction
. . . exclusively for conservation purposes).

See S. Rep. No. 96-1007, at 605–06 (1980).
309
Stephen J. Small, one of the principal authors of the Treasury Regulations interpreting
Internal Revenue Code § 170(h), published a treatise on the federal tax laws relating to conservation
easements in 1986. See SMALL, supra note 254. In that treatise Small explains that the IRS’s authority
may not extend far enough to require that at some distant point in the future easements be
extinguished only in the context of judicial proceeding, as opposed to by mutual consent of the
landowner and the donee organization. Id. at 16-4, -5. The IRS’s concern, he notes, is whether the
gift qualiﬁes for a deduction at the time it is made, and not what tax, civil, or criminal liabilities
ought to be imposed if something unexpected happens in two or twenty years. Id. at 16-5. If the
highest court in a state were to determine that holders of perpetual conservation easements are free
to simply agree with the owners of the encumbered land to release, extinguish, or terminate the
easements, in whole or in part, regardless of the easements’ terms and the state’s charitable trust
laws, the IRS could take the position that conservation easement donations in the state are no longer
eligible for federal tax incentives. In such a case, it would be clear at the time of donation that a
conservation easement could not comply with federal tax law requirements regardless of its terms.
And if a government entity or land trust agreed to substantially modify or terminate a conservation
easement in contravention of the “restriction on transfer,” “extinguishment,” and other federal tax
law requirements, the IRS could take the position that conservation easements donated to that
holder are no longer eligible for federal tax incentives because there would be no assurance that the
conservation purposes of such easements would be “protected in perpetuity” as is required under
Internal Revenue Code § 170(h)(5)(A). Again, however, neither determination would ensure that
government entities or land trusts administer their existing easements in accordance with their
stated terms and purposes. Rather, such determinations would merely preclude the affected entities
from acquiring additional tax-deductible conservation easements in the future.
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the eligibility requirements noted above, Congress and the Treasury Department
must have been relying on state charitable trust law to ensure that, over time,
conservation easements would be enforced in accordance with their stated
terms and purposes, and terminated in whole or in part only in judicial cy pres
proceedings.310
Reliance on the states for the enforcement of perpetual conservation easements
over the long term is appropriate. As explained by the Panel on Nonproﬁts in
its report to Congress, the regulation of the behavior of charitable ﬁduciaries
is and should remain principally a state, rather than a federal, function because
(i) state judges and attorneys general have the greatest expertise in disputes
involving corporate and trust governance and ﬁduciary responsibilities and (ii) it is
state courts, rather than the Tax Court or the IRS, that possess the broad range of
equitable powers necessary to protect assets dedicated to charitable purposes.311
As a ﬁnal note, it bears comment that the argument made in 4HE %ND OF
0ERPETUITY cannot be limited, as a matter of logic, to conservation easements and
land trusts. 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS basic argument is that charitable trust rules are
inconvenient, costly, and cumbersome and federal tax laws alone impose sufﬁcient
constraints on charitable organizations. If that argument were persuasive as to
charitable gifts of conservation easements made to land trusts, it would be similarly
persuasive as applied to any gift made to any charitable organization to be used for

310
In discussing the “restriction on transfer” requirement, Stephen J. Small notes that, “although
the law in many states would permit interested parties to step in and sue to prevent a future transfer
[of a conservation easement] . . . contrary to the original intent of the donor,” requiring that
the instrument of conveyance prohibit future transfers except to another government entity or
charitable organization that agrees to continue to enforce the easement “provide[s] a better legal
basis for any future litigation to prevent impermissible transfers.” See SMALL, supra note 254, at 3–6.
And in explaining the “extinguishment” requirement, Small notes that such provision represents
a recognition by the IRS that changes in economic and natural conditions may make continuing
to protect the encumbered land for conservation purposes impossible or impractical, and that in
such circumstance the easement can be extinguished by judicial proceedings, the property sold or
exchanged, and the holder’s share of the proceeds used for similar conservation purposes. Id. at 16-4.
He further notes:

To those who suggest [the judicial proceeding required by the Treasury regulations]
may be a cumbersome way to deal with the problem [of extinguishment], I would
respond that these restrictions are supposed to be perpetual in the ﬁrst place, and the
decision to terminate them should not be made solely by interested parties. With the
decision-making process pushed into a court of law, the legal tension created by such
judicial review will generally tend to create a fair result.
Id.
311

3EE 3UPPLEMENT TO .ONPROlT 2EPORT supra note 234, at 28–29. The report explains that state
courts may order accountings, remove and appoint trustees and directors, dissolve the charitable
entity, force ﬁduciaries to restore losses caused by breach of their duties, and enjoin trustees from
further wrongdoing, and that neither the IRS nor the Tax Court possesses the same broad equitable
powers over the actions of charitable ﬁduciaries. See id. at 28.
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a speciﬁc purpose (including gifts of cash, personal property, and fee title to land).
That, of course, would render donors’ carefully wrought requirements as to how
their gifts are to be used unenforceable, and reverse hundreds of years of precedent
with regard to the administration of charitable gifts.

) $ONOR -OTIVATIONS
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY acknowledges that conservation easements are conveyed
in the form of charitable trusts, stating
a court could ﬁnd that a conservation easement is granted subject
to the “restriction” that the terms of the easement be enforced
in perpetuity for the beneﬁt of the public. This would seem to
be the essence of the requirements of the Code for deductible
easements and consistent with the terms of most easements.
Such intent also constitutes the essence of what it takes to create
a charitable trust.312
The article then asserts, however,
these ‘restrictions’ are not imposed on the donation unilaterally
by the donor. They are required by federal tax law. Accordingly,
one can argue about whether the donor really made a classic
restricted charitable gift, imposing the donor’s own preferences
and restrictions on the land trust, or whether the donor simply
sought to follow the requirements of the tax code to be eligible
to claim a charitable donation.313
There is, however, no justiﬁcation for distinguishing conservation easements
from other forms of restricted charitable gifts or charitable trusts on this ground.
First, there is no evidence that landowners donate conservation easements
designed to protect the particular land encumbered by the easement in perpetuity
solely because of the requirements under federal tax law, or that absent such
requirements landowners would be willing to donate easements that holders
were free to liquidate, in whole or in part, as they might see ﬁt from time to
time. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. As previously noted, surveys indicate
that many landowners donate conservation easements in large part because of
a personal attachment to the particular land encumbered by the easement and
a desire to see that land permanently preserved.314 In addition, the promises of

312

4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY SUPRA note 4, at 74.

313

Id.

314

See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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permanent protection of cherished land that land trusts make to prospective
easement grantors strongly suggest that such protection is a signiﬁcant factor
motivating easement donations.315
More importantly, it is not necessary for courts to engage in the difﬁcult (if
not impossible) task of attempting, years after the donation of a conservation
easement, to ascertain and weigh the various factors that may have motivated the
donation or the form in which it was made. Courts do not attempt to tease out the
various factors that motivate the creation of charitable trusts in other contexts, and
they should not do so here.316 Whether the donor of a tax-deductible conservation
easement conveyed the easement in a form that created a charitable trust because
he wanted tax beneﬁts, because he actually cared about the perpetual protection
of the land, because he wanted to create a memorial to himself and his family,
or, as is likely in most cases, because he was motivated by some combination of
these and other factors, should be irrelevant—the donor’s intent to convey the
easement in a form that creates a charitable trust is clear from the terms of the
easement deed and that is the only evidence that should matter.317
Even the hypothetical easement donor who is motivated solely by tax incentives
cannot be said to lack the intent to create a charitable trust. Such a donor must
summon the requisite intent and express it by conveying his easement in a form
that creates a charitable trust to receive the tax beneﬁts he desires. And Congress
requires that donors convey tax-deductible easements in this form to ensure
that the public interest and investment in such easements will be appropriately
protected.
Indeed, followed to its logical extreme, 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITYS argument
would render all conveyances made to comply with federal tax law requirements,
315

See supra notes 25–40 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 368 cmt. d (“If the purposes
to which the property is by the terms of the trust to be devoted are charitable purposes, the motive
of the settlor in creating the trust is immaterial. Thus, if a testator leaves property upon trust to
establish an educational institution, the trust is charitable although by the terms of the trust the
institution is to be called by the name of the testator, and although his motive in creating the
charitable trust was to acquire fame for himself rather than to promote education. Even if the
motive of the testator in disposing of his property is to spite his heirs, the trust is none the less
a charitable trust if the purposes are charitable.”); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 366 (West 2008) (“It is immaterial what state of mind in the settlor induced
him to transfer the property. He may have founded the trust solely to satisfy his family pride or for
self-gloriﬁcation, in order to emulate and rival a neighbor’s bounty, or to establish a memorial and
cause future generations to remember him and his family. The courts are not concerned with these
incidental psychic or sentimental advantages to the settlor or his family. They should, and generally
do, direct their attention merely to the question whether the net result of the trust in operation will
be to advance some substantial public interest.”).
316

317
See supra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining that the parties’ intent must generally
be ascertained from the language of the instrument itself ).
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such as those creating charitable remainder trusts or charitable lead trusts,318
unenforceable under state law. After all, the argument could always be made that
the grantors of such trusts did not really intend to make the conveyances in the
form that they were made; they just did so to satisfy the requirements of the tax
code. That argument is simply untenable. There also is no question that such
trusts are enforceable under state law.319

* 0URCHASED AND %XACTED #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS
4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY also argues that conservation easements donated
as charitable gifts should be exempted from the application of charitable trust
principles because some conservation easements are purchased for their full value,
some are exacted as part of development approval processes, and some are acquired
in the context of mitigation.320 But the fact that some conservation easements
are not conveyed in whole or in part as charitable gifts is not a justiﬁcation for
permitting government or land trust holders to avoid their ﬁduciary obligations
with regard to those that are. Indeed, the same argument could be made with

318

In general, a charitable remainder trust is a trust that provides for distributions to one
or more noncharitable beneﬁciaries for life or a term of years, followed by a charitable remainder
interest. In a charitable lead trust, the charitable interest precedes the distribution of the remainder to
private individuals. The structure and the details of these split-interest trusts are usually determined
by the tax objectives of the settlor and the associated requirements of the federal income and transfer
tax provisions. See Halbach, supra note 258, at 732. In fact, the IRS provides numerous sample
forms for such trusts. For just a small sampling, see, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2007–45, 2007–29 I.R.B. 89
(inter vivos charitable lead annuity trusts); Rev. Proc. 2007-46, 2007-29 I.R.B. 102 (testamentary
charitable lead annuity trusts); Rev. Proc. 2005-53, 2005-34 I.R.B. 339 (inter vivos charitable
remainder unitrust for a term of years); Rev. Proc. 2005-54, 2005-34 I.R.B. 353 (inter vivos
charitable remainder unitrust with consecutive interests for two measuring lives).
319
See, e.g., Halbach, supra note 258, at 732 (explaining that the charitable and private interests
in charitable remainder and charitable lead trusts are not only enforceable under state law, they
are also entitled to protection against the adverse effects of trustee misconduct, such as a trustee’s
breach of its ﬁduciary duty of impartiality in making investment decisions). As in the charitable
remainder and charitable lead trust context, to facilitate compliance, enforcement, and consistency
in interpretation, the Treasury Department should develop sample conservation easement provisions
that satisfy the requirements of Internal Revenue Code § 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations
interpreting that section. Such provisions could address, for example, the circumstances under
which a tax-deductible conservation easement can be amended, transferred, or extinguished; the
calculation and division of proceeds upon extinguishment; and the holder’s use of its share of the
proceeds upon extinguishment.
320

See 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, supra note 4, at 82. Even in the purchase context there often
is a charitable gift component. Many conservation easements are acquired in “bargain purchase”
transactions (in which the landowner is paid some percentage of the value of the easement and makes
a charitable donation of the remaining percentage), and others are purchased with funds received
or raised speciﬁcally for the purpose of acquiring the easement. Charitable trust principles should
apply in such cases. See supra notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text (discussing the application
of charitable trust principles to gifts to charitable organizations to be used for speciﬁc charitable
purposes, whether cash or property); supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (discussing
fraudulent solicitation).
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respect to fee title to land, which is sometimes donated to a land trust or
government entity to be used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose (such as a public
park or nature preserve), and other times acquired in an unrestricted fashion
through purchase, exaction, in the context of mitigation, or even as a donation
with the understanding that the land may be sold at the discretion of the donee
and the proceeds used in accordance with the donee’s general charitable mission
(these latter gifts are generally referred to as “trade lands”).321 Rather than argue
that all gifts of land be treated as unrestricted charitable gifts because some land
is acquired without restriction as to its future use, government entities and land
trusts appear to understand that some of their fee title holdings are legally restricted
and some are not, and that they are required by law to administer those assets
accordingly.322 The same should be true with regard to conservation easements.
Moreover, even if uniformity in the rules governing the administration of
all conservation easements were the ultimate goal, the solution would not be, as
suggested in 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, to treat all conservation easements, regardless
of how acquired, as fungible or liquid assets in the hands of their government
or nonproﬁt holders. Such a solution would do violence to the well-settled
principles governing the administration of charitable gifts and the expectations
of easement grantors. Such a solution would be contrary to the requirements for
tax-deductible conservation easements set forth in the Internal Revenue Code
and Treasury Regulations. And such a solution would render the administration
of conservation easements on behalf of the public even more vulnerable to
manipulation, error, and abuse.323 If uniformity in the rules governing the
administration of conservation easements is desired, the proper solution is to
apply charitable trust or similar equitable principles to the administration of all
perpetual conservation easements, regardless of how acquired, as recommended in
the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes.324

See Kendall Slee, 3ELLING 2EAL %STATE FOR 2EVENUES, EXCHANGE: J. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,
Summer 1999, at 15, 17 (discussing “trade lands” transactions).
321

322

For example, the Standards and Practices developed by the Land Trust Alliance provide
that a land trust may receive land with the intent of using the proceeds from its sale to advance
its mission, but in such a case the land trust must provide clear documentation to the donor of its
intent to sell the land before accepting the property. 3EE ,4! 3TANDARDS AND 0RACTICES supra note
48, at 9 (Practice 8L). There is, of course, no justiﬁcation for not similarly requiring a land trust to
disclose to a conservation easement donor its intent to later amend or terminate the easement as it
may “see ﬁt.” See also, e.g., Lancaster v. City of Columbus, 333 F. Supp. 1012, 1024 (N.D. Miss.
1971) (explaining that it is settled state law that land received by a municipality as a gift to be used
for a speciﬁc purpose is subject to the law of trusts).
323

See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the manipulation, error, and abuse
that could occur if government and nonproﬁt holders could substantially modify or terminate
conservation easements “on their own” and as they “see ﬁt”).
See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 7.11. See also 0ERPETUITY AND "EYOND supra
note 18, at 701–04 (providing additional support for this proposition).
324
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+ 0REVALENCE OF )MPROPER -ODIlCATIONS AND 4ERMINATIONS
A ﬁnal argument offered by 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY in favor of creating a special
judicial exemption from the application of charitable trust principles for donated
conservation easements is the “scant evidence of a current serious problem of
improper easement termination or modiﬁcation in the United States today.”325
This argument is also unconvincing. If there are few improper terminations and
modiﬁcations, the likely explanation is that most holders assume they are not free
to terminate conservation easements, or modify them in manners contrary to their
stated purposes, “on their own” and as they may “see ﬁt.”326 Moreover, if it were
determined that charitable trust principles do not apply to conservation easements
and, thus, that holders are free to substantially modify or terminate easements
on their own and as they may see ﬁt, the hundreds of government entities and
land trusts holding conservation easements across the nation would suddenly ﬁnd
themselves sitting on a treasure trove of valuable development and use rights that,
despite the intention of the easement donors, could be liquidated at will. And the
temptation on the part of such holders to yield to political, ﬁnancial, and other
pressures to agree to substantially modify and terminate the easements would only
increase over time as the encumbered lands change hands and the development
and use rights restricted by the easements appreciate in value.327 Accordingly, the
“scant evidence of a current serious problem of improper easement termination
or modiﬁcation in the United States today” is not a justiﬁcation for exempting
conservation easements from the application of charitable trust principles. To
the contrary, the prevailing stability is a tribute to the salutary effect of those
principles.
325
See 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, supra note 4, at 62. For a discussion of cases involving the improper
termination or substantial modiﬁcation of conservation easements, see 0ERPETUITY AND "EYOND, supra
note 18, at 690–93 (discussing the Myrtle Grove controversy); id. at 695–700 (discussing the WalMart controversy). See also (ICKS 157 P.3d at 914. Whether this evidence is “scant” is a matter of
opinion.
326
See, e.g., 2005 CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 188 (warning that
“[a]ll applicable state laws, charitable trust laws, contract laws, nonproﬁt corporation laws, public
trust laws, and federal tax laws must be followed when amendments [and by extension, terminations]
are made”); O’Connor, supra note 144, at 31 (discussing charitable trust law as one of four
potential legal constraints on amendments and providing “[w]ith so much at stake, many easement
amendment issues will probably be resolved by the courts”); supra notes 302–306 (discussing the
federal tax law requirements for tax-deductible conservation easements). It is also possible that some
holders of conservation easements have agreed to improper amendments but no party with standing
to sue was aware of the amendments or understood that such amendments were improper.
327
New owners of easement-encumbered land cannot be expected to have the same conservation proclivities as the easement donors. See, e.g., Darla Guenzler, #REATING #OLLECTIVE %ASEMENT
$EFENSE 2ESOURCES /PTIONS AND 2ECOMMENDATIONS (Bay Area Open Space Council), May 6, 2002, at
v (on ﬁle with authors) (noting that “the conservation community anticipates a wave of litigation
as successor landowners assume control of easement-protected properties”). Indeed, individuals
and developers might purchase easement-encumbered land for a much reduced price due to the
existence of the easement and then pressure the holder to substantially modify or terminate the
easement in the hope of receiving an economic windfall.
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III. A DETOUR—ATTEMPTING TO DO AWAY
WITH THE DOCTRINE OF CY PRES
Rather than argue, as does the author of 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY, that donated
conservation easements should simply be exempted from charitable trust
principles, a few members of the land trust community have taken a different
tack. These individuals advocate for the enactment of state legislation that would
both exempt conservation easements from charitable trust principles and replace
those principles with a complex administrative process. Pursuant to this process,
a politically-appointed state board would authorize the substantial modiﬁcation
or termination of conservation easements if it deemed such actions to be “in the
public interest.”328 These legislative proposals appear to have been inspired by the
same misconceptions regarding the application of charitable trust principles to
conservation easements as are set forth in 4HE %ND OF 0ERPETUITY.329 These proposals
also suffer from a variety of problems, the most important of which are discussed
brieﬂy below.
First, the legislative proposals are motivated in part by a supposed dichotomy
between the interests of the public and honoring donor intent. But that is a
false dichotomy. Honoring donor intent is itself in the public interest because
failure to do so would chill future charitable donations and reduce the diversity
of projects and programs in the charitable sector. Accordingly, a conservation
easement termination procedure that is truly in the public interest would accord
considerable deference to the intent of easement donors, as is the case under the
doctrine of cy pres.330

328

See Darby Bradley, !MENDING 0ERPETUAL #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS #ONFRONTING THE $ILEMMAS
OF #HANGE ! 0RACTITIONERS 6IEW 20 (Dec. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on ﬁle with authors)
[hereinafter ! 0RACTITIONERS 6IEW]; Andrew C. Dana, #ONSERVATION %ASEMENT !MENDMENTS ! 6IEW
From the Field 22 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on ﬁle with authors) [hereinafter ! 6IEW &ROM
the Field].
329
3EE ! 0RACTITIONERS 6IEW, supra note 328, at Abstract (asserting, incorrectly, that if conservation
easements are charitable trusts, they can only be amended with court approval); id. at 7 (asserting,
incorrectly, that the doctrine of cy pres, with its “impossible or impracticable” standard, would apply
to all easement amendments); ! 6IEW &ROM THE &IELD, supra note 328, at 14 (asserting, incorrectly,
“[i]f charitable trust law is applied . . . land trusts, attorneys general and the judiciary must apply the
administrative deviation or cy pres framework to all questions pertaining to conservation easement
amendment, no matter how trivial”) (emphasis in original). As explained in Part II.D.1.a, supra, an
amendment provision included in a conservation easement deed grants the holder broad discretion
to agree to amendments that are consistent with the purpose of the easement WITHOUT COURT APPROVAL,
and a court will not second-guess a holder’s exercise of such discretion absent a clear abuse. In
addition, a cy pres proceeding is required only when a holder wishes to terminate a conservation
easement, or modify it in a manner contrary to its stated purpose (as was attempted in the Myrtle
Grove controversy).
330

The doctrine of cy pres was developed and reﬁned over the centuries to carefully balance
respect for donor intent with society’s interest in ensuring that assets perpetually devoted to
charitable purposes continue to provide an appropriate level of beneﬁt to the public. 3EE 0ERPETUITY
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Second, the legislative proposals could be vulnerable to challenge on
constitutional grounds. In the famous $ARTMOUTH #OLLEGE V 7OODWARD case,
the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the New Hampshire
legislature’s attempt to amend Dartmouth College’s charter to effectively transfer
control of the college to the state.331 The Court determined that such legislation
would impair the implied contracts between the college and its benefactors in
contravention of section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States,
which provides, in part, that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of
contracts.332 In support of the Court’s holding, Chief Justice Marshall explained:
It requires no very critical examination of the human mind
to enable us to determine, that one great inducement to these
[charitable] gifts is the conviction felt by the giver, that the
disposition he makes of them is immutable. It is probable, that
no man ever was, and that no man ever will be, the founder of
a college . . . believing, that it is immediately to be deemed a
public institution, whose funds are to be governed and applied,
not by the will of the donor, but by the will of the legislature.333
Following Dartmouth College, numerous courts have held that the legislature
cannot interfere with charitable trusts either by changing the method of control
or administration of such trusts or by providing that the trust property shall be
devoted to purposes other than those designated by the donors.334 Some decisions
are based on the states’ inability to impair contracts made between charitable
donors and their donees.335 Other decisions are based on the doctrine of separation

and Beyond, supra note 18, at 700. Deference is accorded to the intent of charitable donors under
the doctrine because of a deeply rooted tradition of respecting an individual’s right to control
the use and disposition of his or her property and a concern that failing to honor the wishes of
charitable donors would chill future charitable donations. Id. According deference to donor intent
also facilitates a diversity of projects and programs within the nonproﬁt sector as well as social and
ideological pluralism within the larger liberal polity. Goodwin, supra note 265, at 7.
331

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).

332

See id.

333

Id. at 647. With respect to the changes the legislation would have made to the college’s
charter, Chief Justice Marshall noted:
This may be for the advantage of this college in particular, and may be for the
advantage of literature in general; but it is not according to the will of the donors,
and is subversive of that contract, on the faith of which their property was given.
Id. at 654.
334
See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 399.5. See also BOGERT ET AL., supra note 316,
§ 397 (“[A] legislature has no power to alter the purpose of a charitable trust by statute. It has not
succeeded to the prerogative cy pres power vested in the crown in England, even assuming that this
type of cy pres is recognized in the United States.”).
335

See, e.g., Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc’y v. Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022, 1026–27 (Haw. 1988)
(ruling that if legislation had the effect of granting the city the power to lease a portion of parkland

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss1/1

88

McLaughlin and Weeks: In Defense of Conservation Easements: A Response to the End of Pe

2009

IN DEFENSE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

89

of powers and the judiciary’s jurisdiction over the administration of charitable
trusts.336
The constitutionality of statutes that apply to all trusts and are calculated
to both increase the efﬁciency of trust administration and ensure that the public
held in a charitable trust in derogation of the express terms of the trust, “it would have been
beyond the legislature’s power and unconstitutional” because “[u]nder Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution of the United States, the states [are] forbidden to enact laws impairing the obligation
of contracts” and “it always seems to have been accepted that the limitation on the impairment of
contracts extended to the legislature of the Territory of Hawaii”); Salem v. Attorney General, 183
N.E.2d 859, 862 (Mass. 1962) (ﬁnding legislation authorizing the city to use as a site for a school
building a portion of land that had been conveyed to the city to be used forever as a public park
invalid because “acceptance of the grant by the city constituted a contract between the donor and
the donee that must be observed and enforced”); Adams v. Plunkett, 175 N.E. 60, 64–65 (Mass.
1931) (ﬁnding legislation providing a scheme for the management of a hospital different from that
established by the gift creating the hospital invalid because a completed gift for a public charity
duly accepted constitutes a contract between the donor and the donee, the sanctity of which is
under the protection of the U.S. Constitution, and neither state legislation nor a change to the
state’s Constitution can impair that contract); Reno v. Goldwater, 558 P.2d 532, 534 (Nev. 1976)
(determining legislation authorizing a city to sell park property to be inapplicable to land that had
been donated to the city for use as a public park and playground because “[w]hen the City accepted
the gift of land . . . a contract was created obligating the City to hold such property in trust for the
people of Reno to enjoy as a park and playground. That obligation could not later be impaired by
legislative enactment”); Goldstein v. Trustees of Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 544, 556 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1950) (ﬁnding legislation granting the Governor of the state of New York the power to
appoint three additional trustees of a charitable trust invalid because “[t]he Legislature is without
the power to alter the directions of a testator or divest vested rights”).
336
See, e.g., Hartford v. Larrabee Fund Assoc., 288 A.2d 71, 74 (Conn. 1971) (ﬁnding
legislation attempting to change the manner in which a charitable trust was administered invalid
under the separation of powers provision of Connecticut’s Constitution because “jurisdiction over
the administration of charitable trusts rests exclusively in the judicial department”); Opinion of
the Justices, 371 N.E.2d 1349, 1355 (Mass. 1978) (opining that legislation that would change
the trustees and possibly change the beneﬁciaries of a charitable trust established under the will of
Benjamin Franklin would be invalid under the separation of powers provision of Massachusetts’s
Constitution, and explaining “[a]lthough the Legislature does possess some authority to alter
charitable trusts, this authority is narrowly limited . . .‘[i]t is not within the power of the Legislature
to terminate a charitable trust, to change its administration on grounds of expediency, or to seek to
control its disposition under the doctrine of cy pres.’”); S.C. Dep’t of Mental Health v. McMaster,
642 S.E.2d 552, 566 (S.C. 2007) (holding that the court was the proper entity to authorize the sale
of property impressed with a charitable trust and explaining “[p]roperty subject to a charitable trust
may not be terminated or altered by the General Assembly, but rather, must be approved by the
court). Compare Trustees of New Castle Common v. Gordy, 93 A.2d. 509 (Del. 1952), in which
the court held that legislation authorizing the trustees of a charitable trust to sell real estate held in
the trust was valid because the “no sale” provision in the trust agreement was an administrative term;
the species of property in which the trust corpus could be invested was of secondary importance
to the purpose of the trust, which was to beneﬁt the inhabitants of the town; and the sale of the
land was not only consistent with the fundamental purpose of the trust but in all likelihood would
promote it. The court in 'ORDY was careful to note:

In this country . . . the powers of the Legislature over charitable trusts is not
co-extensive with the prerogative of the Crown. It is limited by principles of
American constitutional law. . . . For example, the Legislature may not exercise the
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will obtain the beneﬁts prescribed by the donors is not in question.337 Examples
include statutes setting forth the powers and duties of the attorney general with
regard to the supervision and enforcement of charities, statutes requiring charities
to ﬁle reports with the attorney general or a court, and statutes granting the
judicial power of cy pres and describing the method of its exercise.338 In addition,
a statute intended to increase the efﬁciency of the administration of a category of
charitable trusts, but that respects the judiciary’s role and the expressed intentions
of the donors, has also been determined to pass constitutional muster.339 The
legislation proposed with regard to conservation easements would, however,
go much further. It would alter the substance of the existing contracts between
easement donors and donees because most easement deeds expressly provide that
the easement is perpetual and can be terminated only in a judicial proceeding.
It would remove primary jurisdiction over the administration of a category of
charitable gifts from the courts. And it would largely disregard rather than respect
the expressed intentions of easement donors—to protect particular parcels of
land in perpetuity as speciﬁed in the easement deeds—by enabling a politicallyappointed state board to authorize the substantial modiﬁcation or termination

power of a Chancellor under the doctrine of cy pres and thus divert the corpus of the
trust to uses other than those speciﬁed. . . . Nor may it terminate a charitable trust
or change the methods of its administration.
Id. at 515.
337

See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 316, § 397.

338

Id.

339

See Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 55 (N.H. 1973) (opining that the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act (see supra note 178), which authorizes institutions to invest
endowment funds on a total return basis and permits the release of restrictions on the investment
and use of institutional funds with the donor’s consent, would not constitute an improper
encroachment upon the functions of the judicial branch). Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 133 A.2d
792, 795–96 (N.H. 1957) (opining that legislation that would permit trustees to use for the general
care of cemeteries surplus funds from charitable trusts created for the purpose of maintaining
speciﬁc cemetery lots would be unconstitutional as it “would be an exercise of what amounts to a
legislative power of cy pres with respect to all cemetery trusts having surplus income, without regard
to established principles of law . . . or the terms of the trusts. . .”). See also UPMIFA, supra note
178, § 6(d) (permitting institutions to apply cy pres to institutional funds without court approval in
carefully limited circumstances and with safeguards to ensure ﬁdelity to donor intent). The Reporter
for the UPMIFA drafting committee explains that the act permits institutions to exercise the cy pres
power without court approval only with respect to “small, old funds” (i.e., where signiﬁcant time
has passed since the donation and the cost of a court proceeding would exceed the value of the
fund), and only after notiﬁcation to the attorney general who can intervene if necessary to protect
the intent of the donors. See Susan N. Gary, #HARITIES %NDOWMENTS AND $ONOR )NTENT 4HE 5NIFORM
0RUDENT -ANAGEMENT OF )NSTITUTIONAL &UNDS !CT 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1329–31 (2007) (noting that
UPMIFA “emphasizes the importance of donor intent”). See also John M. Gradwohl & William
H. Lyons, #ONSTITUTIONAL AND /THER )SSUES IN THE !PPLICATION OF THE .EBRASKA 5NIFORM 4RUST #ODE TO
0REEXISTING 4RUSTS, 82 NEB. L. REV. 312 (2003) (discussing constitutional limits on the retroactive
application of certain provisions of the Uniform Trust Code).
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of easements whenever it deemed such actions to be “in the public interest.”340
Accordingly, the constitutionality of such legislation would be suspect.341
State legislation authorizing the substantial modiﬁcation or termination of
conservation easements when a politically-appointed state board deems it to be in
the public interest would also be inconsistent with the provisions of federal law
authorizing tax beneﬁts for the donation of perpetual conservation easements.
As previously noted, at the time of the donation of a tax-deductible conservation
easement the possibility that the easement will be defeated by the performance of
some act or the happening of some event must be so remote as to be negligible.342
In addition, the conservation purpose of a tax-deductible conservation easement
must be “protected in perpetuity,” such an easement must be transferable by its
holder only to another government entity or charitable organization that agrees to
continue to enforce the easement, and such an easement must be extinguishable
by its holder only in what essentially is a judicial cy pres proceeding.343 Accordingly,
the proposed legislation would radically alter the expectations of Congress and
the Treasury Department with regard to the administration and termination of
tax-deductible conservation easements. Such legislation could also render future
easement donations in the adopting state ineligible for federal tax incentives,
which, in turn, could signiﬁcantly reduce the number of easement donations in
the state.344
It has been argued that Congress should simply amend federal tax law to
authorize tax beneﬁts for the donation of conservation easements that are
terminable through the proposed state administrative process.345 But Congress
would surely hesitate to make such a change. State boards are likely to give greater

340

Legislation employing a “public interest” standard would not ensure the ﬁdelity to donor
intent that has heretofore been considered necessary for a statute to pass constitutional muster. See
supra note 339. Although the legislative proposal in ! 0RACTITIONERS 6IEW includes donor intent as
one of a myriad of factors that the state board would consider in assessing a proposed amendment or
termination, the overriding consideration would be whether the change is “in the public’s interest.”
3EE ! 0RACTITIONERS 6IEW, supra note 328, at 19–22.
341

3EE ALSO +APIOLANI 0ARK, 751 P.2d at 1027–28 (providing that legislation that would have
the effect of granting a city the power to lease a portion of parkland held in a charitable trust in
derogation of the express terms of the trust would also “violate[] the basic principles of equity” and,
“in effect, defraud the donors”).
342

See supra note 306 and accompanying text.

343

See supra notes 302–304, and accompanying text.

344

In a state adopting the proposed legislation, the possibility that a conservation easement
would be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of some event might not be
so remote as to be negligible. In addition, it is not readily apparent how a conservation easement in
such a state could be drafted to comply with the “protected in perpetuity,” “restriction on transfer,”
“extinguishment,” and other federal tax law requirements.
345

3EE ! 6IEW &ROM THE &IELD, supra note 328, at 23 n.53.
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weight to state and local interests (including economic interests) than to national
conservation interests when considering proposals to modify or terminate
easements.346 Moreover, the legislative history to the federal tax incentives indicates
that Congress intended to subsidize the acquisition of conservation easements
only if they protect “unique or otherwise signiﬁcant land areas or structures” in
perpetuity,347 and Congress anticipated that the need to substantially modify
or terminate such easements due to changed conditions would be rare.348 In
other words, Congress did not intend to subsidize the acquisition of fungible
conservation easements. Congress also was and remains concerned about abuse,349
and changing federal tax law to permit the acquisition of fungible conservation
easements would heighten those concerns.350 Indeed, lobbying for a change in
federal tax law to authorize tax beneﬁts for the donation of conservation easements
that are terminable through the proposed state administrative process could have
unintended consequences; for example, it might lead to more extensive federal

346

One has only to read about the controversies surrounding the designation of National
Monuments to understand that state and local economic interests are often perceived to be at
odds with national conservation interests. See, e.g., Robert B. Keiter, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE
184 (2003) (noting that President Clinton’s use of his executive power under the Antiquities
Act to establish the 1.7 million-acre Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in southern
Utah provoked angry responses from the state’s Republican political leaders, as well as its rural
communities where both the president and his secretary of the interior were hung in efﬁgy on the
day of the announcement).
347

See S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 603 (1980).

348

In deciding to not address the possible future extinguishment of tax-deductible easements in
the Internal Revenue Code, Congress was apparently inﬂuenced by testimony from representatives
of the land trust community. Those representatives maintained that, because of their well-planned
easement acquisition programs, few conservation easements were likely to cease to accomplish the
conservation purposes for which they were acquired and such an “unlikely” occurrence would be
better addressed in the Treasury regulations. 3EE -INOR 4AX "ILLS (EARINGS "EFORE THE 3UBCOMM ON
3ELECT 2EVENUE -EASURES OF THE (OUSE #OMM ON 7AYS AND -EANS, 96th Cong. 245 (1980) (statement
of Samuel W. Morris, President, French and Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust, Inc.); id. at 248
(statement of William Sellers, Director, Brandywine Conservancy).
349
See generally, e.g., S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 603 (1980) (noting Congressional concern
about abuse and measures incorporated into Internal Revenue Code § 170(h) to curb abuse); 2005
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 159 (recommending reforms to curb abuses in
the conservation easement donation context); Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, /PTIONS
TO )MPROVE 4AX #OMPLIANCE AND 2EFORM 4AX %XPENDITURES at 277–87 (JCS-2-05), Jan. 27, 2005,
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) (same).
350
See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS! 4ROUBLED !DOLESCENCE, 26 J.
LAND, RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 47, 52–55 (2006) (describing reports of abuse and recommendations
for reform); JEFF PIDOT, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, REINVENTING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION AND IDEAS FOR REFORM (2005) (on ﬁle with authors and available from the
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy) (same).
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involvement in the donation, administration, and termination of tax-deductible
conservation easements, or a narrowing in the type of conservation easements
donations eligible for federal tax incentives.351
In addition, even if the proposed state legislation were determined to be
constitutional and Congress could be convinced to change federal tax law
to subsidize the acquisition of fungible conservation easements (i) if applied
retroactively, such legislation would likely be viewed as a betrayal of past
easement donors, and (ii) if applied prospectively, such legislation would likely
signiﬁcantly decrease future conservation easement donations. Many landowners
donate conservation easements because they wish to ensure that their land will
be protected from development and other harmful uses “in perpetuity”—or for
as long as such protection continues to be possible or practicable, as is permitted
under existing law. Accordingly, the prospect that a politically-appointed state
board could authorize the substantial modiﬁcation or termination of easements
when it deemed such actions to be “in the public interest” would likely anger past
easement donors and chill future donations. It could also drive landowners and
their legal advisors away from the use of conservation easements and force them
to try to utilize other vehicles (perhaps irrevocable trusts or reciprocal covenants)
to more permanently protect the conservation and historic values of the subject
land.
Finally, the legislative proposals also appear to be driven in part by a concern
that the doctrine of cy pres is too constraining, permitting, as it does, the termination
or substantial modiﬁcation of conservation easements only if it can be shown that
the charitable purpose of the easement has become impossible or impracticable.352
There appears to be some fear that projects of great importance to the public (such
as the construction of highways or electric transmission towers and lines) could
be precluded or hindered by the existence of conservation easements and the
protection afforded to them by the doctrine of cy pres. That fear is unfounded. In
circumstances where it is determined that the best place to locate a public works
project is on land that has been protected by a conservation easement because it
has signiﬁcant conservation or historic values, the public can simply condemn
the easement. None of the conservation easement-enabling statutes precludes
condemnation, and half of the statutes expressly provide that easements are
subject to condemnation.353 The real danger is not that conservation easements
will endure in the face of more important public needs. Rather, the danger is that,

351
Lobbying for legislative changes at the state level could also have unintended consequences.
The legislation a state might ultimately enact could be contrary to the interests of land trusts and
the use of conservation easements as a land protection tool.
352

3EE GENERALLY ! 0RACTITIONERS 6IEW, supra note 328.

353

3EE #ONDEMNING #ONSERVATION %ASEMENTS, supra note 61, at 1929.
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absent even minimal statutory or judicial safeguards, easement-encumbered land
will become the path of least resistance for condemning authorities.354
As the foregoing indicates, there are signiﬁcant problems with attempting
to fundamentally redeﬁne the nature of a perpetual conservation easement
through state legislation and apply that new deﬁnition to either existing or future
conservation easements. Moreover, current law, if properly understood and applied
to conservation easements, would make the proposed legislation unnecessary.
Government entities and land trusts can achieve much of the ﬂexibility they desire
by simply (i) negotiating for the discretion to amend conservation easements
consistent with their stated purposes at the time of acquisition, as recommended
by the Land Trust Alliance, (ii) seeking judicial or legislative clariﬁcation of a
holder’s power to agree to such amendments when an easement deed is silent on
the issue, and (iii) acknowledging the need to obtain court approval pursuant
to the doctrine of cy pres to terminate easements (or modify them in manners
inconsistent with their stated purposes), as is contemplated under federal tax
law in any event.355 And in situations where government entities and land trusts
desire or anticipate the need for greater ﬂexibility, they should employ more easily
modiﬁable or terminable means of land protection.356 They should not, however,
acquire expressly perpetual conservation easements as charitable gifts and represent
that they have the obligation to carry out the donors’ intent in perpetuity,357 and
then later attempt to fundamentally change the rules of the game by legislative
ﬁat. They should also take care, with respect to future easements, not to kill the
goose that laid the golden egg with new legislative rules that compromise the
qualities donors prize most in conservation easements.

IV. CONCLUSION
Applying the equitable principles that govern the administration of charitable
trusts to donated conservation easements is consistent with both state law

354
See id.; SEE ALSO #ONDEMNING /PEN 3PACE -AKING 7AY FOR .ATIONAL )NTEREST %LECTRIC
4RANSMISSION #ORRIDORS /R .OT , 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 399 (2008) (discussing the delegation of federal
condemnation authority to public utilities to construct transmission facilities in National Interest
Electric Transmission Corridors and its potential impact on easement-encumbered land).
355

It may be desirable to seek more broad based legislation addressing the amendment and
termination of conservation easements. Such legislation could clarify the extent to which holders
of conservation easements have the implied power to agree to amendments that are consistent
with the easements’ stated purposes. Such legislation could also give content to the judicial cy pres
standard as it is applied in the conservation easement context. Codiﬁcation of the rules governing
amendments and terminations could be expected to increase compliance and accountability on the
part of holders and promote uniformity in easement administration.
356
Such means could include unrestricted fee acquisitions, management agreements, leases,
terminable easements, and land use regulation.
357
See supra Part II.B (describing the representations made by land trusts to easement donors,
funders, and the public regarding the perpetual nature of conservation easements).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss1/1

94

McLaughlin and Weeks: In Defense of Conservation Easements: A Response to the End of Pe

2009

IN DEFENSE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

95

governing the administration of charitable gifts made for speciﬁc purposes and
federal law authorizing landowners to claim charitable income, gift, and estate tax
deductions for the donation of conservation easements. It is also recommended by
the drafters of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, the Uniform Trust Code,
and the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, all of whom recognized
that conservation easements should be afforded more stringent protection than
privately held servitudes because of the public interest and investment in such
easements. Applying charitable trust principles to conservation easements also
cannot be said to be a new or unanticipated development, having been recognized
as part of the legal landscape for over a quarter of a century and asserted by
the land trust community to its beneﬁt in the past. Finally, the application of
such principles to conservation easements is also consistent with the legitimate
expectations of conservation easement donors, funders, and the general public,
none of whom anticipate that conservation easements will be fungible or liquid
assets in the hands of their government or nonproﬁt holders.
Charitable trust principles also do not unduly constrain the discretion of
the government and nonproﬁt holders to engage in the day-to-day management
of the easements they hold. Broad ﬂexibility to amend conservation easements
in manners consistent with their stated purposes can be and often is built into
conservation easement deeds in the form of an amendment provision. In addition,
even holders who have failed to negotiate for the inclusion of amendment provisions
in the easements they hold are not condemned forever to enforce a portfolio of
immutable documents. Rather, such holders may have certain implied powers
to agree to amendments that are consistent with an easement’s stated purposes.
And if the scope of a holder’s implied powers to agree to such amendments is
not sufﬁciently clear, the holder can seek judicial or legislative clariﬁcation of
the extent of its implied powers or court approval of such amendments in an
administrative deviation proceeding. It is only when a holder wishes to terminate
a conservation easement, or modify it in a manner contrary to its stated purpose
(as was attempted in the Myrtle Grove controversy), that court approval in a cy
pres proceeding would be required.
Government and nonproﬁt holders of conservation easements also need
the ﬂexibility to engage in the day-to-day management of the easements they
hold without fear of possible nuisance suits by neighboring landowners or other
members of the public. At the same time, as evidenced by (ICKS V $OWD, the
Myrtle Grove controversy, and the Wal-Mart controversy, there must be a means
by which grantees of conservation easements (whether government entities or
land trusts) can be held accountable for actions taken or not taken that are in
violation of their ﬁduciary obligations to both easement donors and the public.
Charitable trust principles are that means. The standing rules in the charitable
context are carefully calibrated to balance the competing needs of administrative
efﬁciency and organizational accountability. They grant standing to a select group
of persons best suited to represent the interests of the public, and they exclude all
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others so as to protect charities from harassment through litigation. In the end,
if understood by easement grantees and applied sensibly, consistently, and with
appropriate consideration for the context, charitable trust principles will provide
government and nonproﬁt holders with the ﬂexibility they need to accomplish
their public or charitable conservation missions and, at the same time, ensure that
such holders are accountable for actions taken or not taken that are in violation of
their ﬁduciary obligations.
As a ﬁnal note, if some believe that the public interest would be better served
if governmental and nonproﬁt holders could substantially modify or terminate
conservation easements “on their own” and as they may “see ﬁt,” the appropriate
approach is not to argue that charitable gifts of perpetual conservation easements
be specially excepted from the rules governing the administration of all other
charitable gifts made for speciﬁc purposes. Rather, holders that desire this
extraordinary level of discretion should negotiate for it up-front and in good faith
at the time they acquire conservation easements and memorialize that grant of
discretion in the easement deeds. And if these holders wish to continue to receive
the subsidy of the federal tax incentives, as they presumably do, they will have
to convince Congress to change federal law so that landowners can receive tax
beneﬁts for the donation of conservation easements that are fungible or liquid
assets. Congress, of course, may not be willing to subsidize the acquisition of such
easements, and landowners may not be willing to donate them.
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